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Thesis Abstract 
!  
 
 
This thesis re-evaluates the emergence of the neoconservative critique of American 
post-war liberalism from 1945 to 1980. Its original contribution to the scholarship on 
neoconservatism lies in the claim that a particular understanding of Jewishness 
fundamentally shaped the neoconservatives’ right turn, as well as neoconservative 
ideology. Few scholars have recognised the primacy of Jewish identity politics in the 
evolutionary history of neoconservatism. Those who have, have done so inadequately 
and unmethodically. Therefore, my thesis systematically analyses the Jewish dimension 
of early neoconservatism by placing particular focus on its two principal mouthpieces, 
Commentary and The Public Interest, while drawing on autobiographical writings, 
personal papers and oral interviews.  
Reconsidering neoconservatism from this angle also contributes to a re-
evaluation of modern Jewish political history by debunking the myth that the American 
Jewish community is governed by consensus based on political identification with 
liberalism. My thesis shows that neoconservatism not only contributed to the rise of 
conservatism and the fall of liberalism on a national level, but also played an important 
role in post-1945 Jewish intra-communal contentions about which political affiliation 
best expresses modern Jewish American identity. Accordingly, it demonstrates that 
Jewish political culture is more diverse than is usually appreciated and that 
neoconservatives draw on a tradition of Jewish conservatism, which has so far received 
little attention from scholars of modern Jewish history. 
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Introduction 
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In 1988, the traditionalist conservative Russell Kirk predicted that, “within a very few years 
we will hear no more of the Neoconservatives”.1 A couple of years later, the self-professed 
“godfather” of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, seemed to agree. Kristol claimed that 
neoconservatism had been but “a generational phenomenon”, which had been “absorbed 
into a larger, more comprehensive conservatism” by the mid-1990s.2 Similarly, in March 
1996, one year after he had stepped down as editor-in-chief of the “neocon bible” 
Commentary, Norman Podhoretz, “the mandarin general” of neoconservatism, wrote, 
“neoconservatism is dead…it no longer exists as a distinctive phenomenon”. Yet he also 
warned the liberal “enemies” of neoconservatism that this was not cause for celebration, 
since the legacy neoconservatives had left behind would “continue to plague them for a 
very long time to come”.3 
With the World Trade Center bombings of September 2001 and the subsequent war 
on terror, neoconservatism found a new lease on life.4 In the years following 9/11 the term 
                                                
1 Russell Kirk, “The Neoconservatives: An Endangered Species”, Heritage Lecture 178 (Washington, D.C.: 
The Heritage Foundation, 1988, http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/HL178.cfm (accessed 
August 30, 2009). 
2 Irving Kristol, “Neoconservatism: An Idea Whose Time is Now”, Esquire, February 13, 1979, 23-42; Irving 
Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 40. 
3 Max Boot, “What the Heck Is a ‘Neocon’?” Wall Street Journal, December 30, 2002, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002840 (accessed June 18, 2009); Sidney 
Blumenthal, The Rise of Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New York: 
Union Square Press, 2008), 121; Norman Podhoretz, “Neoconservatism: A Eulogy”, Commentary, March 
1996, 19. 
4 Until September 11, 2001, neoconservatives were junior players in the Bush administration. John 
Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Why America is Different (London: Penguin, 2005), 
200. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay show that the neoconservative influence on the Bush 
administration’s policies has been greatly overstated. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign 
Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History 
of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
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experienced a revival as pundits rushed to characterise as neoconservative the Bush 
administration and the group of thinkers who allegedly provided Bush with the rationale for 
regime change and pre-emptive military action. There was talk of a revolution in U.S. 
foreign policy, supposedly instigated by a cadre of policy intellectuals, who had emerged 
from conservative think tanks such as the Hudson Institute, the now defunct Project for a 
New American Century (PNAC), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and also the 
world of magazines, such as Commentary, The Public Interest (PI), and The Weekly 
Standard to manipulate the president into implementing their ideas for ‘remaking the 
world’.5 Prominent neoconservatives within the Bush administration included Paul 
Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle and Elliot Abrams. If one believes most 
commentators as well as neoconservatives themselves, they were highly successful in their 
effort to “whisper in the ears of the powerful”.6 
While Wolfowitz, Feith, Perle, Abrams and others were correctly identified as 
neoconservatives, the usage of the term itself often bordered on the anachronistic with a 
tendency towards exaggerating neoconservatives’ power by neoconservatives and critics 
alike. The terminology was not only applied to define its legitimate legatees, but in many 
cases extended to include George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza 
Rice, and Colin Powell - all of whom neither accepted the label nor objectively qualified 
for it. Moreover, neoconservatism was often described in terms implying a hard-line Zionist 
                                                
5 Joshua Micah Marshall, “Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives”, Foreign Affairs, 
November-December 2003, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-
the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives (accessed November 9, 2009). 
6 Shadia B. Drury, “Saving America: Leo Strauss and the Neoconservatives”, Evatt Foundation, September 
10, 2003, http://evatt.labor.net.au/publications/papers/112.html (accessed June 17, 2009). 
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conspiracy out to subvert American interests in the name of Likkudnik, Greater-Israel 
ideology.7  
Neoconservatives certainly hold a partial responsibility for the failures of the 
disastrous Iraq adventure – and yet recent coverage often misrepresented them, announcing 
once again, the death of neoconservatism, as the Bush administration was preparing to 
leave office. This recurring need to eulogise neoconservatism is itself an interesting 
phenomenon, which not only testifies to the emotionality and divisiveness that surrounds 
discussions of neoconservatism, but also highlights its continued relevance to contemporary 
American political discourse. Yet the recent debates have shown that our current 
understanding of neoconservatism is marked by misrepresentations and misconceptions, 
which this thesis seeks to correct. Moreover, a reconsideration of its evolutionary history 
demonstrates that even though contemporary neoconservatism may appear divorced from 
its original intent and has undergone a number of changes since its inception, in essence 
and style it still remains very much the same. Ruth Wisse describes its development as a 
process by which, over a period of forty years, “certain things were coming into the 
foreground and others receding into the background”.8  
A historical re-evaluation of neoconservatism’s genesis, of its original ideas and the 
main factors actuating it, will therefore be the aim of this thesis. While taking into 
consideration a number of variables, which led to the emergence of neoconservatism, this 
thesis primarily seeks to determine the extent to which a particular perception of Jewish 
identity and interests informed the birth of neoconservative ideas. Even though 
neoconservatism was and is not an exclusively Jewish rationale, its main early proponents 
                                                
7 Stephen J. Sniegoski, The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and 
the National Interest of Israel (Norfolk, Va.: IHS Press, 2008). 
8 Ruth Wisse, interview with author, Cambridge, Ma., April 11, 2008. 
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were all Jewish. Moreover, it was indeed the gradual reclaiming of their Jewish identity, 
defined in ethnic terms that fundamentally shaped the political right turn of these 
intellectuals - a fact few scholars have recognised. Reconstructing the history of 
neoconservatism from this perspective allows for an improved appreciation of 
contemporary events and demonstrates that neoconservative ideas emerged at a much 
earlier time than is generally understood. Moreover, it complicates the evolutionary history 
of neoconservatism, qualifies traditional interpretations of modern American Jewish 
political culture and revises the role played by disenchanted Jewish liberals in the formation 
of modern American conservatism during the 1970s and 1980s.  
At the present time, the term ‘neoconservatism’ is generally used as pejorative, 
referring to an ideological tendency within conservatism, which promotes an ‘imperial’ 
foreign policy and a hyper-nationalist approach to American power. Yet, upon closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that neoconservatism evades simple characterisation. Most 
neoconservatives speak of an intellectual orientation or political tendency, infused with 
internal differences, constituted of a few core members and many vague sympathisers. 
Podhoretz described neoconservatism as “a movement…fed by various strands”, while 
Kristol referred to it as a “persuasion” whose adherents were anti-communist liberals 
“mugged by reality”.9 Midge Decter defined a neoconservative as “a special kind of 
conservative, one who has arrived at conservatism from the left, and whose politics are far 
more in the head than in the local precinct or even national political party”.10 Timothy Noah 
characterised a neoconservative as a liberal “who has been seduced by the notion that 
                                                
9 Norman Podhoretz, Lecture at “Neo-Conservatism” conference, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, September 3-6, 
1981, Transcript, 1, Box 4, Interviews and Speeches January to November 1982, Norman Podhoretz Papers, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., cited hereafter as NPP.; Kristol, Neoconservatism, ix. 
10 Midge Decter, “A Neocon Memoir”, American Jewish History 87, no. 2/3 (June-September 1999): 183. 
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America is in steep decline and must reassert itself as a moral and military force in an 
otherwise corrupt world”.11 While all of these definitions capture one or another aspect of 
neoconservatism, none grasp it in its entirety, reflecting the elusiveness and the 
polymorphous nature of the matter. 
Most original neoconservatives were radicals in their youths, many of them children 
of eastern European immigrants, and belonged to the New York intellectuals, a loose circle 
of self-professed public thinkers. Having felt alienated from American mainstream as well 
as from Jewish culture, a number of them began a simultaneous reconsideration of their 
American and Jewish heritage through the prism of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust after the war.12 In the process of reasserting these identities, they reinterpreted 
not only the American tradition of liberalism, but also Jewish political culture in narrow 
and highly defensive terms. As adherents to the liberal Cold War consensus from the late 
1940s onwards, future neoconservatives began to argue that a perverted liberalism had 
taken over mainstream politics by the middle of the 1960s, one which was anti-middle-
class, anti-American and anti-Jewish in nature. Hence they began to develop a rationale 
with which the perceived destructive tendencies of the new liberalism could be thwarted. 
By 1980 neoconservatives were an integral part of Reagan’s New Right and embraced a 
jingoistic patriotism and Jewish ethnocentrism.  
                                                
11 Timothy Noah, “Fathers and Sons”, The New York Times, January 13, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/books/review/Noah-t.html (accessed November 12, 2009). 
12 For the history of the New York intellectuals see: Alan M. Wald, The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and 
Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left From the 1930s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987); Alexander Bloom, Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals And Their World (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); William Phillips, A Partisan View: Five Decades of the Literary Life 
(New York: Stein and Day, 1983); William Barrett, The Truants: Adventures Among the Intellectuals (New 
York: Doubleday, 1982); Terry A. Cooney, The Rise of The New York Intellectuals: ‘Partisan Review’ and Its 
Circle, 1934-1945 (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986); Ruth R. Wisse, “The New York 
(Jewish) Intellectuals”, Commentary, November 1987, 28-38; Irving Howe, “The New York Intellectuals: A 
Chronicle and a Critique”, Commentary, October 1986, 29-51; Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope: An 
Intellectual Autobiography (San Diego: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982); Neil Jumonville, ed., The New 
York Intellectuals Reader (New York: Routledge, 2007).  
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 This re-evaluation focuses on the years 1945 to 1980. Beginning their journey into 
mainstream American society and the intellectual establishment after the Second World 
War, neoconservatives had by 1980 instituted themselves as conservative critics of 
liberalism and risen into positions of political power within and outside the Reagan 
administration. Throughout these years, neoconservative thought did not develop in a linear 
manner, but rather as a bundle of ad-hoc, often fragmented, contradictory and highly 
individualistic responses to events and developments, as they were unfolding on the 
communal, national and international stage. This is demonstrated by a systematic 
evaluation of both Commentary, founded under the auspices of the American Jewish 
Committee (AJC), and, as of 1965, PI, a brainchild of Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell.  
While future neoconservatives also published in Encounter, The New Leader, 
American Scholar, Harper’s Magazine, The New York Post, and The Washington Post, this 
thesis places a particular focus on Commentary and PI as the two principal mouthpieces of 
early neoconservatism. The contiguous analysis of both Commentary and PI discredits 
those interpretations of neoconservatism that assess it almost exclusively either from a 
foreign policy standpoint, such as John Ehrman’s The Rise of Neoconservatism, or from a 
domestic policy perspective, such as Peter Steinfels’s The Neoconservatives.13 These 
approaches disregard the fact that the domestic and international spheres were intricately 
interconnected in early neoconservatism and part of a comprehensive critique of modern 
American liberalism. Finally, this thesis also draws on under-used autobiographical 
writings, personal papers and oral interviews.  
                                                
13 John Ehrmann, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994 (New Haven, 
Ct.: Yale University Press, 1995); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing 
America’s Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); see also: Garry Dorrien, Imperial Designs: 
Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004); Stefan Halper and Jonathan 
Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
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The main proponents of early neoconservatism were Norman Podhoretz, Irving 
Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook, Milton Himmelfarb, Midge Decter and 
Getrude Himmelfarb. Some of the younger and/or less central neoconservatives whose 
voices nevertheless played a minor part in re-evaluating neoconservatism’s rise are Lucy 
Dawidowicz, Ruth Wisse, Joshua Muravchik, Irwin Stelzer, William Kristol, Neal 
Kozodoy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, James Q. Wilson, Ben J. Wattenberg, David Brooks, 
and Michael Novak, to name but a few. While others contributed to the emergence of 
neoconservatism, the above-mentioned actors constituted the core group of thinkers who 
developed the ideas that gave rise to the neoconservative rationale. 
Neoconservatism has received little comprehensive and serious treatment. Much of 
the literature consists of essays, newspaper articles, and essay collections. Moreover, many 
studies are driven by political agendas, either condemning or defending neoconservatism. 
No one enjoys discussing neoconservatism more than neoconservatives and their 
supporters. These publications are highly stylised canticles, such as Kristol’s 
Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea or Norman Podhoretz’s numerous 
autobiographical polemics, which interpret the rise of neoconservatism as an unavoidable 
and heroic development, according to which neoconservatives remained true to ‘real’ 
liberalism in response to the rise of the New Left.14 They generally disregard the 
                                                
14 Kristol, Neoconservatism; Irving Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America (New York: Harper & Row, 
1972); Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983); Thomas L. Jeffers, ed., The Norman Podhoretz Reader: A Selection of His Writings from the 
1950s through the 1990s (New York: Free Press, 2004); Christopher DeMuth and William Kristol, eds., The 
Neoconservative Imagination: Essays in Honor of Irving Kristol (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1995); 
Midge Decter, The Liberated Woman and Other Americans (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 
1971); Midge Decter, Liberal Parents, Radical Children (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1975); 
Irwin Stelzer, ed. Neoconservatism (London: Atlantic Books, 2004); Norman Podhoretz, Making It (New 
York: Random House, 1967); Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1979); Norman Podhoretz, Ex-Friends: Falling Out with Allen Ginsberg, Lionel and Diana Trilling, 
Lillian Hellman, Hannah Arendt and Norman Mailer (New York: Free Press, 1999); Norman Podhoretz, My 
Love Affair with America: A Cautionary Tale of a Cheerful Conservative (New York: Free Press, 2000); 
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polymorphous nature of neoconservatism and the extent to which early neoconservatism 
was very much in tune with the emerging New Right. As examples of political biography, 
these testimonials are valuable primary sources, which allow scholars to infer a sense of the 
polemical atmosphere that surrounded neoconservatism’s emergence. However, they also 
were “written for the benefit of posterity”, and as such “overlaid with intentions that are 
inconsistent with strict regard for historical truth”.15 It is therefore essential to not to 
approach them at face value. 
A similar problem exists with those narratives, which try to politically discredit 
neoconservatism.16 Leftist critics, such as Lewis Coser and Irving Howe, accused 
neoconservatives to be “liberals who got cold feet”, whose gratitude to a system, which 
enabled their social climb, turned into “a self-satisfied conservatism”.17 Bernard Avishai, 
writing for Commentary’s leftist nemesis Dissent, cast Jewish neoconservatives as traitors, 
having turned into spokespeople of the Jewish establishment and replaced the Jewish 
commitment to social justice with Jewish jingoism.18 According to conservative Paul 
Gottfried, neoconservatism was too worldly, too issue-oriented and too little informed by 
“permanent principles” of human nature, which organise society in terms of an ascriptive 
                                                
Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New York: Doubleday, 2007); 
Norman Podhoretz, Why Are Jews Liberals? (New York: Doubleday, 2009); see also: Mark Gerson, The 
Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (New York: Madison Books, 1997); Mark 
Gerson, ed., The Essential Neoconservative Reader (Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1996); Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign Policy 
(London: Social Affairs Unit, 2005); Douglas Murray, Neoconservatism: Why We Need It (London: Social 
Affairs Unit, 2005). 
15 John Tosh and Sean Lang, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods, and New Directions in the Study of 
Modern History (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2006), 63-65, 119-122. 
16 Gore Vidal, “The Empire Lovers Strike Back”, The Nation, March 22, 1986, 350-353; Halper and Clarke, 
America Alone; Patrick J. Buchanan, Where the Right Went Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the 
Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 2005); Paul 
Gottfried, “What’s In A Name? The Curious Case of ‘Neoconservative’”, VDARE.com, 
http://www.vdare.com/gottfried/neoconservative.htm (accessed August 11, 2009). 
17 Lewis Coser and Irving Howe, eds., The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left (New York: The New 
American Library, 1977), 4-5. 
18 Bernard Avishai, “Breaking Faith: Commentary and the American Jews”, Dissent, Spring 1981, 236-256. 
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social hierarchy in accordance with the belief in a superior force as the mainspring of all 
things. Critics, both on the left and on the right, contended that neoconservatives were so 
concerned with the interest of Israel, that it seemed as if, in the words of Kirk, “some 
eminent Neoconservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States”.19 
Moreover, Kirk believed that neoconservatives were busy “pursuing a fanciful democratic 
globalism rather than the national interest of the United States”.20 While these approaches 
offer an insight into the hard-fought ideological battles between the left and the right, as 
well as within the right itself, they are extremely reductive and distortive and do not allow 
for systematic insight into a subject. 
The Jewish dimension of early neoconservatism is central to Murray Friedman’s 
The Neoconservative Revolution and Jacob Heilbrunn’s They Knew They Were Right.21 
While these studies concede that Jewish identity politics was central for the emergence of 
neoconservatism, they overlook the central role played by early Holocaust consciousness 
during the 1950s and early 1960s amongst future neoconservatives. The Holocaust and its 
memory is conspicuously absent from Friedman’s narrative. Friedman’s explanation that it 
was a heightened awareness of “totalitarianism and massive human suffering” as well as 
“an unabashed proclivity for intellectualism” which gave neoconservatism a specifically 
Jewish note, does not in itself explain the emergence of Jewish neoconservatism. As a 
matter of fact, one comes away from Friedman’s study not really knowing what the Jewish 
dimension of neoconservatism is.22  
                                                
19 Kirk, “The Neoconservatives” (accessed August 30, 2009); Sniegoski, The Transparent Cabal. 
20 Kirk, “The Neoconservatives” (accessed August 30, 2009). 
21 Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jacob Heilbrunn, The Knew They Were Right: The Rise of 
the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 
22 Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution, 8. 
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The same holds true for Heilbrunn who claims at the outset that the emergence of 
neoconservatism was “shaped by the Jewish immigrant experience, by the Holocaust, and 
by the twentieth century struggle against totalitarianism”, but never investigates the subject 
in any meaningful and comprehensive way.23 Both studies discuss the issue in dissociation 
from the larger Jewish intra-communal debates about the meaning of Jewish identity in a 
post-Holocaust world, which were crucial in defining the Jewish character of early 
neoconservative thought. Furthermore, neither Friedman nor Heilbrunn take into 
consideration the impact the civil rights movement had on the Jewish self-perception of 
future neoconservatives and their anti-progressive reaction to it. Finally, both studies 
strongly base themselves on secondary sources and fail to draw sufficiently on the wealth 
of primary sources to make their case. 
Additionally, the Jewish dimension of neoconservatism is reduced often to a 
hawkish support for Israel. According to Robert Wright “Critics murmur that 
neoconservatism ‘is all about Israel’”.24 This thesis will show that while the defence of 
Israel and the emergence of a hard-line pro-Zionist stance played an important role in the 
intellectual genesis of neoconservatism, it was not initially a central driving force in its 
emergence. While Israel’s security and its strategic importance to the U.S. are central 
tenets, neoconservatism is primarily concerned with the state of American power and 
democracy. Neoconservatism, in the words of Podhoretz, “would have been better named 
neonationalism than neoconservatism”, since its main impulse was “a reaffirmation of the 
                                                
23 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, 10. 
24 Robert Wright, “The Neocon Paradox”, The New York Times, April 24, 2007, 
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/opinion/24wright.html (accessed November 13, 2009). 
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liberal democratic virtues” of the American system and “of the culture of the West in 
general”.25 
 Chapter 1 locates the emergence of Jewish neoconservatism within the context of 
American Jewish political history of the twentieth century, which, since the late 1920s, has 
been defined by a strong attachment to liberalism and the Democratic Party. As Jews 
became fully integrated into American society after 1945, a new set of anxieties with 
respect to Jewish life emerged, which according to future neoconservatives were no longer 
to be remedied by liberalism but by a more conservative approach to politics. Chapters 2 
and 3 show how this anti-progressive outlook began to develop during the 1950s and early 
1960s with respect to issues of anti-communism and the budding civil rights movement. By 
the early 1960s, those who would a decade later become known as neoconservatives began 
to argue in the pages of Commentary that defending the civil liberties of communists and a 
strong attachment to civil rights were no longer compatible with the Jewish interest and that 
those Jews who promoted these issues were undermining Jewish group cohesiveness. 
Chapter 4 introduces the other primary mouthpiece of early neoconservatism, PI. The 
journal was founded with the proclaimed intent to focus on non-ideological social policy 
analysis. Yet, as the chapter shows, PI was an ideological undertaking from the beginning 
and very quickly turned into a proponent of a value-driven conservatism, which believed 
that governmental interventionism in the social realm created more problems than it solved. 
Together with Commentary, PI mounted a full-blown attack against interventionist 
liberalism and 1960s radicalism, and a defence of traditional cultural and social values. 
Chapter 5 deals with the burgeoning alliance between neoconservatism and the New Right. 
                                                
25 Podhoretz, Lecture at “Neo-Conservatism” conference, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, September 3-6, 1981, 
Transcript, 6, NPP. 
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While neoconservatives had been closer to traditional conservatism throughout the later 
1960s and early 1970s than is generally assessed, the alliance remained complicated. By the 
1980s, however, they came to embrace the New Right candidate Ronald Reagan and, with 
him, the neoconservatives moved into the realms of political power. 
This thesis argues that the right turn of a number of Jewish intellectuals is seminally 
informed by their rediscovery of their Jewish identity in the aftermath of the Second World 
War and the Holocaust, as well as by a renewed appreciation of the American status quo. 
This approach demonstrates that the emergence of neoconservatism was intricately shaped 
by Jewish intra-communal debates relative to the lessons of the Holocaust, anti-
communism, civil rights and liberal politics generally. Informed by an existential angst and 
an intertwining of neoconservatives’ insider status with an outsider memory, early 
neoconservatives began to develop a particularistic interpretation of Jewish identity, 
informed by ideas of Jewish group survivalism and an excessive pro-Americanism. This 
mindset translated for example into an embrace of unqualified hard anti-communism and a 
rejection of pro-active racial integrationist measures, such as such as busing and affirmative 
action. Arguments made with respect to these issues show that neoconservatives 
rationalised their distancing from progressive liberalism in the name of perceived Jewish 
interests and that the emergence of neoconservative thought was intricately connected to 
Jewish intra-communal debates about the essence of Jewish identity in a post-Holocaust 
world.26 
At the centre of neoconservative evolutionary history lay the idea that American 
society was undergoing a crisis in values and authority, brought about by the perceived 
                                                
26 Kirsten Fermaglich, American Dreams and Nazi Nightmares: Early Holocaust Consciousness and Liberal 
America, 1957-1965 (Waltham, Ma.: Brandeis University Press, 2006).  
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excesses of progressive liberalism, which not only undermined America’s original liberal-
democratic tradition, but also directly affected Jewish group interests and survival. 
Podhoretz intricately connected the neoconservative defence of the American status quo “at 
a time when America has been under moral and ideological attack” from liberal and radical 
forces to the defence of “the Jewish people and the Jewish state”. To him there was “no 
conflict or contradiction involved in defending this dual heritage by which I have been 
formed”.27 By the late 1960s, neoconservatives believed that “new threats to Jewish 
security” were no longer coming from the right, as in the past, but from the left.28 Part of 
the neoconservative agenda was therefore a concerted effort to convince American Jews, 
who continued to vote Democratic and identify with liberalism in great numbers, that their 
security was no longer tied to forces of liberalism but rather to forces of conservatism.29 
The investigation of the Jewish dimension of neoconservatism, therefore, partially 
revises the traditional narrative according to which American Jews are congenitally 
predisposed to be politically liberal. Indeed public opinion polls have repeatedly shown that 
American Jews consider political liberalism to be the essence of American Jewish identity. 
The idea that Jews are ‘by nature’ liberal has become so ingrained in popular Jewish 
American culture that many American Jews have come to consider that “the contents of 
liberal American and Jewish culture…as almost identical”.30 Revisionist scholars, however, 
claim that conservatism is actually more emblematic of traditional Jewish thought than 
liberalism. Jonathan Sarna, for example, has shown that there are ample, but under-
                                                
27 Norman Podhoretz, “Editing Commentary: A Valedictory”, Commentary, June 1995, 19-20. 
28 Norman Podhoretz, Interview for the William E. Wiener Oral History Library, December 2, 1980, 
Transcript, 33, Dorot Jewish Division, New York Public Library, cited hereafter as Wiener Oral History 
Library. 
29 Wisse, April 11, 2008. 
30 Steven M. Cohen, The Dimensions of American Jewish Liberalism (New York: American Jewish 
Committee, 1989), 33; Sylvia Barack Fishman, Jewish Life and American Culture (Albany, N.Y.: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), 179. 
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discussed, precedents within American history of Jews who embraced a politics defined by 
ideas of a limited federal government on the one hand and by an emphasis on social 
stability and moral authorities on the other.31  
While neoconservatives never argued explicitly from within a tradition of Jewish 
political conservatism, they nevertheless denied the idea of an ‘organic’ connection 
between liberalism and Jews. By revising this axiom, they contributed to creating patterns 
of political identification according to which Jewish conservatism was no longer “a 
contradiction in terms”.32 Neoconservatives rejected what they regarded as the “moral 
solipsism” of Jewish liberal politics, according to which Jews had felt uncomfortable 
throughout their history with the acquisition and exercise of political power and tended, 
both as a collective and as individuals, to pay greater attention to their own moral 
performance rather than to the necessities of survival.33 While this thesis agrees with 
revisionist historians that Jewish neoconservatives were not an aberration within broader 
Jewish American political culture, it also shows that this culture has always been more 
diverse and dynamic than either traditional or revisionist interpretations allow for. This 
thesis demonstrates that while there are indeed precepts within Jewish religious and cultural 
tradition from which rationalisations for political liberalism flow, the same holds true with 
regard to political conservatism. 
Lastly, this thesis reconsiders the role played by formerly leftist Jewish intellectuals 
in the rise of modern American conservatism. While some, such as Stefan Halper and 
Jonathan Clarke’s America Alone, consider neoconservatism as “little more than an 
                                                
31 Jonathan D. Sarna, “American Jewish Political Conservatism in Historical Perspective”, American Jewish 
History 87, no. 2/3 (June- September 1999): 113-122. 
32 Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution, 8. 
33 Ruth R. Wisse, Jews and Power (New York: Schocken Books, 2007). 
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aberration” within American conservatism and broader American political culture, most 
analyses either describe the emergence of neoconservatism in isolation from the rise of the 
New Right or suggest, as for example Friedman, an excessive influence of neoconservatism 
within the modern American conservative movement.34 While Peter Steinfels’ The 
Neoconservatives and Garry Dorrien’s The Neoconservative Mind, for example, render a 
telling account of the alleged cultural crisis, which early neoconservatives diagnosed, both 
focus heavily on the intellectual warfare of budding neoconservatives against the liberal 
establishment. Steinfels described this conflict within the liberal intelligentsia in terms of 
an updated version of the battles between the Stalinists and the anti-Stalinists of the 1930s 
and 1940s, an interpretation, which reduces neoconservatism’s emergence to a personal 
feud amongst policy intellectuals and avoids discussion of the ways in which 
neoconservative ideas were in tune with and fed into the rise of modern American 
conservatism.35  
This thesis demonstrates that neoconservatives, together with New Right 
intellectuals, contributed in important ways to redefining the idiom of populism, which had 
historically been a language of reform or radical movements, into a language of the right. 
This populism of the right was not intent on promoting social change but on stalling and 
reversing it. Indeed, neoconservatism was not an aberration within the wider context of the 
conservative movement or within American intellectual history, but fit in with a tradition of 
anti-statist and anti-progressive intellectuals and contributed to the rise of the New Right by 
connecting their fight against liberalism to popular ideas, such as republican virtue, 
                                                
34 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 7; Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution, especially Chapter 8. 
35 Steinfels, The Neoconservatives; Garry Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War 
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individualism and equality of rights. According to Christopher Lasch, neoconservatives’ 
main contribution to the New Right was to redefine successfully the enemy of the 
American people as the liberal establishment rather than Big Business.36  
Considering neoconservatism as an integral part of the rise of modern American 
conservatism shows that it was not a force running counter to the emerging “silent 
majority”, as often maintained by traditional interpretations of neoconservatism or 
neoconservatives themselves. Moreover, Jewish neoconservatives, with their backgrounds 
in the Jewish working-class milieu contributed to the creation of a conservative populist 
identity, which appealed to working-class and middle-class white ethnics and constituted a 
conservative alternative to leftist identity politics. Thereby they contributed to the creation 
of a conservative ideology, which not only appealed to Jewish concerns, but also opened 
the conservative movement to white ethnics and ultimately prepared the way for the rise of 
so-called multicultural conservatives.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 
512. 
37 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Roots Too: White Ethnic Revival in Post-Civil Rights America (Cambridge, Ma.: 
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Chapter 1 
‘Unparalleled Opportunities’: 
From Anxious Subculture 
Into the Mainstream, 
1932 - 1945 
!  
 
Introduction 
 
In 1936, Fortune magazine observed in a report on contemporary American Jewish life: 
“Misgivings and uneasiness have colored the thinking of American Jews”. Moreover, it 
noted, “the apprehensiveness of American Jews has become one of the important influences 
in the social life of our time”. The article continued to show that, contrary to widespread 
anti-Semitic stereotypes, Jews were not omnipotent. Simultaneously, the report denigrated 
the excessive concern over anti-Semitism, calling on Jewish leaders to abandon their 
“provocative...defense measures”.38  
The 1930s and early 1940s were indeed a period of mixed messages for American 
Jews, which translated into widespread insecurity in relation to their position in American 
society. American Jews, mainly children of eastern European immigrants who that had left 
the Old World around the turn of the 19th century, were moving up the socio-economic 
ladder and beginning to enjoy the comforts of middle-class life in large numbers. By the 
1930s, the majority of American Jews were “supremely modern, urban, educated and 
secularised” – a condition that would intensify over the next two decades.39 Paralleling this 
development were efforts to exclude Jews from certain elite universities and colleges, as 
                                                
38 Archibald McLeish, “Jews in America,” Fortune, February 1936. Published as monograph Jews in America 
(New York: Random House, 1936), 71, 141. 
39 Stephen J. Whitfield, American Space, Jewish Time: Essays in Modern Culture and Politics (Hamden, Ct.: 
Archon Books, 1988), 100. 
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well as residential areas, certain business sectors, and social clubs.40 Furthermore, anti-
Jewish sentiment was an integral part of public discourse at the time and increased as U.S. 
entrance into the Second World War became more likely. Anti-interventionists, such as 
Charles Lindbergh, capitalised on anti-Semitism in order to keep the country out of war. 
Consequently, Americans Jews tended to segregate themselves even further - a trend, which 
resulted in the emergence of what historian Jonathan Sarna has referred to as an “anxious 
subculture”.41  
Nevertheless, integration continued to be the highest priority on the agenda of most 
Jewish leaders and organisations. The question dominating Jewish discourse during the 
inter-war years was just what integration should look like. Aware of the need and driven by 
the desire to fit in with mainstream society, Jewish leaders sought to develop diverse 
strategies with which American Jews could find full inclusion in American society, while 
simultaneously retaining a distinctly Jewish identity. While a great majority of Jewish 
leaders sought integration either by accommodation to the dominant patterns of gentile 
society or by cultural transformation, it has to be noted that there was no single ideological 
position that characterised a “normative” Jewish stance.42 Indeed, in his work on American 
Jewish political culture Arthur Goren demonstrated that “Organizational diversity, 
ideological ambiguity, and even contentiousness appear to be endemic to the communal 
experience of American Jewry” at any given time.43  
                                                
40 There was, for example, a sharp rise in newspaper advertisements during the 1930s, which specifically 
cautioned Jews not to apply, especially for large corporations and chain stores. Jews were also systematically 
denied teaching positions in colleges and universities. Gerald Sorin, Tradition Transformed: The Jewish 
Experience in America (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 183.  
41 Jonathan D. Sarna, American Judaism: A History (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 2004), 208. 
42 Charles S. Liebman, “American Jews: Still a Distinctive Group”, Commentary, August 1977, 57. 
43 Arthur A. Goren, The Politics and Public Culture of American Jews (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University 
Press, 1999), 29. 
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It was primarily the alliance with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Democratic Party, which 
began to move large numbers of Jews into the centre of American society during the 1930s. 
Until the early twentieth century American Jewish voting behaviour had been characterised 
by a diversity of political positions and it was only with the advent of the New Deal 
coalition that Jews affiliated themselves with the Democratic Party and political liberalism 
in large numbers. Accordingly, a majority of Jewish leaders set out to renegotiate Jewish 
American identity within the liberal paradigm during the 1930s and 1940s.44 
The inclusive spirit of Rooseveltian liberalism rallied Jewish leaders behind the effort 
to merge Jewish religious and cultural traditions with American values and political 
liberalism into a unified entity.45 Many Jewish leaders came to promote the idea that 
American and Jewish values were congruent and that both cultures were based on the 
values of equality, the rule of law and individual rights. In accordance with this 
interpretation, Jewish commitment to liberal causes did not run counter to particularly 
Jewish values and interests but reinforced it.46 The Jewish identification with liberal ideas 
and politics was seen as a way to embrace universalism, which contributed to bringing 
America closer to its egalitarian ideals and making it more inclusive for Jews and other 
minorities, while simultaneously offering a vehicle for expressing a particular Jewish 
identity through affiliation with liberalism.47 This rationale, which ignored conflicts and 
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contradictions between the two cultures, would eventually be questioned by a number of 
Jewish intellectuals, first and foremost by neoconservatives.  
Before taking a closer look at the emergence of neoconservatism and the extent to 
which neoconservatives came to dominate certain agendas within intra-communal Jewish 
debates, it is essential to explain how large numbers of Jews developed a strong attachment 
to liberalism. The period of the 1930s and early 1940s was marked by intense bigotry and 
some of the most concerted efforts of exclusion in the American Jewish history. At the 
same time, a number of developments and events – first and foremost the success of 
Rooseveltian liberalism and the experience of the Second World War - gave way to a 
process of increased inclusion into mainstream American society. This chapter therefore 
investigates the extent to which large numbers of American Jews connected their hopes for 
the future with liberal political culture and how, in the process of which, they renegotiated 
modern Jewish American identity.  
Equating Jewishness with being politically liberal is an important master narrative of 
American Jewish history, which is recounted by historians, community leaders and 
laypeople alike. The belief that liberalism “has been bred into the bone of American 
Jewry,” as Murray Friedman described it, is so widely held that it has become part of the 
popular mythology of American Jewry.48 According to this interpretation, Jewishness is not 
exclusively measured by synagogue attendance and other formal religious and cultural 
expressions, but also, and sometimes solely, in terms of affiliation with liberal politics. 
Within this context, many American Jews came to understand their affinity for liberalism as 
part and parcel of their American Jewish identity. Studies of voting behaviour during the 
                                                
Free Press, 1960), 614-626; Steven M. Cohen and Charles S. Liebman, “American Jewish Liberalism: 
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last half century document that American Jews indeed have been and continue to be 
overwhelmingly and consistently in support of liberal causes and Democratic candidates, 
even long after a great majority of American Jews have ascended to a socio-economic 
status normally associated with a conservative/Republican predilection.49 
According to the narrative of Jewish liberalism, Jewish conservatism is a 
contradiction in terms. Yet, Jewish neoconservatives, who made Jewish concerns central to 
their shift from political left to right, complicate the idea that being Jewish translates into 
being politically liberal. Furthermore, it demonstrates that by drawing on traditional tenets 
of Diaspora conservatism, conservative Jews are not an aberration from modern Jewish 
history but an integral part of it. A number of scholars, such as David Dalin, Jerold 
Auerbach and Jonathan Sarna, have in recent years echoed the constitutional lawyer, 
community leader and lifelong Republican Louis Marshall, who claimed that “the Jew is 
not by disposition a radical. He is essentially conservative, wedded to the ideals of his 
forefathers”.50 These scholars have tried to debunk the myth according to which the Jewish 
Diaspora experience has been dominated by political liberalism. While they do not deny the 
fact that there is a strong tradition of Jewish liberalism in the U.S., they demonstrate that 
there has always been a significant conservative Jewish tradition, rooted in Jewish religious 
law, political philosophy and historical experience.51 
                                                
49 After the presidential election in 1968, Milton Himmelfarb commented on the fact that Hubert Humphrey 
received Jewish votes equal to those of blacks and chicanos, that “Jews are like Episcopalians in income, but 
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While Jewish neoconservatives are often considered an aberration within the larger 
context of American Jewish political culture, Jonathan Sarna suggested that Jewish 
conservatism in the U.S, while by no means widespread, was certainly more prevalent than 
generally imagined. This conservatism based itself on central tenets regulating Jewish 
political behaviour in pre-emancipatory times, which, in the prophet Jeremiah’s Letter to 
the Exiles, called on Jews to “seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be 
carried away captives, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof shall ye have 
peace”.52 This and similarly religious tenets were over centuries worked into a political 
philosophy, which considered a gentile government of laws, even if it was oppressive, 
superior to social chaos and anarchy.53 This also points to another principle of Jewish 
political thought, namely that of “royal alliance,” according to which Jewish experience in 
the Diaspora has taught that Jewish safety always depended on political and social stability 
and consequently on the authorities who exercised legitimate power.54 A combination of 
religious tenets, political philosophy and historical experience therefore generally 
reinforced conservative, pro-authority behaviour amongst Diaspora Jewry.  
This chapter contextualises the emergence of the Jewish neoconservative critique of 
the liberalism many Jews grew so attached to within a framework of the larger forces that 
shaped the American Jewish experience in the second half of the twentieth century. It will 
assess the extent to which a number of national, as well as international developments from 
1932 to 1945 reshaped American Jewish life and evaluate how these changes set the stage 
for the rise of neoconservatism amongst a small but leading group of Jewish intellectuals in 
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the 1960s and 1970s. While Jewish neoconservatives were partially successful in moving 
the focus of intra-communal debates towards the right, it has to be acknowledged that they 
are a minority amongst American Jews, who in large numbers continue to identify as liberal 
up to the present day. In order to comprehend fully the driving forces behind this shift in 
Jewish political culture and make sense of the conservative turn of intellectuals such as 
Sidney Hook, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, and 
Gertude Himmelfarb, it is important to take a closer look at a series of decisive events and 
changes, which introduced what Norman Podhoretz referred to as the “Golden Age of 
Jewish Security”.55 
 
‘Still a Distinctive Race’: American Jewry in the 1930s 
 
Jews occupied a complex and ambivalent position within the racialised atmosphere, which 
characterised American society during the 1930s and 1940s. Like other ‘white ethnics’, 
such as Italians and Irish, they were generally considered as a racial group distinct from the 
‘white’ category. Anti-Semitic stereotypes, such as those of the overly influential and 
powerful Jews reigned supreme in American discourse and were translated into 
marginalising Jews in specific areas. Their ‘racial’ status, for example, excluded Jews from 
the WASP-dominated elite institutions and organisations; housing patterns, induced by 
housing covenants, in major urban centres like New York revealed a high degree of 
segregation between Jews and non-Jews. This exclusion, in turn, created a sense of unease 
and self-segregation on behalf of American Jews while simultaneously diminishing ethnic 
and religious differences amongst them, as for instance those between Jews of German and 
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Eastern European heritage. Many accepted the idea that they belonged to a ‘race apart’ - 
some with pride, others in resignation - and even tried to turn it into a positive attribute. 
Others, reacted with care to efforts to racialise Jewish identity; some even denied Jewish 
difference altogether, racial or other.56 
Therefore, while Jewish identity became more homogenised during the 1930s, 
American Jewish communal life was also characterised by divisive debates between 
leading heads, on whether Jews should consider themselves as belonging to a race, a nation, 
a cultural group, an ethnic group or a religious denomination. How should Jewishness be 
defined in such an environment and how could Jews harmonise the demands of being 
Jewish and being American? Many Jewish leaders countered exclusionary tendencies by 
developing a rhetoric, which justified and/or legitimised racial difference and sought a 
middle ground between the perceived racial distinctiveness of Jews and white Americans.57  
Comprehensive documentations of Jewish contributions to America and Western 
civilisation, which represented the alleged Jewish distinctiveness as a positive force in 
society, were part of an effort to develop ways with which the racial categorisation could be 
positively embraced. Magazines, such as The American Hebrew and the Jewish Tribune, 
regularly published articles about Jewish cultural, political, scientific and athletic 
achievements. Books such as Mac Davis’ They All Are Jews: From Moses to Einstein 
sought to illustrate Jewish accomplishments in various fields, interpreting them as the very 
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fruit of distinctiveness. Many contended, however, that Jewish difference had to be defined 
in psychological rather than in purely biological terms.58 
Other voices warned of overusing the racial label with respect to Jewish identity. The 
journalist Walter Lippman, for example, criticised the tendency towards self-segregation 
and expressed concern that the racial label might easily be turned against Jews. Labour 
activist Bertha Wallerstein called on Jews to fight for acceptance “as human beings without 
making a whole romance of the race”.59 Since the general American discourse of the time 
stressed nativist conceptions of Americaness and often singled out Jews for allegedly 
interfering with the stability of this perceived homogeneous construct, a number of public 
Jewish figures urged Jews not to be too conspicuous about Jewish distinctiveness.60  
Whether the concept of Jewish ‘racial’ difference was accepted or rejected often 
depended on the social status, national heritage and/or ideological positions of respective 
actors. The idea that Jews were in some way racially distinct resonated especially positively 
with descendants of eastern European Jewish immigrants who had begun moving into the 
organisational structures of the Jewish community and taking up leadership positions since 
the 1920s. As opposed to Jews of central and western European descent, many eastern 
European Jews understood Jewish identity primarily in terms of a ‘people religion’ - a 
concept, which fit well into the racialised discourse of the time. While many American 
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Jewish leaders had previously often followed a policy of denying Jewish racial, or even 
cultural identity, a new type of leadership was now increasingly claiming a group status 
that went beyond merely religious elements and was heavily based on ethnic and cultural 
features and principles.61 Many spokespeople for a cultural or national definition of Jewish 
identity were Zionists - labour, cultural, or political Zionists - who promoted a racial or at 
least national understanding of Jewish identity. Louis Lipsky, head of the Zionist 
Organization of America (ZOA), as well as Maurice Samuel and Ludwig Lewisohn, all 
condemned what they saw as the assimilationist tendencies of American Jews and urged 
them to embrace positively their Semitic origins.62 
Many others, who viewed Jewish distinctiveness negatively, sought to escape it by 
embracing Marxist ideology and politics, which held the utopian promise of creating a 
social order in which ethnic and religious particularism would be irrelevant. In many ways 
substituting Judaism and Jewishness with Marxism and socialism in politics and 
modernism in culture, these radicals broke with what they perceived as the confining 
ethnocentric world of their parents, while at the same time articulating their alienation from 
American mainstream culture and society. Refusing to differentiate between people on the 
basis of nationality, ethnicity or race, they stressed a universalist ideology as a means with 
which to deal with the issue of Jewish difference and anti-Semitism.63  
This approach also characterised a group of anti-Stalinist leftist thinkers and writers 
that became known as the New York intellectuals, which assembled around leftist journals 
such as Partisan Review, The Nation, Menorah Journal and The New Republic. Even 
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though not all of the New York intellectuals were Jewish, most core members were. First 
generation New York intellectuals were for instance Philip Rahv, William Philips, Lionel 
and Diana Trilling, Meyer Shapiro, Clement Greenberg, Eliot E. Cohen, Sidney Hook, 
Alfred Kazin, and Lionel Abel. They felt estranged from Jewish as well as American 
mainstream culture and found a home in modernist cultural criticism, as well as political 
radicalism which offered a refuge form the perceived parochialism of established Jewish 
and American culture, as well as from anti-Semitic forces. Due to their politics and to the 
fact that they were largely excluded from the WASP-dominated intellectual establishment, 
they looked upon American society with suspicion. According to Norman Podhoretz, 
“They did not feel they belonged to America, or that America belonged to them”.64  
Like a number of early New York intellectuals, a younger generation, such as Irving 
Howe, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Gertrude 
Himmelfarb, and Midge Decter, would eventually rediscover their Jewish, as well as 
American heritage, and some of them would go on to become stern defenders of the 
national status quo after the Second World War. During the inter-war period, however, this 
self-conscious cadre of intellectuals existed on the margins of American and Jewish 
society. In his autobiography, A Margin of Hope, Irving Howe expressed the ambivalence 
many New York intellectuals felt with respect to their Jewish heritage, leading them “to 
subordinate our sense of Jewishness to cosmopolitan culture and socialist politics”. 
Accordingly, “We did not think well or deeply on the matter of Jewishness – you might say 
we avoided thinking about it.” However, as opposed to what they wrote and discussed, 
there was also “what we felt, and what we felt was rarely quite in accord with what we 
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wrote or thought”. With respect to everyday life, “the fact of Jewishness figured much more 
strongly than we acknowledged in public”.65  
It was at City College of New York (CCNY), the “poor man’s Harvard”, that many of 
them became involved with Marxism. CCNY was tuition-free and admitted students who 
were otherwise excluded from mainstream and elite colleges. It afforded many children of 
immigrants the opportunity to receive a college education and a ticket that would ultimately 
open doors into American mainstream society. Many of the students attending CCNY were 
of Jewish background, often burning with ambition and social resentment towards not only 
the WASP establishment, but also the more integrated, upper class ‘German Jews’.66 The 
only way out and up, they religiously believed, was education – much like Abraham 
Cahan’s protagonist in The Rise of David Lewinsky, who described CCNY as “the 
synagogue of my new life”. The college, he claimed, “appealed to me as a temple, as a 
House of Sanctity, as we call the ancient Temple of Jerusalem”.67 
At the same time, the outsider status that characterised them translated into an 
underlying sense of elitism and snobbery, which would inform much of the work of the 
New York intellectuals and of future neoconservatives. This tenor found expression, for 
example, in their anti-Stalinist leftism, which Howe compared to being a member of a 
sect.68 Interested in culture and the arts, they felt an air of superiority towards what they 
perceived as the vulgarity and pedestrian minds of their Stalinist co-students. According to 
Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol’s wife whom he first met at a meeting of the Young 
People’s Socialist League (YPSL), she joined the Trotskyites at school because “the 
                                                
65 Howe, A Margin of Hope, 251. 
66 It is estimated that about 80 to 90 per cent of the student population at CCNY as well as Hunter College 
were Jewish during the 1920s. 
67 Abraham Cahan, The Rise of David Lewinsky (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 117. 
68 Howe, A Marging of Hope, 36-60. 
 29 
Trotskyites were the smartest people around”.69 Furthermore, she claimed, “The Stalinists 
were not intellectually serious”.70 The theoretical discussions, central to Trotskyism, were 
what most appealed to her: “There was something Talmudic and playful about the whole 
thing, and that’s exactly the spirit in which I entered into it”.71 
The theoretical debates were also what drew Irving Kristol to Trotskyism. 
Trotskyites, according to Howe, discussed politics “with an aura of certainty, quickness in 
referring to Marxist texts, a pride in factional strife, a system of relationships resembling 
the internal arrangements of a sect”.72 According to Kristol’s son, William, founder and 
editor of the neoconservative publication The Weekly Standard, his father’s Marxism was 
never very serious, however, having always been “somewhat of a bourgeois”.73 Kristol 
himself wrote: “Trotskyist or no, radical socialist or no, I was a bourgeois to the core”.74  
A majority of American Jews tried to find a middle ground between extreme 
positions - defining the issue of ‘race’ in ways that were not too dissonant with American 
identity, while at the same time asserting a more pluralistic and tolerant vision of 
Americanism. Some of these efforts were vaguely influenced by the works of scholars such 
as Horace Kallen, Franz Boas, Julius Drachsler or Isaac Berkson, who all had aimed at 
developing new conceptions of group difference since the 1910s.75 Initially, their 
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arguments for an extension of pluralism among European immigrant groups were based, 
according to the dominant idiom of the time, on racial categories, which would shift to 
categories of culture and ethnicity in due course. Even though ideas of cultural and ethnic 
pluralism were not very influential before the Second World War, they eventually came to 
shape the basic conceptions of group life and offer the possibility of a more positive 
affirmation of Jewish identity in American society.76 
The notion that Jews were a cultural rather than a racial group became popular in 
Jewish intellectual circles associated with the Menorah Journal.77 One of its frequent 
contributors, Mordecai Kaplan, would go on to become a major advocate of the idea that 
being Jewish was more a cultural identity rather than a racial one. As the founder of the 
Reconstructions movement, Kaplan described Judaism as an evolving religious civilisation, 
encompassing not only religious beliefs but also “history, literature, language, social 
organisation, folk sanctions, standards of conduct, social and spiritual ideals, and aesthetic 
values”.78 Kaplan sought to adapt Jewish religion to fit into American society and held that 
both cultures were congruent, since both were basically democratic and Hebraic. 
However, since most Americans still resisted pluralist conceptions of society in the 
1930s and continued to understand Jewish distinctiveness as an obstacle to the maintenance 
of an allegedly homogenous white population, the decade was characterised more by 
uncertainty for American Jews with respect to their status in American society than by the 
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successful synthesis of Jewish and American identity. Moreover, even though the idea of 
Jews as a cultural group was popular with intellectuals during this period, it originally 
failed to convince the majority of ‘ordinary’ American Jews. According to Eric Goldstein, 
the question that preoccupied American Jews most during the 1930s was not so much 
“whether they were a distinct race” but rather “how strenuously to assert Jewish racial 
distinctiveness”.79 It can be assumed that this was especially so because no other concept 
that the race concept seemed potent enough to defend against anti-Semitic charges of the 
time. Only when the dominant society moved away from ideas of a distinctive Jewish race, 
did it become possible for Jews to do so as well. 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the ‘Jew Deal’ 
 
While a majority of American Jews continued to understand themselves as a minority 
group denied ‘equal footing’ throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, developments within 
the national and international arena began to set the course for the fundamental changes in 
social status American Jewry would undergo during the later 1940s and 1950s – changes 
which would eventually lead to the development of new alternatives for defining collective 
Jewish American identity. One driving force, which over time came to redefine the 
relationship between American Jews and American society and culture, was the rise of 
Rooseveltian liberalism. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to the office of president in 1932 on a platform, 
which transformed American liberalism from an ideology of limited government and free-
market economics to one, which was dominated by ideas of an interventionist and socially 
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conscious federal government. Freedom within this framework came to connote stronger 
federal protections for civil liberties and greater economic security for the largest amount of 
people. This redistributive approach to wealth would eventually enable greater numbers of 
previously marginalised Americans to enjoy the benefits of modern economic and social 
progress.80 Moreover, during Roosevelt’s presidency the political system of the U.S. 
underwent a significant realignment, which turned the Democratic Party into a grand 
coalition party of farmers, industrial workers, reform-minded urban middle class, liberal 
intellectuals, African Americans, ‘white ethnics’, and Southerners. 
According to Stephen Whitfield, the New Deal era was also the beginning of “the 
Jews’ modern political style”.81 American Jews were amongst the minority groups 
Roosevelt reached out to and many of them became enthusiastic supporters of his 
interventionist liberalism and by extension the Democratic Party.82 The fact that this 
alliance has lasted until this day has puzzled many contemporary commentators of Jewish 
political culture and is sometimes referred to as an anomaly, in light of the high levels of 
affluence enjoyed by large numbers of Jews.83 The affection many American Jews 
developed for Roosevelt led New York Judge and Republican Jonah Goldstein to claim that 
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American Jews have three worlds (Yidn hobn drei velten): Di Velt (this world), Yene Velt 
(the other world) and Roosevelt. Leading neoconservative Norman Podhoretz illustrated the 
deep admiration many Jews felt for FDR. Growing up in Brooklyn, New York, during the 
1930s, he remembered that Roosevelt’s “name in my own household was always spoken in 
a tone of hushed reverence and never without the title attached”.84 
Since FDR, Jews have consistently and in large numbers (on average 70 per cent) 
voted for Democratic candidates in national and to a somewhat lesser extent in regional and 
local elections. This lasting alliance has been explained in a number of ways. According to 
Stephen Whitfield, Jewish liberalism can only be understood by moving beyond material 
considerations and political convenience and taking into consideration the Jewish historical 
experience as well as the ethical dimension of politics. While vested interests played and 
continue to play an important role in Jewish political culture, issues of social justice and 
tolerance of difference also mark the Jewish approach to politics. Whitfield has shown that 
the historical record holds ample evidence that “Jews are more susceptible than other voters 
to a vision of human brotherhood, to ideologies and programs that can be packaged in 
ethical terms”.85 
Even though American Jews were on the whole somewhat less affected than other 
groups by the collapse of the international economic system, the depression era as well as 
Rooseveltian liberalism came to shape seminally their ideas about themselves and the U.S. 
because it marked the first time, that Jews as a group (and as individuals) were given a 
quantitatively and qualitatively significant part in American politics. Roosevelt’s inclusive 
policy towards American Jews was path breaking in leading Jews into mainstream 
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society.86 Beyond matters of material interest, Roosevelt’s liberalism also appealed to many 
Jews because of its social justice concerns and the greater tolerance for those previously 
excluded from mainstream American society. From Roosevelt onwards, to be “a good Jew” 
became equated for many with being “a liberal on political and social issues” and to be 
committed to “social equality”. According to a poll taken by the Los Angeles Times in 
1980, liberalism was for a great majority of American Jews “a major component of their 
understanding of what it mean to be a Jew”.87 
Not only did Roosevelt receive massive support from American Jews in the voting 
booth, but many of Roosevelt’s closest advisors were Jews, such as future Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, labour leader Sidney 
Hillman, advisor and speechwriter Judge Samuel Rosenman, his legislative craftsman 
Benjamin Cohen and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Some of the newly 
created agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Departments of 
Agriculture, Labor, and Interior employed Jews in leading positions. Hence it was during 
the New Deal era that many American Jews for the first time in their history received 
significant opportunities to work in the federal government.88 
However, this reaching out to Jews (and other minorities) by FDR was not always 
appreciated by mainstream American society. Indeed, the fact that Jews figured 
prominently in the Roosevelt administration led some anti-Semites to refer to the New Deal 
as the “Jew Deal”, an epithet that surfaced in 1936 and stuck. A pamphlet by Robert E. 
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Edmondson depicted Bernard Baruch, financier and presidential advisor, as the “unofficial 
president”, Felix Frankfurter as the “director of the New Deal”, and Louis Brandeis as the 
“father of the New Deal”, all of them members of what it alleged to be Roosevelt’s 
“supreme council”. Tales began to circulate that Roosevelt not only preferred appointing 
Jews to high positions, but also that he himself was a descendent of Dutch Jews by the 
name of Rosenvelt.89  
Roosevelt’s opponents claimed the close relationship between Roosevelt’s 
administration and ‘the Jews’ of endangering the integrity of the government and the 
nation. In this context, Jews were considered not only to be the root cause of America’s and 
the world’s economic and social problems, but also responsible for the enactment and 
failings of New Deal legislation. Irrational fears that Jews were about to take over the U.S. 
and that Roosevelt was selling his country out to them was expressed in a letter addressed 
to the president in 1934 that claimed, “the Jews are responsible for the continued 
depression, as they are determined to starve the Christians into submission and slavery”. 
Realisation of this plan was under way, the author claimed, because Roosevelt had “over 
two hundred Jews, they say, in executive offices in Washington, and Jew bankers run the 
government and [Bernard] Baruch is the real President”.90 
The economic deprivation and social dislocation introduced by the economic 
depression created the conditions in which anti-Semitism flourished. In a public opinion 
poll taken in 1938, about 50 per cent of respondents held some form of negative view of 
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Jews, and about 60 per cent agreed with the statement that Jews were by and large greedy, 
dishonest, and aggressive.91 Anti-New Dealers and anti-Semites, such as Charles Coughlin, 
William D. Pelley, Gerald L.K. Smith and Gerald B. Winrod contributed their share of fear 
mongering as they instrumentalised anti-Jewish sentiment in order to undermine popular 
confidence in the government and its policies. By charging Roosevelt to be a puppet of a 
cabal of Jewish communists as well as Jewish bankers, his opponents sought to discredit his 
politics. These opponents warned that Jews were subversive elements, who, in pursuing 
their own interests, were threatening the established order of the American polity.92 
Father Charles Coughlin, for example, was one of the more radical opponents of 
Roosevelt and did not, unlike many upper-class opponents of the administration, shy away 
from publicly espousing a virulent anti-Semitism. The Catholic radio priest was able to 
attract an audience of about 20 to 30 million listeners, blatantly blaming the economic 
suffering and social dislocation caused by the Great Depression on Jewish businessmen and 
bankers as well as Jewish Communists.93 Additionally, about 100 anti-Semitic 
organisations, such as the Silver Shirts and the German American Bund, were founded 
between 1933 and 1941 and, according to a Fortune survey, roughly half a million 
Americans at least occasionally attended anti-Semitic rallies or meetings during this 
period.94 Beyond rhetoric, which often declared open sympathy with the goals and methods 
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of Nazi Germany, these organisations inspired gangs of rabble-rousers, to terrorise Jewish 
institutions, such as synagogues and cemeteries, businesses and people. The journalist 
Charles E. Silberman recalled, “brown-shirted members of the German-American Bund 
used to sell their virulently anti-Semitic newspaper” when he was coming of age in New 
York during the 1930s. Moreover, “the synagogue my family attended was frequently 
defaced with swastikas and crosses; an elementary school classmate…had a swastika cut 
into his hand with a penknife. These developments, he declared, turned being Jewish into 
“a source of anxiety and discomfort”.95 
In addition to the antagonisms encountered at home, American Jews were unsure how 
to deal with the implications of the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany and the 
succinct establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship whose central enemy was world Jewry - 
das internationale Judentum. Initially, a majority of American Jews tended to respond to a 
heightened anti-Semitic climate in the U.S. and in Europe with intensified expression of 
‘racial’ pride. Others, however, driven by the fear that German-style anti-Jewish policies 
could take root in America, became increasingly concerned with the ultimate dangers 
implicit in pushing the racial definition of Jewishness too far. In response to these 
developments, many Jewish spokesmen started to call on American Jews to avoid any 
action that would intensify anti-Jewish sentiment.96 
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While FDR’s inclusive liberalism, New Deal rhetoric and programmes sought to 
unite Americans behind their political leader and set out to promote a more inclusive 
nationalism, the inter-war era also made it clear to American Jews that even though they 
were formally becoming more accepted into mainstream society, they still remained not 
quite as equal as everyone else. When times got bad, the conclusion went, Jews still 
functioned as scapegoats upon which the anger and fears of others could be projected. Anti-
Semitism in the U.S. had reached new heights during the 1930s and early 1940s. Yet, at the 
same time, it needs to be remembered that American anti-Semitism had to compete with a 
whole range of prejudices and was at no point part of the national policy agenda. Despite 
widespread antagonism towards Jews as a group, the large majority of them were well on 
their way into the centre of American society and continued to make economic, social and 
political headway. 
Even more instrumental than New Deal liberalism in the process of moving Jews into 
the American mainstream was the experience of the Second World War and the Holocaust. 
Despite the fact that America’s entrance into the war – which was almost unanimously 
supported by American Jews - was accompanied by a substantial amount of anti-Jewish 
rhetoric and sentiment, Roosevelt’s more inclusive nationalism would eventually take hold 
on the national psyche. In addition, the tendency towards greater inclusiveness was 
accelerated by the swift recovery of the American economy once the U.S. had entered the 
war.   
In order to promote ideas of diversity and unity at home, the Roosevelt administration 
launched a vigorous propaganda campaign that sought national openness by defining 
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American values, especially those of tolerance and equality, as the antithesis of Nazism. 
These policies, as well as the war experience itself, introduced widespread acceptance of 
the two ideological foundations on which the move towards greater inclusiveness of 
American Jews after the war would rest: the ideas of cultural (later ethnic) pluralism, as 
well as the construct of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition, which replaced a narrowly defined 
‘Christian’ Americanism with what Will Herberg referred to as the more inclusive 
“Protestant Catholic-Jew” model.  In these terms, cultural (and later ethnic and racial) 
intolerance as well as religious bigotry were officially declared to be “un-American”.97 
 
 
The Impact of the Second World War and the Destruction of European Jewry on American 
Jews 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, a majority of American Jews, perhaps for the 
first time in their history, came to believe that they had never come closer to full inclusion 
into the dominant society. This was especially the case in light of the near destruction of 
European Jewry. The relationship between their Jewish and American identities was, many 
Jews hoped, from now on to be one of symbiosis and no longer one of conflict and 
ambivalence.  
On the eve of the American entrance into the Second World War in December 1941, 
however, even though American public opinion was generally pro-British and anti-German, 
few Americans were willing to intervene, and even less for the sake of European Jewry. 
The overall tone that had characterised Americans’ relations with the world since the end of 
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the First World War had been one of disinterestedness and isolationism. In the late 1930s, 
isolationist organisations began to feed into this prevailing mood, often capitalising on anti-
Semitism, as tensions between the U.S. States and Germany grew. Some Americans began 
to voice their concern that America was on the verge of being drawn into the war by a cabal 
of influential Jews.  
Isolationists as well as pro-German forces used anti-Semitic rhetoric to discredit the 
administration’s efforts to pursue a more activist and pro-British foreign policy and to boost 
American military preparedness. A common theme that united both pro-German and 
isolationist propaganda was the idea that Roosevelt’s foreign policy was the work of 
influential Jews and was now being forced upon the nation against its will and against the 
national interest. In a speech given on September 16, 1941, entitled “Who Are the 
Agitators?”, the leader of the America First Committee, Charles Lindbergh, accused Jews, 
the British and the Roosevelt administration of war mongering against the will and the 
interest of the American people.98 He went on to state that the largest threat emanating from 
American Jews “lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our 
press, our radio and our Government”.99  
According to Leonard Dinnerstein, anti-Semitism in the U.S. reached its “high tide” 
as the possibility of war increased and continued unabated as the U.S. finally entered the 
war on December 8, 1941. The need for unity and closeness in the face of so formidable an 
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enemy as the Germans and the Japanese, further heightened popular intolerance towards 
“outsiders”.100 American Jews therefore felt even more dependent upon Roosevelt, while 
his administration tried to avoid being too closely associated with Jews and often asked 
Jewish advisors during the war years not to emphasise their ethnic and religious identity. 
Additionally, the administration sought to distance itself from what could be seen as 
specifically ‘Jewish causes’, especially when it was approached by proposals on how to 
deal with the Jewish plight under Nazi rule. 
The perceived need of the Roosevelt administration not to be too closely identified 
with what could be considered ‘Jewish interests’ was to a large extent directly influenced 
by the negative opinions of Jews that had been prevalent in public discourse throughout the 
New Deal era and before and after the U.S.’s entrance in the war. As demonstrated earlier, 
Jews were held responsible not only for the economic depression, but also for New Deal 
policies and now also for pushing the U.S. into war. In addition, Roosevelt’s primary war 
goal was to win the war as quickly as possible while retaining congressional support for the 
establishment of a United Nations organisation. Fear of losing popular consensus for his 
war- and post-war aims and upsetting the already fragile national sense of unity, led 
Roosevelt to embrace a rather passive approach towards the issue of rescuing European 
Jews.101  
Even though polling methods were still relatively underdeveloped, surveys of the 
time continually revealed a widespread antipathy towards Jews. One poll taken in 1940 
showed that nearly two-thirds of the respondents believed that Jews as a group had 
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“objectionable traits” and more than 50 per cent of Americans thought that German anti-
Semitism stemmed either partially or wholly from the actions and behaviour of German 
Jews themselves. When asked in 1944 which nationality, religious or racial group was 
perceived as posing the biggest threat to Americans, 24 four per cent of the respondents 
named Jews, 9 per cent the Japanese and 6 per cent the Germans. In a poll of 1945, 88 per 
cent of Americans claimed that they believed that Jews had too much power in the U.S. In 
addition, in the last two years of the war, Jewish leaders had to struggle with a public 
unwillingness to believe the reports of extermination camps that had been filtering out of 
Europe since August 1942.102 
It is highly likely that the continued diatribes of such people as Father Coughlin, 
Gerald Winrod and William Pelley further fuelled the persistence of widespread anti-
Jewish sentiment and consequently the reluctance of the government to help European 
Jewry. Even though the Roosevelt administration tried to avoid any direct association with 
Jewish interests, the urge for unity did force Roosevelt to take decisive action against 
individuals and groups, who were perceived to threaten the war effort by undermining 
national unity through racist rhetoric. Under the Espionage Act of 1917, many a 
hatemonger was forced to restrain his activities during wartime. Winrod and Pelley, for 
example, came under investigation by the FBI for sedition and undermining the war effort, 
and Pelley was sentenced to 15 years in prison.103 
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Given the magnitude of American anti-Semitism and nativism at the time, Jonathan 
Sarna claims that it is astonishing that U.S. did accept over 200,000 Jewish refugees, which 
is more than any other country took in.104 Pressure from non-Jewish and Jewish sources 
eventually led Roosevelt to set up the War Refugee Board (WRB) in January 1944 by 
Executive Order 9417, in order to coordinate efforts to rescue European Jews. While most 
of the funds for the WRB came from the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, any mention 
of Jewish involvement was avoided for political reasons. It is estimated that the WRB 
played an important role in saving about 200,000 Jews. However, the extent to which its 
actions contributed to the survival of the persecuted remains unquantifiable. The problem 
with the WRB, according to David Wyman, was that it was not set up too late, but also that 
government agencies did not provide the cooperation legally required by Executive Order 
9417.105 
Moreover, American Jewish leaders were divided on how to proceed with respect to 
the persecution of European Jews. According to historian Gerald Sorin, the Jewish 
community “was rent by various strategies and ideologies and kinds of religious 
persuasion, as well as duplication and competition”.106 Nevertheless, by 1943 every major 
American Jewish organisation, except for the AJC and the Jewish Labor Committee, had 
united under the umbrella organisation of the American Jewish Conference to coordinate 
political and rescue activities and work for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.  
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As a result of anti-bigotry and “call for unity “ campaigns by the government and 
Jewish organisations, as well as the experience of the war itself, the belief that anti-
Semitism was no longer compatible with Americanism started to register in the national 
psyche towards the end of the war. As the shock about the Holocaust set in, Americans 
realised that National Socialism had de-legitimised any public expressions of anti-Semitism 
and introduced a change in attitudes towards Jews. Anti-Semitism became no longer 
acceptable in the public realm. Pronouncements of anti-Semitism, which in the first half of 
the 1940s were more virulent than at any previous time in American history, were by 1950 
at an all-time low. Opinion polls of the time showed that anti-Semitism was receding from 
mainstream society and driven to the fringes. One year before the election of John F. 
Kennedy, for example, a poll revealed that more Americans claimed to be willing to vote 
for a Jewish president then for a Roman Catholic.107 Simultaneously, pressured by the 
government, American universities began to repeal quotas for Jewish students, big 
corporations opened more employment opportunities for Jews, and residential areas started 
to drop restrictions against potential Jewish buyers.108 
In this new climate, the traditional Jewish defensiveness was superseded by a more 
vigorous assertion of Jewish interests. The reluctance of Jews to draw particular attention to 
themselves, what Charles Silberman has called the era of shah [be quiet], came to an end.109 
In the post-war years, the national Jewish organisations heightened their campaigns of 
lobbying state and federal levels for anti-discriminatory legislation on behalf of minority 
groups, challenged discriminatory behaviour and legislation in court, and sponsored 
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community programmes with other groups to work against racially and ethnically 
motivated prejudice.110 
In doing so, these defence organisations, who now referred to themselves as 
community relations organisations - a shift in terminology which was in itself an expression 
of a new found confidence -, claimed that they were not only working on behalf of Jews but 
on behalf of all Americans. They propagated the idea that anti-Semitism and by extension 
all forms of racial, ethnic and religious prejudice were counterproductive to American 
democracy. As demonstrated by Stuart Svonkin, many American Jewish leaders used the 
intergroup relations movement in the 1940s and 1950s in order to reorganise itself in 
response to the seminal changes introduced by the Great Depression, the New Deal, the 
Second World War and the Holocaust. The fact, however, that they did not feel in a 
position to fight anti-Semitism for its own sake, but had to tie it to the struggle against other 
kinds of prejudice was a sign that the newfound confidence continued to be accompanied 
by a lingering sentiment of feeling “uneasy at home” in the immediate post-war years.111  
The extermination of European Jewry had major consequences for American Jewry, 
not least because it resulted in relocating the demographic, cultural and intellectual centre 
of world Jewry from Europe to the U.S.112 The feeling that Jewish life in America had to be 
reinvigorated in the aftermath of the Holocaust was widespread amongst American Jews. It 
was reflected, for instance, in the fact that synagogue membership jumped from about 20 
per cent in 1930 to just under 60 per cent by 1960. Part of a larger revival of 
institutionalised religion in the context of the emerging fight against “godless” 
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communism, belonging to a synagogue became a means through which to express the 
desire to be part of a Jewish collective and offered avenues to engage in patterns of Jewish 
identification through communal association and activities with other Jews.113  
Furthermore, the defeat of Nazism restored Jewish solidarity with America. This was, 
for example, the case for large numbers of Jewish soldiers who had fought in Europe. Over 
half a million Jews served in the U.S. armed forces during the war and for most of them it 
was a deeply transformative experience, characterised by an intense struggle both with their 
Jewish as well as American identities. Even though, as demonstrated by Deborah Dash 
Moore, Jewish servicemen and women were confronted with the same kind of prejudices in 
the military than Jews at home, many considered their participation in the war effort as an 
ethnic, religious as well as patriotic imperative. The war had merged the American and the 
Jewish fate in their eyes, as Nazi Germany posed an immense threat not only to world 
Jewry but also to the American way of life. Consequently, even as their experience 
empowered them as Jews, it also strengthened their identification with the democratic 
ideals of the American polity and made the belief that anti-Semitism was un-American 
more cogent than ever.114 
The war and the Holocaust also impacted critically on the New York intellectuals, 
who before the war had felt estranged from and ambivalent about their American as well as 
their Jewish identities. Many of them had considered the war against Nazi Germany and 
Japan as an imperialist war, preferring to maintain a “third camp” position that continued to 
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hold out hope for the establishment of a socialist democratic alternative in the U.S. after the 
war. This led to much infighting between those New York intellectuals who came to 
support the war effort on behalf of the Allies after the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939 and the 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and those, such as Clement Greenberg and Dwight 
McDonald, who rejected any meaningful distinction between Roosevelt and Stalin, 
Churchill and Hitler as the war progressed. Yet, a majority of them, apart from Melvin 
Lasky and Sidney Hook, refrained from publicly voicing a sense of special responsibility 
towards the fate of European Jewry during the war. When the Contemporary Jewish Record 
held a symposium in 1944 that wanted to investigate how anti-Semitism had affected 
Jewish writers in the U.S., none of them expressed any “sense of urgency” with respect to 
the situation of European Jewry. According to Steven Whitfield, there did not seem any 
“sense of obligation” on behalf of these writers and intellectuals “to incorporate the 
experience of persecution and mass murder in their depiction of human actuality”.115 
From the almost total absence of reference to what was happening to European Jews 
in the symposium, one was not able to grasp “how constant has been the pressure of the 
Holocaust, how forcefully it has exerted itself on the memory and imagination” of these 
intellectuals.116 Only by how they remembered their reaction to the Holocaust 
retrospectively and by their radical change in posture at war’s end, can we deduce the 
magnitude of impact it had on their self-perception. For many of them, as for others 
amongst the Jewish leadership, the cataclysmic events of the Second World War had 
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profound consequences and the near destruction of European Jewry became arguably “the 
touchstone of their identities as Jews”.117  
According to New York intellectual Diana Trilling, they were “deradicalized by the 
war because they had to find their Jewish identities once more in relation to the whole new 
aspect of Zionism; there had to be a home for the Jews who had been made homeless by 
Hitler”.118 The Holocaust, which according to Norman Podhoretz demonstrated once and 
for all “the inescapability of Jewishness”, forced them to reconsider their allegiances to 
both their Jewish as well as their American heritage and look for new ways in which to 
reconcile the two.119 Alfred Kazin, who in the 1930s had proclaimed the revolt against 
Jewish chauvinism, described the Holocaust as the all-consuming event in his life, the 
memory of which “will haunt me to my last breath”.120 Irving Howe referred to it as “the 
most terrible moment in human history” which drove him to engage in “timid 
reconsiderations of what it meant to be Jewish”.121  
For these intellectuals, the war had diminished the perceived conflict between their 
identities as Americans and as Jews. It was now of utmost importance not only to fight anti-
Semitism more decisively because it was no longer tolerable in light of the systematic 
slaughter of six million European Jews, but also to stimulate the development of a proud 
and lively Jewish community in the U.S. To these formerly alienated intellectuals, America 
now became central - not as a force of evil but as a force of good. With the beginning Cold 
War, many of these former Trotskyites would come to champion a hard-line 
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anticommunism and bourgeois nationalism that aimed not simply at containing Soviet 
communism but also at the promotion of American power and values worldwide.  
The central organ for this mission was to be Commentary, founded in 1945 under the 
auspices of the AJC, which wanted to refocus American Jews on their Jewish cultural and 
spiritual heritage, while simultaneously engaging in a process of harmonising Jewish and 
American values and culture.122 Eliot Cohen, the first editor of Commentary, wanted to 
create a vibrant Jewish life in the U.S., which would symbiotically coexist alongside a 
highly affirmative identification with American society and culture.123 “We have faith,” 
said Cohen, “that out of the opportunities of our experience here, there will evolve new 
patterns of living, new modes of thought, which will harmonise heritage and country into a 
true sense of at-home-ness in the modern world. Surely, we who have survived catastrophe, 
survive freedom too”.124 
As American mainstream society became ever more receptive to and inclusive of 
Jews over the next two decades, the long-standing struggle for the right to be different as 
well as the right to be equal would again be tested. By the late 1960s a number of Jewish 
leaders sounded alarm that freedom had actually taken a toll on Jewishness, that the great 
inclusiveness experienced by American Jewry during its ‘Golden Age’, had begun to 
macerate collective and individual Jewish identities. As Stephen Whitfield pointed out, the 
ancient danger of persecution that had characterised Jewish existence and self-
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understanding for centuries was in post-Second World War America replaced by the 
problem of Jewish identity and continuity, not because of persecution but because of the 
imminent lack thereof.125 
 Ultimately, it can be concluded that it was not until the Allied victory introduced a 
new period of optimism and social stability in the U.S., that American Jews ceased to 
function as the symbol of social anxiety in the eyes of gentiles that they had been in the 
1930s and the first half of the 1940s. After having experienced about four decades of 
uncertainty about their place in American society, Jews exalted at the possibility of 
integration offered by American society and many were now highly optimistic about an 
eventual unconditional entrance into mainstream society. However, it should also be kept in 
mind that even though Jews were now no longer considered as a distinctive, uncomfortable 
group and public talk of the “Jewish problem” receded, they were still expected to keep 
expressions of group difference to a level that was acceptable to dominant gentile society.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As remaining exclusionary efforts and anti-Semitism waned over the next two decades, 
Jews were confronted with the challenge of assimilating into broader society while at the 
same time maintaining an ethno-religious distinctiveness. Historian Michael Staub has 
observed that during the 1950s Jews continued to be “subjected to profoundly mixed 
messages about how to behave and who to be. Fitting in among gentiles was important, but 
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so too was loyalty to the Jewish family and community”.126 To a certain extent post-war 
Jewish identity seemed to be more uncertain and unstable than ever before. Intra-Jewish 
debates were dominated by questions such as: What does Jewishness and Judaism stand 
for? Should Jews identify with oppressed blacks or with the white majority? How should 
Jews position themselves on issues of social justice even as their socio-economic upward 
mobility increased? And finally, did the rising comfort and apparent security mean they had 
more to give or more to lose? Looming over all these debates was the lingering uncertainty 
as to whether anti-Semitism really was in permanent decline, as opinion polls seemed to 
suggest.  
Many American Jews sought to solve the dilemma surrounding post-war Jewish 
identity by strengthening their commitment to liberal politics and social justice issues, such 
as the struggle for black civil rights. Simultaneously, however, doubts that Jews were 
neglecting to address concerns and issues specific to their own community began to appear. 
It was often felt that the undifferentiated embrace of post-war liberalism, which had 
brought Jews into the fold of the white power structure, also contributed to the dissolution 
of Jewish collective identity and distinctiveness. Constructing Jewish identity in terms of 
being an integral part of the white hegemony, it was felt, left them with a less functional 
Jewish identity. In the words of Seth Foreman, the close association between Jews and 
political liberalism led to “a collective Jewish identity crisis in post-war America”, because 
“Jews were so preoccupied with other people’s problems that they neglected their own”.127 
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The emergence of what eventually came to be known as neoconservatism was 
directly related to the rising doubts within parts of the Jewish community about the idea 
that Jews were best served by the commitment to liberal politics. While it is generally 
assessed that the anti-progressive liberal critique of future neoconservatives was begun in 
the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967, evidence of an emerging anti-progressive agenda 
amongst those who turned neoconservative can be observed in their work from the 1950s 
onwards. Future neoconservatives, such as Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer, began to 
argue that a number of tendencies within liberalism warranted a serious reconsideration of 
the compatibility of Jewish interests with liberalism. They urged Jews to approach politics 
from a “Jewish perspective” and rid themselves of what they saw as self-destructive liberal 
altruisms. The time had come for Jews to look after their own interests, lest they run the 
risk of not surviving as a collective. 
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Chapter 2 
‘Exile and Homecoming’: 
Commentary and the Renegotiation of  
Jewish American Identity, 
1945-1959 
!  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were arrested in 1950, brought to trial in 1951 and 
eventually executed for conspiring to pass atomic secrets on to the Soviets in June 1953, 
Jewish leaders were alarmed by the potentially negative repercussions the case could have 
for Jews.128 Major Jewish defence agencies such as the American Defense League (ADL) 
and the AJC had been battling the “the Jew-as-communist-canard” since the First World 
War.129 With the onset of the Cold War, it seemed more vital than ever to dissociate Jews 
from communism in the public mind. According to historian Deborah Dash Moore, the 
Rosenberg case was crucially instrumental in making “opposition to communism a 
criterion” of whether one was part of the Jewish community or not.130 Even though many 
Jewish leaders remained ever watchful of the potential threat emanating from certain 
extreme forms of anti-communist activity for American Jews, a majority believed, 
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nevertheless, that liberal anti-communism could function as a vehicle for further 
integration.131  
As opposed to the ambivalence felt within leading Jewish organisations about how to 
approach the anti-communist consensus, Commentary was one Jewish voice that had little 
qualms about subscribing to and emphatically supporting hard anti-communism. In relation 
to the majority of the Jewish establishment, Commentary and its writers positioned 
themselves further to the right on the issue of anti-communism. Kristol, for instance, 
taunted the relatively moderate AJC for being far too lenient on communists and 
communist sympathisers and for not being able to “make what I would have regarded…as 
the necessary distinctions within American liberalism, of what was worthy of support and 
what was not”. He, therefore, believed that the AJC’s “exaggerated liberalism” dangerously 
interfered with protecting American democracy and Jewish security therein.132  
Commentary articles dealing with the Rosenberg case accused the couple and their 
supporters of abusing the legacy of the Holocaust. By implying anti-Semitic motifs on 
behalf of their accusers, the Rosenbergs, Commentary argued, were manipulating the 
Jewish heritage in order to divert from their ‘real’ identity as communists. Lucy 
Dawidowicz rejected appeals to rabbis and secular Jewish communal leaders on the 
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Rosenbergs' behalf as insincere and part of a communist strategy to de-legitimise the case 
against them by linking it to anti-Semitism.133 
The Holocaust rhetoric used by the Rosenbergs and the fact that Ethel Rosenberg 
likened the behaviour of Jewish leaders towards her and her husband to that of the 
Judenräte in war-torn Europe, was, according to Dawidowicz nothing but an attempt to 
“pick up sympathy and support from individual Jews who may be suckers for this particular 
bait”.134 It constituted a communist propaganda effort, which wanted to convince the world 
that the U.S. was turning into Nazi Germany and “that the conviction of Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg for espionage is a 1952 version of Reichstag fire, prelude to an American 
version of Auschwitz”.135 Their agenda of “fabricating evidence of anti-Semitism” and 
equating anti-communism with anti-Semitism, she concluded, was dangerous and deceitful, 
since it ran the risk of making all Jews appear potentially guilty of communist 
sympathies.136 The Rosenbergs, Robert Warshow in turn argued, were nothing but 
impostors who had taken on the role of victimised Jews that the communist propaganda 
machine had “demanded of them”.137 Implying that the Rosenbergs were not to be 
considered as real Jews, Commentary began to drive home the message that being Jewish 
was no longer compatible with being a communist. 
Commentary’s coverage of the Rosenberg trial neatly captures the main themes 
discussed in this chapter. While the distancing of New York intellectuals from their leftist 
past is familiarly located within the context of de-radicalisation and the emergence of 
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fervent anti-communism amongst formerly Marxist intellectuals, this chapter expands this 
narrative by investigating the Jewish dimension of this turn. The double alienation of New 
York Jewish intellectuals gave way to a simultaneous rediscovery of their Americaness as 
well as their Jewishness during the 1950s. The process of enthusiastically reasserting both 
identities, was according to Alfred Kazin, “made slightly hysterical by the need to cast off 
Marxist ideology”, which was replaced with a hard liberal anti-communism by many and a 
stringent nationalism by some.138 Early Holocaust consciousness and a specific 
understanding of the lessons of the Holocaust were central driving forces in developing a 
hard anti-communist rationale amongst Commentary writers.  
The change in status of American Jews required rethinking the terms within which 
American Jewish identity was defined. This task led to highly divisive intra-communal 
debates. These debates revolved around issues such as how to ensure Jewish group survival 
and to tackle anti-Semitism, as well as which positions to take towards the conflict with the 
Soviet Union, anti-communism at home, matters of civil liberties and the budding civil 
rights movement. Overarching all these matters were questions pertaining to the meaning of 
American Jewish identity and which political stances would best express Jewish interests. 
Was the essence of modern Jewish identity to be found in a commitment to social justice 
activism and liberal politics or had this attachment, in light of the Holocaust and the 
perceived threat emanating from communism become an untenable position for Jews? 
Whatever the issues in question, Jews on all sides of the debate tended to accuse each other 
of being inadequately ‘Jewish’ for embracing one or another position. 
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This chapter focuses on the ideological intra-communal arguments in relation to the 
significance of liberalism and examines specifically how issues were framed within the 
pages of Commentary magazine. Even though Commentary was a publication with a small 
circulation of only 20, 000 before the 1960s, it was also a community magazine, funded by 
the AJC, setting the agenda for discussing matters of importance to Jewish life at the 
time.139 For Ruth Wisse, professor for Yiddish literature and second-generation 
neoconservative, for example, Commentary came to play a central role in shaping her 
growing up in a Zionist home in Montreal, Canada and influenced, as she claimed, her 
intellectual maturation, especially with respect to Jewish issues.140  
By analysing Commentary’s positions on issues, such as the Cold War, anti-
communism, and an emerging Holocaust consciousness, it is possible to isolate premature 
neoconservative themes and ideas, such as the development of a hyper nationalism based 
on a symbiotic relationship between American and Jewish identity and a fierce rejection of 
communism, as well as the beginning of anti-liberal rhetoric tied to a specific discourse 
about the Holocaust and its perceived lessons for the American scene. It is important to 
note here that even though not all of Commentary contributors discussed below would 
become neoconservatives in later years, they, nevertheless, all contributed in some way to 
its conservative turn. 
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‘An Act of Faith in America’: The Birth of Commentary Magazine 
 
As a result of profound shifts in attitudes introduced by the Second World War, the idea 
that American Jews belonged to a different racial group altogether quickly lost its appeal 
after 1945. As public expressions of anti-Semitism fell into disrepute in light of the 
Holocaust, Jews began moving into the centre of the white power structure in large 
numbers, even though some exclusionary pockets remained. As a result of the rapid 
inclusion, the organised Jewish community saw itself confronted with the task of 
developing new patterns of Jewish identification that would take into consideration the 
newly achieved status as insiders and yet enable Jews to remain a distinct collective.  
The Holocaust and the resultant relocation of the demographic and cultural centre of 
world Jewry from Europe to the U.S. demanded of American Jewish leaders the 
rehabilitation of Holocaust survivors and the nurturing of the struggling Jewish community 
in Palestine. The post-Holocaust era introduced, what Bernard Rosenberg and Irving Howe 
referred to as a “schizoid” condition to American Jewish life: while Jews were becoming 
fully integrated and moving upward in great numbers, the extermination of six million Jews 
hung over them “with consequent feelings of guilt, fright, shame, and sentiments of 
apocalypse”.141 Reconciling these two elements of American Jewish existence was the 
major task confronting Jews after the war. In order to avoid, what Rabbi Emil Fackenheim 
referred to as granting “Hitler yet other, posthumous victories”, American Jews sought to 
develop affirmative patterns of American and Jewish identification, which would ensure 
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integration into American society and collective Jewish survival.142 The overall tendency 
amongst secular as well as religious leaders after the war was to approach Jewish identity 
more assertively and to be more appreciative of the precariousness of survival itself. While 
central themes of the Jewish Diaspora discourse of the past had often praised the virtue of 
powerlessness and the sanctity of the oppressed, the Second World War and the formation 
of Israel did much to mitigate Jewish averseness to martiality and militancy and many, such 
as budding neoconservatives, came to see powerlessness as a vice rather than a virtue. 
However, the diversity of opinion and the ideological disagreements that had 
characterised American Jewish leadership before the Second World War would continue 
after the war and even grow stronger as Jewish society grew culturally and socio-
economically more homogenous. While a majority of Jewish leaders continued to embrace 
some version of liberalism throughout the 1950s, a number of Jewish representatives began 
promoting an attenuated universalism while at the same time championing a more pluralist 
approach to American democracy. Within the anti-communist climate of the early Cold 
War, they came to believe that only a more particularistic approach to Jewish identity could 
safeguard collective survival.143 
The changing status of American Jews introduced, according to Edward Shapiro, a 
redefinition of American Jewish identity revolving around political and social causes rather 
                                                
142 Rabbi Emil Fackenheim postulated a 614th commandment in reaction to Hitler’s murder of six million 
Jews and months before the Six Day War: “If the 614th commandment is binding…then we are…commanded 
to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish…To abandon any of these imperatives, in response to 
Hitler’s victory at Auschwitz, would be to hand him yet other, posthumous victories.” Emil L. Fackenheim, 
“Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future: A Symposium”, Judaism 16, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 272-273. In 
an interview with the author, Podhoretz claimed that he was the one “to coin the most famous sentence Emil 
Fackenheim ever wrote”, Podhoretz, interview with author, May 17, 2008. 
143 Goren, The Politics and Public Culture of American Jews, 29. 
 60 
than around purely cultural questions.144 Jewish identity politics, which had been part of 
Jewish political culture since the 1920s, found further reinforcement in the post-war 
environment in which Horace Kallen’s ideas of cultural pluralism became an integral part 
of the American society. One major agent in renegotiating Jewish identity around political 
and social causes was Commentary magazine, which according to Ruth Wisse “became the 
first Jewish magazine in history that speaks to power in the polity at large, while protecting 
maximally the interests of the Jews”.145 
Commentary was first published in November 1945 as a consciously Jewish 
magazine, but also dealing with matters of American and ‘universal’ concern. Combative in 
tone and mindset, Commentary wanted to address an eclectic range of topics, relating to 
domestic and foreign policy, American high and popular culture, as well as the realm of 
ideas and philosophy. Its target audience were not just intellectuals and/or Jews but the 
educated reader more generally. The title implied that it wanted to be a magazine of opinion 
and comment, contributing to shaping contemporary events and perceptions. Yet, as 
opposed to the little magazines, such as the Masses, New Masses, the Nation, the New 
Republic or Partisan Review, Commentary also signified a move away from the radicalism 
and of past decades towards more conformity with mainstream culture. According to 
Norman Podhoretz, the AJC aimed at creating “a kind of Jewish Harper’s, only more 
scholarly”.146 The intention had been to create, in the words of Elliot Cohen, the first editor 
of Commentary, a publication, which restored “the intellectual dignity of Judaism”.147  
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Commentary wanted to be an agent that transformed formerly alienated Jewish 
intellectuals into productive members of the Jewish and the national community, while it 
pushed Jews towards the centre of American mainstream society. Its main message was that 
Jews were an integral part of American society and that Jewish security in America and 
around the world was intricately tied to the preservation of the American system. For Eliot 
Cohen the journal was “an act of faith” in a Jewish future in the United States. “With 
Europe devastated” he said, “there falls upon us in the United States a far greater share of 
responsibility for carrying forward, in a creative way, our common Jewish cultural and 
spiritual heritage”.148  
The effort to push for greater inclusion of Jews into mainstream society was to be 
based on an affirmative identification with the American status quo, which in the early 
Cold War environment also meant a staunch rejection of communist ideology and politics, 
which characterised Commentary from its earliest beginnings. As a matter of fact, Cohen, 
who in later years became obsessed with anti-communism, once explained, “Commentary 
had been created by the American Jewish Committee to prove to the world that there were 
anti-Communist Jewish intellectuals”.149 
Eliot Cohen, born in 1899 in Des Moines, Iowa, had come of age in Mobile Alabama, 
in a nominally Orthodox home, infused with a strong tendency towards secularism and a 
proclivity for English poetry and literature. Cohen was an intellectually precocious child, 
entering Yale at the age of fourteen where he excelled at his studies of English. He became 
President of the Menorah Society in his senior year. He broke off his graduate studies in 
English at Yale and became assistant editor for the Menorah Journal, one of the precursors 
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of Commentary, in 1924, after he realised that his opportunities for an academic career 
were severely curtailed because of his Jewishness.150 Like many other intellectuals, Cohen 
became active on the left after the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic 
depression. As fellow New York intellectual Diana Trilling recalled, Cohen “had come to 
believe that capitalism had run its course and that Communism was the only answer to the 
crisis confronting the country”.151 Like others, however, he also quickly developed a strong 
disinclination for organised Marxism and joined the anti-Stalinist Trotskyites.152 
Growing up in the South differentiated him from most New York intellectuals who 
had primarily spent their lives in New York and Chicago, both cities with large Jewish 
populations and a vibrant Jewish life. Nathan Perlmutter, former director of the ADL, 
described being Jewish in New York as opposed to other places in the country as much less 
of a communal experience: “When all the world is Jewish, nobody is Jewish 
really…You’ve got to leave major metropolitan areas to fully understand what I mean 
about a sense of a Jewish community – of a ‘we’ and ‘they’ – in New York it’s all ‘we’”.153 
The Jewish experience in the American South, especially in the Deep South, was on 
the whole much more homogeneous, at least outwardly, and characterised by a tendency to 
compartmentalise Jewish and American identities.154 In opposition to his fellow 
‘Commentarians’, this background put Cohen more positively in tune with his Jewishness 
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on the one hand and his Americaness on the other.155 Lionel Trilling, who was very much 
influenced by Eliot Cohen, once said about Cohen that he was “proud of his knowledge of 
an American life that wasn’t easily available to young Jewish intellectuals”. After Cohen 
committed suicide in 1959, Trilling eulogised: “He taught the younger men around him that 
nothing in human life need to be alien to their thought, and nothing in American life”.156 
In an article published in the Menorah Journal in 1922, Cohen spelled out his vision 
of what a Jewish magazine should do for Jews in America, which he would later set out to 
realise in Commentary. In this critique of American Jewish communal life of the 1920s as 
devoid of real content, he called for a “complete rehabilitation of the Jewish tradition and 
the most thoroughgoing reconstruction of Jewish intellectual values”.157 The publication he 
had in mind would emphasise literature, criticism and the arts and encourage its readers to 
perceive themselves both as Jews and as citizens of the U.S. and the modern world. At the 
same time he wanted Jewish writers to write about their Jewishness and/or Judaism with 
the same worldliness and refinement with which they discussed highbrow culture and 
politics, thereby exploding Jewish stereotypes created by both Jews and gentiles alike. 
According to Trilling, the overarching aim was “to normalize” Jewish existence in America 
so that Jews could fully contribute to American society.158 
In order to realise his vision, Cohen recruited and reared a long list of young writers, 
amongst them people such as Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and later Norman 
Podhoretz. Other original contributors to Commentary were the art critic Clement 
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Greenberg, social critic Robert Warshow and novelist Saul Bellow.159 As shown, most of 
these intellectuals had been very ambivalent about their Jewish heritage throughout the 
1930s and early 1940s. As aspiring public intellectuals and Marxists, they had preferred not 
to discuss it publicly, as they feared it would impact negatively on their intellectual 
credibility as well as associate them with what they perceived as a complacent bourgeoisie. 
In fact, most New York Jewish intellectuals denied that their Jewish ancestry had any 
significant influence on their thinking. If anything, they had experienced Jewishness as a 
limiting, keeping them from entering broader society and for a number of them, interfering 
with pursuing academic careers. Irving Howe said with respect to his Jewishness that he 
“felt no particular responsibility for its survival or renewal. It was simply there. While it 
would be shameful to deny its presence or seek to flee its stigma, my friends and I could 
hardly be said to have thought Jewishness could do much for us or we for it”.160 
For many of these twice alienated intellectuals, the uncovering of their Jewishness 
paralleled their rediscovery of America. After the war, many of them understood that they 
could count themselves lucky to have been born in the United States. Howe gave 
expression to that sentiment when he wrote: “We knew but for an accident of geography we 
might also now be bars of soap”.161 With Cohen, they wanted to lead the way in making 
Jews more at home in America as well as feel more positively about their Jewishness, in the 
process of which, they themselves overcame their self-imposed ‘homelessness’. They 
would quickly become buoyantly optimistic about the nation’s future, calling upon 
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America “to reaffirm and restore the sense of sanctity of the human person and the rights of 
man”.162  
 Commentary’s effort to create a symbiosis of Americanism and Jewishness was to 
be achieved by dealing with issues of general, American and international concern on the 
same level as issues relating to Jewish literature, culture, religion and philosophy. At the 
same time, the publication presented itself as a sophisticated magazine intelligible to lay 
readers and intellectuals, Jewish and non-Jewish. The diversity of material and opinions 
covered by Commentary found reflection from the first issue onwards. Along with essays 
by historian Salo Baron on “The Spiritual Reconstruction of European Jewry” and Rabbi 
Franz Rosenzweig’s “On Being a Jewish Person”, the edition also features a report by 
George Orwell on the British General Elections, a piece on the state of theatre production 
by Louis Kronenberg, a short story by Paul Goodman, as well as book reviews by Mary 
McCarthy and Harold Rosenberg. 
 This diversity of subjects reflected what Alfred Kazin described as the realisation of 
the many-sided relatedness of Jewish existence after the Holocaust. It testified to the belief 
that it was no longer possible after the Holocaust to believe that Jewish survival and Jewish 
self-determination were not related to everything else in the world. Kazin stipulated that 
after 1945, the Jewish writer realised that the Holocaust “bound him more closely to every 
fundamental question of human nature and historic failure involved in Europe’s self-
destruction”.163  
 In order to realise this eclectic analysis of issues, Cohen selected a varied group of 
editorialists and regular contributors, who were not just chosen for their editing and writing 
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abilities, but also for their anti-Stalinist and pro-American credentials. According to Louis 
Harap, Cohen gathered around him the “most inclusive united front of the anti-progressive, 
anti-communist, anti-Soviet fractions of the “left” in this country”, people such as Sidney 
Hook, Robert Warshow, Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Phillip Rahv and Clement Greenberg. 
Kristol himself admitted that he and others “had been hired because of our views 
(including, of course, our political views) and talents were congenial to the sponsoring 
organisation”.164 
 Kristol began writing for Commentary while he was living in Cambridge, England 
from 1946 to 1947, where his wife Gertrude Himmelfarb was working on her doctoral 
thesis on Lord Acton. From 1947 to 1952 he was associate and later managing editor of the 
publication, while simultaneously functioning as executive director of the American 
Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF), after which he went on to edit the British-based 
and CIA-funded Encounter with poet Stephen Spender from 1953 until 1958.165 Encounter 
was created “to counteract, insofar as it was possible, the anti-American, pro-Soviet views 
of a large segment of the intellectual elites in the Western democracies and in the English-
speaking Commonwealth”.166 While Kristol described Encounter’s political vantage point 
as “right-wing Social Democratic”, he thought of himself as politically further to the right, 
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expressing this attitude by “publishing a few articles by some of the younger, more gifted 
British Tories”. According to Peregrine Worthorne, contributor to Encounter, it was not just 
Kristol’s intention to convince the left of the necessity to support U.S. cold war policy, but 
also those parts of the British Right, which traditionally had been characterised by anti-
American prejudices.167  
 Kristol was born on January 22, 1920 into a nominally Orthodox family in 
Brooklyn. While his parents rarely attended synagogue, the household was kept strictly 
kosher. Kristol received a Jewish education by attending yeshiva two times a week and on 
Sundays, where he learned to read Hebrew and the Yiddish translations from Torah 
excerpts. Retrospectively, he described his attachment to Judaism and Jewishness during 
his youth as having been devoid of passion. While he never thought of himself as religious 
and took much more interest in the issues that were discussed in The New Masses than in 
issues concerning Jews and Israel, he later nevertheless described himself as having been 
“born theotropic”.168  
Even as Trotskyite student at CCNY, he pursued his interest in religion and matters 
of spirituality, reading Plato, the King James Bible, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and 
Jacques Maritain. What interested him most when reading Christian theologians was that 
the fact that their thought was undergirded by the belief that “the human condition placed 
inherent limitations on human possibility”.169 Only later, “after the war and after the 
holocaust”, did he develop an interest in Jewish thinkers, such as Martin Buber, Gershom 
Sholem and Franz Rosenzweig, because, as he said, the Holocaust had “touched my Jewish 
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nerve”. Moreover, he explained, that it was “as a result of that experience, the war and the 
holocaust, that we began pushing for Jewish thinkers to write in Commentary and Jewish 
magazines”.170 
What remained of his Trotskyite past, after his de-radicalisation, was his “training in 
polemics and sustained political analysis” and a harsh, all-or-nothing style of argumentation 
which characterised his work.171 Joseph Epstein once described Kristol’s style as 
“supremely confident about subjects that are elsewhere held to be still in the flux of 
controversy, assuming always that anyone who thinks differently is perverse or inept”.172 
Kristol once claimed that he believed the continuities between Trotskyites and 
neoconservatives to lie in the fact that the latter “are the political intellectuals, and that’s 
what the Trotskyists were”.173  
  It also needs to be pointed out here that Kristol was always one step ahead of most 
of the other intellectuals in terms of his evolution towards conservatism. Even while he was 
still viewed as and referred to himself as a liberal, he was “something of a closet Tory”.174 
Not only was his conservatism more developed at an earlier stage, but he would ultimately 
move much further to the right than most of his fellow intellectuals. About himself, Kristol 
said: “Ever since I can remember, I've been a neo-something: a neo-Marxist, a neo-
Trotskyist, a neo-liberal, a neo-conservative”.175  
Much of Kristol’s conservatism emanated from his “deep distrust of…liberal 
democracy” and much of his critique of modern liberalism were already visible in the 
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1940s and 1950s.176 In a 1948 review of Reconstructionist Rabbi Milton Steinberg’s book 
Basic Judaism, Kristol, reflecting on the desire expressed by many young intellectuals like 
himself to rediscover their Jewish heritage, assailed Steinberg’s extreme oversimplification 
of Judaism as devoid of sincere religious content. He believed that Steinberg’s aim to adapt 
Judaism to ‘Main Street’ America “results in the perversion of the Jewish religion into a 
doctrine of social (and sociable) principles, the transformation of Messianism into a 
shallow, if sincere, humanitarianism”.177  
The review reflected Kristol’s contempt for radical rationalism, an argument he made 
repeatedly throughout his career. He particularly attacked fellow Jews who tried to adapt 
Judaism to modernity. Paradoxically, even while Kristol came to defend religion as one of 
the great carriers of meaning in society, he remained a secular Jew all his life. The main 
problem of modernity, as Kristol understood it, was the fact that modern man had lost 
religion and that all efforts of accommodating religion to modernity were characterised by 
“superficiality, even vulgarity”.178 
During this time, Kristol also began to express his ambiguous view of the ‘people’, 
upon which his rejection of utopianism and his negative attitude towards participatory 
democracy hinged. Much of Kristol’s writing was characterised by his sceptical approach 
to human nature. While he claimed admiration for ‘the people’ as “a repository of common 
sense”, he continuously expressed concern about the masses’ potential for uncontrolled and 
irrational expression of passion. The two years he spent in the U.S. army removed him 
from the New York microcosm and brought him into contact with average Americans. The 
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experience of war as well as the contact with ‘ordinary’ folk allegedly convinced Kristol 
that the construction of a utopian society based on socialist ideals was an undesirable 
enterprise: “The idea of building socialism with the common man who actually existed--as 
distinct from his idealized version--was sheer fantasy, and therefore the prospects for 
"democratic socialism" were nil. The army may have radicalized Norman Mailer; it 
successfully de-radicalized me. It caused me to cease being a socialist”.179 
As associate editor at Commentary, a job that he took up immediately upon his return 
from Great Britain, Kristol was also reunited with his former CCNY friend Nathan Glazer. 
Together, Kristol and Glazer constituted what Kristol has referred to as the “Jewish” editors 
of Commentary, Glazer commenting on the secular life of the Jewish community and 
Kristol dealing with religious and philosophical matters.180 Kristol described Glazer as “a 
sociologist who was sceptical of most of what then passed for sociology” – writing for 
“The Study of Man” department at Commentary “which summarized and criticized new 
trends in the social sciences”.181  
Nathan Glazer had been born in February 25, 1923 and raised in the Bronx. He 
claimed that his parents raised him "socialist, but not too socialist; Orthodox, but not too 
Orthodox, friendly to Palestine, but not a Zionist; Yiddish-speaking, but not a 
Yiddishist”.182 As student at CCNY, he edited the national newspaper of the Socialist-
Zionist student group Avukah Student Action.183 As doctoral candidate at Columbia 
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University (he received his Ph.D. in 1962), Glazer took particular interest in the 
opportunities social sciences offered to analyse social problems. He would later hold 
teaching positions at Berkeley and Harvard and write widely noted studies on race 
relations, ethnicity and urban sociology, such as Beyond the Melting Pot, in cooperation 
with Daniel Moynihan and the anti-affirmative action polemic Affirmative 
Discrimination.184 A Commentary article of 1958 foreshadowed some of Glazer’s interests 
and ideas. Dealing with the integrationist patterns of New York’s Puerto Rican community, 
Glazer argued that Puerto Ricans were relying heavily on the facilities of the welfare state 
offered in order to ‘solve’ individual and community problems. By describing how people 
accommodate to welfare services, he implicitly criticised the welfare state for creating 
dependency, a rationale that would inform much of his later work. The sceptical approach 
towards social policy, and specifically towards the social programmes established by 
Lyndon B. Johnson’ s Great Society, would become one of the main driving forces for the 
creation of PI, to which Glazer contributed seminally, later replacing Daniel Bell as co-
editor.185 
Daniel Bell, often referred to as a “sometime affiliate of the emerging 
neoconservative group”, or one that “runs with the neoconservatives”, was born in New 
York on May 10, 1919 as Daniel Bolotsky, the son of Polish Jewish immigrants.186 He 
grew up speaking Yiddish as his first language and joined the YPSL in 1932 at age thirteen. 
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Bell and Kristol first met at CCNY where they both belonged to the Alcove One group of 
anti-Stalinist Marxists. Bell later worked as managing editor for the New Leader and labour 
editor for Fortune. He received his Ph.D. degree from Columbia in 1960 where he 
subsequently taught sociology until he relocated to Harvard University in 1969. Bell never 
accepted the characterisation of himself as a neoconservative, so much so that, in the words 
of Podhoretz, when Bell is referred to as such, he “writes you an 8-page letter single 
spaced…to explain why he isn’t”.187 Bell thought that the “designation is meaningless” – a 
shorthand which misrepresented the fact that his criticism tried to “transcend the received 
categories of liberalism, and seek to treat the dilemmas of contemporary society within a 
very different framework”.188 He preferred to describe himself as “a socialist in economics, 
a liberal in politics and a conservative in culture”.189  
And yet, there is some reason for the claim that he partially contributed, at least 
initially, to the formation of neoconservative thought. As observed by Steinfels, “Bell’s 
horizon is essentially one of danger, of potential decline and disruption”.190 He was 
primarily concerned with the “fending off of social and political instability”, societal and 
institutional collapse which hovers over ‘post-industrial’ society. Ultimately, Bell believed, 
that “the essential questions are those of values”; that ideas of morality and ethos were the 
driving forces of history.191 And according to Bell it was exactly the realm of culture and 
values that was most in trouble in modern society: “The real problem of modernity is the 
problem of belief…it is a spiritual crisis”.192  
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Bell’s self-proclaimed cultural conservatism therefore came to outweigh his 
economic socialism and his political liberalism. Contrary to neoconservatives, however, 
Bell’s approach was less polemical and he did not make the allegedly ‘inferior’ motives of 
his opponents into a central element of his argument. His reluctance to engage in 
ideological mudslinging was also one reason why he left PI in 1973, even though, at the 
time it was said, according to Glazer, that Bell was leaving in order to work on other 
projects. Bell later confirmed that it was because he disagreed with Kristol’s endorsement 
for Nixon and with the continued ‘ideologisation’ of PI, that he “resigned as co-editor, 
stating that I regarded friendship as more important than ideology”.193 
Finally, it was also during the 1950s, Norman Podhoretz, whose biography will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter 3, began to develop a number of themes, which would 
characterise his later work. One such theme was his defence of bourgeois society. Even 
though Podhoretz started out writing literary criticism, it was always characterised by a 
strong social and political dimension. From very early on Podhoretz’ writings reflected 
little understanding for the philosophy of liberalism and the conception of human nature 
that it embodied. In a 1957 symposium by the New Leader, he evoked his characteristic 
mistrust of liberalism describing it as “a porous and self-destructive ideology”, accusing 
liberals of being naïve and unable to “take a sufficiently complicated view of reality”. 
Liberalism, he claimed, was “a conglomeration of attitudes suitable only to the naïve, the 
callow, and the rash: in short, the immature”. The liberal Weltanschauung was, according 
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to Podhoretz, a “dangerous philosophy for the leading nation in the West to entertain”.194 It 
became Podhoretz’s mission to engage in a “demolition job” of American liberalism and 
related ideologies of the left.195 
 
‘Is America Exile or Home?’: Pro-Americanism, Anti-Communism and the Legacy of the 
Holocaust 
 
 
 
The patriotic sentiment that swept American society after the Second World War also 
affected the intellectual community. The former mouthpiece of marginalised Trotskyite 
intellectuals, Partisan Review, devoted three successive issues in 1952 to a symposium 
entitled “Our Country and Our Culture” where prominent intellectuals declared that it no 
longer felt alienated from American mass culture.196 Luminaries such as Lionel Trilling, 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jacques Barzun, Sidney Hook, Reinhold Niebuhr, Leslie Fiedler, 
and David Riesman voiced their newly arrived-at appreciation of the American system. 
They believed that their formerly ‘non-conformist’ stance had to be overcome in light of 
the Second World War and with the onset of the Cold War. Many of the contributors 
expressed regret for the positions they had embraced in the past and recognised that the 
threat posed by communism at home and abroad left them no choice but to reconsider 
previously held leftist beliefs about culture, politics and the role of intellectuals in society. 
Not everyone agreed with this new conformism however. Out of the 24 intellectuals writing 
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for the symposium, Irving Howe, Norman Mailer, and C. Wright Mills, while appreciative 
of the new inclusiveness they found within mainstream culture, disagreed with this new 
“Age of Conformity”, accusing intellectuals, especially Commentary intellectuals, of 
having “become apologist for middle-class values, middle-class culture”.197 
New York intellectuals had always constituted a highly divisive conglomerate of 
people. The communist threat, however, introduced a further rift to the group, which would 
lead to fierce arguments amongst them over the next couple of decades. ‘Commentarians’ 
began to advocate a rigidly pro-American stance. They moved further away from leftist 
positions than other New York intellectuals. Moreover, ‘Commentarians’ believed that the 
war and the Holocaust demanded of them, in the words of Diana Trilling “to find their 
Jewish identities”.198 The new home was found in an idealised conception of America in 
which Jews as Jews were to be fully integrated participants in the American polity. 
During the 1950s, Commentary became, in the words of Michael Staub, “fairly 
obsessed with how to dramatise the synergy of Jewish and American values and traditions”, 
which it organised around the alleged abhorrence of both cultures for communism.199 Jews, 
according to Commentary, embodied the most anti-communist ethnic group, whose 
religious and cultural traditions would strengthen the fabric of American democracy 
because they were so compatible with American values. Moreover, Jews were so 
supportive of democracy, because only democracies permitted them to live freely as Jews. 
Accordingly, Commentary claimed that American-style democracy was the only viable 
system to guarantee Jewish affluence and group survival. Simultaneously, treatment of its 
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Jews became a barometer by which Commentary measured American society’s 
progressiveness and love for democracy. In his article, “Must the Jews Quit Europe?”, 
Zachariah Schuster wrote that, 
 
Historical evidence points unmistakably to the conclusion that whereever democracy rose and 
grew, Jewish emancipation rose and grew as an integral part of it. And, conversely, the decline 
of democracy in any country was either preceded or accompanied by an attack on the position 
of the Jews. No country has ever risen to more democratic and progressive levels while at the 
same time lowering the status of the Jews.200 
 
 
 
Sidney Hook, pragmatist philosopher at New York University, who studied Marxism in 
Berlin and Moscow, propagated the idea that Jews made the best and most loyal Americans 
(and therefore anti-communists) precisely because Jews had experienced first hand what 
totalitarianism can lead to. The Holocaust, Hook argued, had taught them to staunchly 
defend American democracy against the excesses of totalitarianism in all its forms. In 
“Why Democracy is Better” he echoed the belief that not only was there no moral 
difference between the Soviet regime and Hitler, but that Soviet communism actually posed 
a much greater threat to American democracy.201 This reasoning would gain great currency 
amongst neoconservatives in later years. The greatest danger for the American polity, he 
argued furthermore, did not emanate from the Soviet Union as such but from communists, 
fellow travellers and ‘doughface’ liberals within the United States: 
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Whoever believed that Nazi expansionism constituted a threat to the survival of democratic 
institutions must conclude by the same logic and the same type of evidence that Soviet 
Communism represents today an even greater threat to our survival, because the potential 
opposition to totalitarianism is now much weaker in consequence of the war, and because the 
Soviet government commands a fifth column in democratic countries stronger than anything 
Hitler…ever imagined possible.202 
 
 
 
Hook, who had been a lone Marxist with regular faculty appointment during the 1930s, 
came to believe that the ideal type of totalitarianism was Stalinism rather than National 
Socialism and by the early 1950s the concept came to encompass communism more 
generally. Hook warned earlier than his fellow New York intellectuals of the long-term 
threat that flowed from Soviet-style communism because, as opposed to fascism, it was 
more influential within intellectual and university circles.203 His ideas played a central role 
in the right turn of neoconservatives.204 
Born in 1902, raised in Williamsburg, Brooklyn and educated at CCNY and 
Columbia University, Hook spent all his life trying to reconcile his Jewish heritage with his 
American identity. The most important elements defining his Jewishness were not religion 
or Zionism, but democratic values. Hook believed that there was a symbiotic relationship 
between American Jewry and American democracy; Jewish identity, Hook contended, 
strengthened democracy and vice versa.205 The essence of a Jewish-American symbiosis lay 
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for Hook in the joint commitment to American democracy and to the traditions of social 
justice, cultural diversity and the scientific method. Furthermore, he believed that as long as 
American democracy was strong, anti-Semitism would have little appeal and success.206 
Trying to prove that Jews were ‘good’ Americans, that they were “like other 
Americans, only more so”, went hand in hand with Commentary’s fight against anti-
Semitism, which was intricately related to the effort of disassociating Jews from 
communism.207 While Commentary agreed with other Jewish communal leaders that actual 
and potential anti-Semitism had to be confronted with fortitude and determination, it 
quickly disconnected the fight against anti-Semitism from the fight against other forms of 
bigotry – especially white racism - and began to address the issue almost exclusively in 
terms of its fight against communism.208  
Throughout the 1950s, many Jewish communal organisations continued to avoid 
making anti-Semitism a subject of direct and open discussion because they feared that such 
an approach would give anti-Semites the publicity they desired and would moreover attract 
negative attention to Jews. Therefore, they continued to couch the fight against 
Judeophobia in terms of a universal struggle against prejudice. The main argument was that 
Jews would only be secure in a society where all forms of bigotry were removed. This, 
these organisations argued, was especially important in light of the ideological conflict 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In order to keep the moral high ground, the U.S. 
had to live up to its self-projected image as the leader of the free world, by ridding itself of 
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all forms of prejudice and discrimination. In this sense, the fight against anti-Semitism was 
presented as proof of their anti-communist patriotism.209 
Yet, the analogies between Nazism, the Holocaust and white racism, which had been 
part of the repertoire of civil rights activist since the 1930s, disappeared relatively quickly 
as the Cold War intensified in the early 1950s only to re-emerge in public discourse in the 
later half of the 1950s in a somewhat altered form.210 In Commentary, which previously 
had cited Holocaust lessons in support of civil rights, these parallels were almost 
completely superseded by analogies between Nazism and communism, by the early 
1950s.211 As shown below, Commentary not only began to downplay its support for black 
civil rights, but, as time progressed, it started to use Nazi and Holocaust analogies in order 
to discredit civil rights activists, especially those of Jewish descent, as well as African 
American efforts at integration.  
It is generally assumed that the Holocaust and its lessons emerged as a central topic 
of debate and as a symbol for collective Jewish identity during the later part of the 1960s. 
According to Peter Novick, it was not until the late 1960s that Jewish community leaders 
and intellectuals began to publicly discuss and employ the symbol of the Holocaust in 
accordance with social and political agendas.212 Yet, re-evaluating early neoconservatism 
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from a Jewish perspective demonstrates that the Holocaust was already much discussed and 
used in debates amongst Jewish communal leaders throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Jeffrey Shandler, for example, has shown that the 1940s and 1950s not only saw Holocaust 
memorialisation by Holocaust survivors and individuals personally affected by it but also 
“the writing of the first hundreds of personal and communal memoirs, the establishment of 
the earliest memorials”. Additionally, the Holocaust was very much present on American 
television before the 1960s, in newsreels as well as in fictionalised form.213 
Scrutinising early issues of Commentary contributes to a revision of traditional 
interpretations of when and how Holocaust consciousness, which was far from static, 
emerged and became a central topic in intra-communal debates. Moreover, it shows that the 
emergence of neoconservative thought was intricately connected to early forms of 
Holocaust consciousness. Far from being silent during the late 1940s and throughout the 
1950s, Jewish commentators of diverse politics used Holocaust analogies or invoked its 
purported lessons when debating domestic and international issues. While the Holocaust (in 
association with Israel) had not yet emerged as the official symbol of collective Jewish 
identity, the roots of this process nevertheless were located in discussions of the lessons of 
the Holocaust by Jewish leaders and intellectuals during the later 1940s and the 1950s. 
Even while there was a diversity of opinions about what the actual lessons of the Holocaust 
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for the present were, everyone seemed to believe that there was a moral to be taken away 
from those disastrous events. According to Michael Staub, it was only during the later 
1960s, when Holocaust memorialisation was becoming a official symbol of collective 
Jewish American identity that concerns with respect to the impropriety of certain types of 
lesson- making would be raised.214 
Early intellectual discussions of the Holocaust within Commentary were framed to a 
large extent by Hannah Arendt’s concept of totalitarianism and comparisons between 
communism and Nazism were pervasive.215 Communists who claimed to be fighting for 
Jewish and African American civil rights, for example, were described persistently as 
impostors who were in reality, the claim went, no better than Nazis themselves. In the 
aftermath of the Peekskill riots, for example, in August 1949, at which a concert of the 
leftist singer Paul Robeson turned into a racist, anti-Semitic and anti-communist 
demonstration, James Rorty and Winifred Raushenbush, while condemning the mob 
violence which ensued at Peekskill, accused communist spokespersons of instrumentalising 
the riot in order to viciously create the impression that “Negroes, Jews and Communists are 
arrayed against the rest of the country”. Yet, “That the Communists pose as the chief 
defenders of Jewish and Negro rights”, they argued, “forms only a deceptive distinction 
between them and the Nazi agents”.216 
During the 1950s, Commentary played a central role in defining the parameters of the 
intra-communal discussions of the Holocaust in conjunction with the perceived necessity of 
defending American democracy against the communist threat. By discussing these matters, 
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the magazine contributed eminently to the development of a Jewish anti-communist and 
pro-American rationale and early interpretations of the lessons of the Holocaust. Indeed, 
Commentary’s creation in itself was considered a direct answer to the murder of six million 
Jews. In the first issue, Cohen wrote: “As Jews we live with this fact: 4, 750, 000 of 6, 000, 
000 Jews of Europe have been murdered. Not killed in battle, not massacred in hot blood, 
but slaughtered like cattle, subjected to every physical indignity – processed...At this 
juncture, in the midst of this turbulence and these whirlwinds, we light our candle, 
Commentary. Surely here is an act of faith”.217  
Hence, the near destruction of European Jewry and the Nazi killing machinery were 
discussed in almost every issue during the late 1940s and even throughout the 1950s. The 
traumatic events were debated from every possible angle, along with the conditions that had 
caused them, and how reoccurrence could be avoided. Cohen published “wide-ranging 
analyses of the Nazi era and its consequences for the post-Nazi world” and thereby framed, 
according to Dawidowicz, “more than any other medium…our contemporary outlook on 
Hitler’s Germany”.218 Many of the pieces, such as “The Common Man and the Nazis” and 
“The Complex Behind Hitler’s Anti-Semitism” tried to psychologically and sociologically 
understand National Socialism and the mechanics of extermination.219 Commentary also 
                                                
217 Cohen, “An Act of Affirmation”, 1-2. 
218 Lucy S. Dawidowicz Aborted, unfinished mass for Commentary Symposium, drafted August 4-6, 1985, 1, 
Box 49, Folder 7, LDP. 
219 For example: Salo Baron, “The Spiritual Reconstruction of European Jewry”, Commentary, November 
1945, 4-12; Martin Greenberg, “The Common Man and the Nazis”, Commentary, December 1946, 501-506; 
Leo Srole, “Why DP’s Can’t Wait: Proposing an International Plan of Rescue”, Commentary, January 1947, 
13-24; Irving Kristol, “The Nature of Nazism”, Commentary, September 1948, 271-282; Gertrud M. Kurth, 
“The Complex behind Hitler’s Anti-Semitism: A Psychoanalytic Study in History”, Commentary, January 
1948, 77-82; Solomon F. Bloom, “The Dictator of the Lodz Ghetto: The Strange History of Mordechai Chaim 
Rumkowski”, Commentary, February 1949, 111-122; H.R. Trevor-Roper, “Is Hitler Really Dead?: A 
Historian Examines the Evidence”, Commentary, February 1951, 120-130; Joseph Leftwich, “Songs of the 
Death Camps: A Selection with Commentary”, Commentary, September 1951, 269-274; L. Poliakov, “The 
Mind of the Mass Murderer: The Nazi Executioners – and Those Who Stood By”, Commentary, November 
1951, 45-459; H.L. Trefousse, “German Historians’ Verdict of Hitler: This Time No ‘Stab-in-the-Back’”, 
 83 
became the first American magazine to print extracts from The Diary of Anne Frank in 
1950.220 
Since Commentary wanted to be a creative force in the wake of the devastation of 
European Jewry, it shifted its focus from discussing the Holocaust per se towards 
discussing how a future holocaust could be avoided and what its lessons for the present 
were. Articles that discussed communism at home and abroad repeatedly made use of 
Nazi/Holocaust imagery as a warning of what the totalitarian rationale of communism 
could lead to, thereby implying that any Jewish association with communism was 
disregarding the lessons of the Holocaust. Commentary, for example, tried to demonstrate 
that the Soviets were especially cruel towards Jews and that a new holocaust was in the 
making behind the Iron Curtain. In “Hungary's Jewry Faces Liquidation – Again the 
Concentration Camps”, former president of the Hungarian Independent Democratic party, 
Bela Fabian, cautioned American Jews that Stalin posed as much a threat to Central and 
Eastern European Jewry as did Hitler: “The parallel to the policy of Nazi extermination is 
almost complete: the only difference is the denial that “Jews as Jews” are being mistreated, 
and the fact that, at the end of the line, instead of the extermination camps of Auschwitz 
and Treblinka, there are the slave labor camps of Karaganda and Kolyma and the cotton 
fields of Tashkent and Alma-Ata”.221 It was essential that American Jewry take notice of 
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the warnings this time around: “To the best of my powers I tried to communicate this 
message [of the threat posed to Hungarian Jews] to American Jews”. But just as in 1942, he 
cautioned, “these new reports were received with disbelief”.222 
Irving Kristol drew parallels between communism with Nazism, implying that both 
end in mass murder, when reflecting on the trial of the State Department employee and 
Soviet spy Alger Hiss, who was convicted of perjury in 1950. “Many of us have known 
Communists, and most of them conveyed no impression of being conspirators”, he wrote, 
“But then, some of us have known Nazis too, and they conveyed no immediate association 
with gas chambers”.223 Accusing liberals of being blue-eyed about communism, he 
wondered how they would react if Nazis were promoting their views freely. Leslie Fiedler 
added that the Hiss case had shown that liberals were “unwilling to leave the garden 
of…illusion” by refusing to condemn communist and alleged communists.224 Both Fiedler 
and Kristol concluded that the issue at stake were not the civil liberties of communists but 
the deadly threat posed by domestic communism to American democracy. In the light of 
what Nazism had wrought, and because they believed communism to be equally dangerous, 
removing communists and communist sympathizers from their government jobs was 
entirely appropriate.225 
In addition to the anti-communist rhetoric coupled with Holocaust/Nazi analogies, 
Commentary was beginning to take aim at liberals, who would soon become its preferred 
villains. Nor did it object to the curtailment of civil liberties in the fight against 
                                                
222 Fabian, “Hungary's Jewry Faces Liquidation”, 330. 
223 Irving Kristol, “Civil Liberties, 1952 – A Study in Confusion. Do We Defend Our Rights by Protecting 
Communists?”, Commentary, March 1952, 234-235. 
224 Leslie A. Fiedler, “Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of Innocence: Who Was Guilty – And of What?”, 
Commentary, August 1951, 119. 
225 Kristol, “Civil Liberties, 1952 – A Study in Confusion”; Fiedler, “Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of 
Innocence”. 
 85 
communism. In this respect, liberal anti-communists who would turn neoconservative in 
the not too distant future differed from traditional anti-communist liberals: contrary to 
people such as Arthur M. Schlesinger and George Kennan, Irving Kristol, for example, 
perceived the main threat to American society not as coming from the Soviet Union but as 
emanating from communist sympathisers and especially from liberals who considered 
communism as part of the legitimate left. At the same time, Commentary did not just 
promote containment but also published articles, which called for “confrontation and 
liberation”.226  
Moreover, incipient neoconservatives did not seem to regard McCarthy as much of a 
problem. At the height of McCarthyism, Kristol argued that understandably as liberals’ 
reactions to “the vulgar demagogue” McCarthy were, their “anti-anti-Communist” position, 
like the Popular Front coalition, reflected the fact that they considered communism “a 
political trend continuous with liberalism and democratic socialism” rather than as a clear 
enemy of the democratic left. Infamously, he went on to defend McCarthy, by claiming that 
at least Americans could be sure of McCarthy’s anti-communist credentials: “About the 
spokesmen for American liberalism they feel they know no such thing, and with some 
justification”.227 
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Kristol wrote the article, which contained elements of incipient neoconservative 
thought, in reaction to what he perceived as the “disingenuousness, the hypocrisy, even the 
intellectual cowardice” of liberals who considered communists as radical progressives. 
Written against the background of the Korean War, Kristol felt compelled to leash out at 
liberals whom he considered to be disloyal towards the U.S. during the conflict for 
allegedly defending the “civil liberties of American Communists, who openly supported the 
North Korean regime”.228 
In a similar vein, Robert Bendiner had previously warned liberals against a “self-
defeating tolerance” towards communism, only to defend proposed legislation against 
communist infiltration even if it compromised constitutional freedoms. Social stability was 
a precondition to liberty and therefore more important than individual freedom, an 
argument neoconservatives would make repeatedly in later years. The curbing of 
constitutional freedoms was necessary and legitimate, because the “obvious truth is that 
there can be no complete freedom short of anarchy”.229 Liberals, so the argument went, 
blurred the differences between liberal democracy and totalitarian leftism and were too 
naïve to understand the “malign intentions” of communist ideology and practice.230 They, 
therefore, were posing an even greater threat to the American polity, than actual 
communists were. 
By 1949, Commentary was clearly in the hard anti-communist camp. While it 
contributed seminally to defining the liberal anti-communist consensus of the 1950s, it 
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positioned itself to the right of anti-communist liberalism. Moreover, it played an eminent 
role in developing a Jewish rationale for the embrace of Cold War patriotism and rejection 
of leftist solutions, wherein lay the seeds for the rightward drift of the journal, its editors 
and a number of its contributors. The initial driving force for this shift lay in the impact of 
the Second World War and the Holocaust had on these intellectuals. The Holocaust 
signified an hour zero for ‘Commentarians’, as it did for Jews worldwide. While the 
Holocaust had not yet taken on the official centrality for American Jewish identity, it 
nevertheless was central to the transformation of Jewish intellectuals’ thought, a number of 
whom would in later years become neoconservatives. As shown above, the near destruction 
of European Jewry functioned as a “negative creation myth”, a point of reference, from 
which they defined how to renegotiate their relationship with their Jewish heritage and their 
American identities.231 Their ‘new’ identity was based on a symbiotic and assertive 
interaction between their Jewish and American identities. America was different and “good 
for the Jews” and it therefore had to be defended by every means possible. 
 
‘What Is Good for Israel is Good for America’: Israel and Commentary Magazine 
 
Another incipient neoconservative theme that began to appear during the 1950s in the pages 
of Commentary and was intricately related to the enthusiastic affirmation of the American 
status quo and the emphatic rejection of communism as un-American and un-Jewish, was 
the development of a rationale for the defence of Israel in conjunction with an anti-
communist, pro-American stance. Neoconservatism has become closely associated with 
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and sometimes even is reduced to a stringent pro-Zionist stance. Certain voices even 
contend, that neoconservatism exclusively represents Israeli interests at the expense of 
America.232 Moreover, most studies assert that neoconservatism’s Jewish dimension 
emerged as a reaction to the Israeli-Arab War of 1967.233 These interpretations distort the 
reality. 
While early neoconservatives, Jewish as well as non-Jewish, were indeed strong 
defenders of Israel and of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship, this defence was based on 
the belief that Israel was a strategic asset to the foreign policy of the U.S. in the Middle 
East. In this sense, Israel not only had political and strategic importance, but also was a 
cultural representative of Western and American ideals and values in a region characterised 
by lack thereof. The earliest version of the ‘Israel-as-strategic-asset’ argument can be found 
in Commentary during the 1950s. At that time, the journal still considered itself a non-
Zionist publication and its contributors were more interested in the American scene than in 
Palestine/Israel. Moreover, according to Garry Dorrien, Commentary’s discussion of Israel 
was initially more “urbane, pluralistic, and generally moderate in its politics” and it was not 
until the later 1960s that its “approach to Israeli affairs” began to “flatten to a hard line”.234 
Yet, a number of articles published in the 1950s argued that Israel was a politically vital 
ally with congruent interests in the fight for democratic pre-eminence in the Middle East. 
Within the context of developing its anti-communist, pro-American rationale, Commentary 
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began to spell out the arguments, which would turn it into a resolute supporter of the Israeli 
state in later years and come to associate neoconservatism with a hard-line Zionist image. 
The creation of Israel in 1948 and its repercussions for Jewish American self-
perception led to divisive debates amongst Jewish intellectuals and community leaders. It 
became essential to define a legitimate Jewish American stance towards Israel that would 
allow for a close identification of American Jews with the new nation and yet not interfere 
with Jewish American identity.235 For instance, the great majority of Jewish American 
leadership sternly rejected the central Zionist dictum of making Aliyah, i.e. the return to the 
holy land, for American Jews, claiming that their Zion was America. Even within the 
official Zionist organisations, such as the ZOA, Hadassah, and the Labour Zionists, pure 
Zionist ideology seldom amounted to more than lip service.236  
While these discussions were part of Jewish intra-communal discourse during the 
1940s and 1950s, it was not until the 1960s that Israel (together with the Holocaust) began 
to become an officially promoted symbol of collective Jewish American identity. 
According to Jonathan Sarna, the establishment of the state of Israel was ultimately 
sanctioned for American Jews not by “the declining state of the Jewish Diaspora but the 
memory of the Holocaust”.237 Israel was intrinsically linked to the Holocaust in the mind of 
most American Jews, and both symbols “developed together...They incubated [during the 
1950s], nourished by engaged subgroups like Holocaust survivors and Zionist activists, and 
reinforced by Jewish educators”.238 Israel was in many ways seen as an answer to the 
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Holocaust and the central theme that came to dominate organised American Jewish life 
during the 1960s was the “Holocaust and redemption” narrative – “the generative myth by 
which the generality of American Jews make sense of themselves”.239  
Commentary was one of the incubators of this collective symbol and an eminent 
voice in the debates relative to the establishment of the Jewish state and its implications for 
American Jewry. While it contributed cardinally to making Israel - in tandem with 
Holocaust memorialisation - into a central pillar of organised communal life, it originally 
had mixed feelings towards the Jewish state, believing that it might interfere with its most 
cherished mission - the full inclusion of Jews into American society. However, the journal 
quickly developed a rationale with which it was possible to defend Israel as well as be 
stringently patriotic. During the 1950s, it began arguing that Israeli and American interests 
were congruent, describing Israel as a representative of American style democracy in the 
Middle East and an important ally in the fight against the Soviet Union and anti-democratic 
tendencies within the region more generally. As such, the support of Israel was not just a 
Jewish but also an American interest. This argument would form the basis for an eventually 
staunch Zionism that would come to characterise the journal in the late 1960s. 
In the years from 1945 to 1948, Commentary published articles, which expressed 
hesitance with respect to the idea of a Jewish state.240 It was not until the sixth issue that 
Commentary ran its first straightforward Zionist article entitled “No Hope But Exodus” by 
Shlomo Katz, in which he stipulated that mass emigration to Palestine was the only 
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practical and moral solution for uprooted European Jewry.241 And yet, Commentary 
remained ambivalent as to the prospects and nature of a Jewish state in Palestine. As Israel 
declared independence on May 14, 1948, Hannah Arendt, long active on behalf of Zionism 
and supporting the idea of a disarmed bi-national state, criticised that Jews everywhere had 
come to unanimously “believe in fighting at any price and feel that ‘going down’ is a 
sensible method of politics”.242 She warned that the new Jewish state would face unbending 
Arab hostility and would be in a constant state of war.243  
None of the central characters around Commentary were ardent Zionists initially. 
Eliot Cohen had grown up in an anti-Zionist family and was, according to Irving Kristol 
“much of a non-Zionist”, reflecting the AJC’s position. Cohen himself had long backed 
Judah L. Magnes’ the idea of a bi-national state before the founding of Israel. Kristol 
“never bought that” idea and supported the establishment of a homeland for Jews, but still 
did not consider himself a Zionist.244 Nathan Glazer retrospectively also downplayed the 
extent of his Zionism at the time, claiming that he too supported the creation of a bi-
national workers’ state.245 Norman Podhoretz, while considering himself a Zionist by the 
1950s, told Trilling after a visit to Israel in 1951, that he “felt more at home in Athens” 
describing the Israelis as “surly and boorish”.246 
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Nevertheless, early Commentary issues also expressed a sense of urgency when 
dealing with the volatile situation in Palestine and the condition of homelessness of 
European Jewry. Taken together these articles seemed to reflect the sentiment that the 
creation of a Jewish state was the most important matter on the American Jewish national 
agenda from 1945 to 1948, during which time, according to Arthur Hertzberg, “there was 
about Zionism the compelling atmosphere of a moral crusade in which all of world Jewry 
participated”.247 In the words of Ruth Wisse, the “permanent sense of crisis” expressed by 
Commentary relative to the situation in Palestine and Europe after the Holocaust, 
“conveyed the need for extraordinary measures” in the early post-war years.248 This 
sentiment was underscored by a wide range of articles on the Holocaust, the psychology of 
anti-Semitism and Nazism, the situation of Displaced Persons and the Jewish community in 
Palestine/Israel.249  
Despite many concerns relative to a Jewish state, the vast coverage of the Holocaust, 
the dilemma of European Jewry and the situation in Palestine/Israel conveyed the message 
that the magazine came to support the newly founded state by the end of the 1940s, less for 
ideological reasons but because it had been convinced by the practical and moral urgency 
of the matter. Numerous articles on American and Israeli Jewry and the common Jewish 
heritage that linked both communities, also reflected an awareness of the historical 
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dimension of the new state and an underlying support for the idea of a culturally defined 
concept of Jewish peoplehood.250 Moreover, according to David Horowitz, there was an 
awareness that the success of the new state depended to a large extent on the support 
American Jewry and other Jewish communities around the world: “Here is a challenge to 
all the creative forces of Palestine and of Jewry as a whole”.251 Furthermore, the regular 
discussions of Yiddish, Hebrew and Jewish literature, and to a lesser extent of Jewish 
religious thought, communicated the newly found Jewish self-assertiveness, which 
accompanied the establishment of the new Jewish state. In accordance with Cohen’s 
original intent for the magazine, it had become a forum in which Jewish authors and ideas 
received equal analysis to gentile literature and thought.252  
Nevertheless, as the Cold War ground on, Commentary was more concerned with 
developing hard anti-communist positions rather than a defence of Israel per se. The fact 
that anti-communist hysteria dominated the early 1950s and projected a demand of 
complete loyalty of its citizens, left little room for extensive exploration of ethnic 
divergence. The article “America Demands A Single Loyalty”, in which Dorothy 
Thompson claimed that Israeli ties conflicted with the full exercise of U.S. citizenship, 
reflected the atmosphere, which most surely contributed to the somewhat restrained 
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embrace of Israel by Commentary during those years.253 Yet, in his rebuttal “America 
Recognizes Diverse Loyalties”, Oscar Handlin claimed that it was the essence of American 
culture that “men are capable of expressing themselves, wherever they feel such need, 
through associations to which they are drawn by a common ancestry”.254 Handlin argued, 
that American supporters of Israel were the most stringent proponents of American values 
and interests. It was on the background of these diverging interpretations of American 
pluralism that Commentary began to develop its rationale for supporting the Israeli state. 
During the 1950s, the magazine published articles, which argued that Israel was an 
essential player in the struggle against Soviet expansionism in a strategically vital region. 
Accusing the Eisenhower administration of abetting the Arab states to the detriment of 
Israel, for instance with respect to arms sales, and of being made up of “A group of baffled 
men…frightened by the Communists” generally, these articles foreshadowed a standard 
neoconservative argument that American foreign policy in the Middle East was based on a 
paralysing and cowardly fear of Soviet power and preferred to cajole the Soviets and their 
proxies rather then asserting the responsibilities of world leadership.255 The most critical 
positions relative to U.S. policies in the region were published during and after the Suez 
Canal crisis of 1956. The U.S., reluctant to identify unconditionally with former colonial 
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powers France and Britain, publicly opposed the use of force in the course of Egypt’s move 
to nationalise the Suez Canal. Ultimately, the U.S., together with the Soviet Union, coerced 
Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory and upheld the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal.256 
Contributions discussing the Suez Crisis expressed a deep concern that the Soviets 
were able to exploit the power vacuum in the Middle East, as former colonial powers 
Britain and France were receding, because of American political and military timidity.257 
The U.S.’ “bowing and scraping” had led directly to Egypt’s Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser 
“cockiness” towards the West and the threat of “losing the Middle East” to the Soviets, 
which would constitute an even greater menace to the continued existence of Israel’s free 
society than autocratic and hostile Arab regimes, armed with Soviet weaponry.258 
Moreover, Commentary was concerned about the internal communist threat within Israel 
itself.259 The only way to avoid the spread of communism in the Middle East and 
strengthening the Arabs in their belief that they could get away with a war of annihilation 
against Israel, Commentary argued, was by giving more diplomatic and especially military 
support to Israel and making it into a central strategic representative of U.S. power. 
Cautioning to stop the State Department’s “policy of Arab appeasement”, the underlying 
rationale for this supposed change of policy, it suggested, was the congruence of interests 
between Israel, the United States and the West generally. 260   
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Not only were Israel and the U.S. linked by a common interest in avoiding the spread 
of communism and the military armament of Arab nations who were hostile to Israel’s 
existence, they were also culturally related, by the fact that Israel was a pioneer nation, 
surrounded by enemies, who rejected the liberal democratic system that had been implanted 
in their midst. According to historian Walter Laqueur, Israel functioned as a lightening rod 
for “Arab anti-Westernism” – diverting some of the “Arab resentment” from the West - and 
should therefore get adequate support from Western nations.261 Much like a city upon a hill, 
the Israeli experiment of developing democracy in a hostile environment, had to be 
defended by American military and political might.262  
Considering Israel as a representative of the free world, Commentary argued, that it 
was in the American interest to stop pandering to the Arab world and fortify Israel against 
communism. It was during the 1950s that ‘Commentarians’ began to interpret “the fierce 
assault on its [Israel’s] legitimacy as part of the ideological offensive against the 
democratic world led and orchestrated by the Soviet Union”, an argument, which would 
find further development over the next three decades.263 Furthermore, Podhoretz, writing 
one year after the Suez Crisis, admonished fellow Jewish intellectuals for not standing up 
more firmly for Israel during the crisis. He assailed Jews for not voicing their support for 
Israel more categorically, claiming that Israel’s continued existence was also in their 
interest, since their fates were inescapably linked. Finally, Israel, he exhorted, should be 
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treated by the same standards as any other country, since “no apologies are required for 
asserting one’s right to existence…because this right is absolute”.264 
 
Conclusion 
 
A close reading of early Commentary issues demonstrates that incipient neoconservative 
ideas and themes emerged at a much earlier date than generally assumed. Incipient 
neoconservatives’ euphoric embrace of the American status quo after 1945 led to the 
development of a hyper-nationalism in which American and Jewish identities were 
intertwined in a symbiotic relationship based on a allegedly fierce antipathy of both 
cultures for communism. In the process of developing its hard anti-communist stance, 
Commentary also began to expand its anti-liberal rationale, tied to a specific use of 
Holocaust analogies and its perceived lessons for the American scene, which, as David 
MacDonald has shown, would in later years become a central rhetorical characteristic of 
neoconservatism.265 While communism was comparable to Nazism, liberals, so the 
argument of incipient neoconservatives went, were as guilty as ever for abetting those evils, 
unable to recognise the damage they were doing in the name of liberal values of tolerance 
and civil liberties. Liberals had not learned the lessons the Holocaust supposedly taught. 
Holocaust analogies accompanied incipient neoconservatives’ efforts to prove that Jews 
were ‘good’ Americans at every stage – refuting the widespread interpretation that the 
Holocaust was a taboo amongst American Jews up until the later half of the 1960s. 
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Investigating early Commentary issues confirms Ruth Wisse’s claim that “it was the 
Jewish component of Commentary that promoted neoconservatism (long) before the term 
came into use”.266 Studies, which consider the Jewish dimension of neoconservatism 
generally describe it as having been exclusively driven by the emergent Zionism of its 
adherents, especially after the Six Day War. While the perceived need to defend Israel was 
indeed important in early neoconservative thought, it nonetheless did not constitute a 
driving force in its emergence. Most early neoconservatives were initially more concerned 
with the American scene than Israel. As shown above, many of them had mixed feelings 
about the creation of a Jewish state - a condition reflected in the pages of Commentary. It 
was only in the context of its defence of American pre-eminence in the Middle East that the 
magazine began to develop a defence of the Israeli state as a strategic and ideological asset 
to U.S. foreign policy, defining Israel as an outpost of the West in a strategically vital 
region.  
During the later 1940s and throughout the 1950s, Jewish intellectuals, working within 
the realm of Commentary focused primarily on defining a position for themselves as Jews 
and as intellectuals within American society. Driven by the desire to be fully included in 
dominant society and yet rediscover and uphold their Jewish particularity, they searched for 
ways in which to connect both components symbiotically. This was to be accomplished by 
embracing the American status quo and a fierce anti-communism, thereby proving that 
Jews were ‘good’ Americans. Holocaust analogies, as has been shown, accompanied this 
effort at every stage – a fact that refutes the myth that the Holocaust was a taboo issue 
amongst American Jews up until the later half of the 1960s. 
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Chapter 3 
“Liberal Judaism is a Contradiction in Terms”: 
Commentary and  
the Anti-Progressive Backlash,  
1960-1965 
!  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In February 1963, Commentary published “My Negro Problem – And Ours” by its new 
editor-in-chief Norman Podhoretz. The article was a barometer for the extent to which 
Podhoretz’s anti-progressivism had developed by the early 1960s. Its main target were 
“white middle class liberals” who supported racial integration. Framed by Podhoretz’s 
personal experience of an emotionally constrained boy, who was repeatedly harassed by 
“much bigger and stronger” black boys, Podhoretz’s story inversed the ‘blacks as victims-
whites as oppressors’ pattern. Nevertheless, as the ‘good liberal’ he had become, Podhoretz 
claimed, he knew to control his “irrational fear of blacks” – and therefore had no choice but 
to support racial integration.267 
Yet, the article made clear that he had serious doubts about integrationist liberalism. 
Expressing his disdain for white liberals because they allegedly “romanticise the Negroes 
and pander to them” out of guilt for past injustices, he accused them of letting 
“Negroes…blackmail them into adopting a double standard of moral judgment”.268 The 
article introduced a rhetoric, which played on negative stereotypes of blacks as violent and 
uneducated and simultaneously denounced liberals for their alleged hypocrisy of supporting 
civil rights in words but not in deeds. Liberals, Podhoretz claimed, had realised that “their 
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abstract commitment to the cause of Negro rights will not stand the test of a direct 
confrontation”.269 The article reflected, according to Dorrien, Podhoretz’s belief that 
integrationist liberalism was but “the pathetic product of middle-class guilt”.270  
While Podhoretz did not directly refer to Jewish pro-civil rights activists, he 
implicitly aimed at them, when he invoked the ovens of Auschwitz towards the end of the 
article in order to criticise black racial assertiveness. Carrying integrationist liberalism to 
extreme conclusion, he suggested that the only way the racial crisis could be overcome was 
by miscegenation at the end of which lay the dissolution of blacks as a distinct group. 
Further, he asked himself if survival as a distinct group really was desirable for black? 
While Jews had “good reason” to want to survive as a group, he claimed, blacks had no 
positive legacy worth preserving. For the African American, he claimed, “his past is a 
stigma, his color is a stigma and his future is the hope of erasing the stigma by making it 
disappear as a fact of consciousness”.271 If blacks would disappear, he seemed to suggest, 
the memory of their persecution could also be erased. 
Justine Wise Polier and Shad Polier of the progressive American Jewish Congress 
(AJCongress) expressed outrage at Podhoretz’s article by accusing him of lacking the 
necessary Jewish self-respect. They turned Podhoretz’s indictment of liberals’ alleged 
tendency towards self-deprecation against him and confirmed the Jewish commitment to 
black civil rights. Further, they claimed that it was precisely the heritage of Jewish 
commitment to the ideal of “human brotherhood” that had “made the survival of the Jewish 
people meaningful to Jews as men and to those lands in which the Jews had lived”. 
Podhoretz’s article, however, was nothing but a rejection of “the Jewish and American 
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ideal” and an “admission of self-contempt”.272 Did he, they speculated, feel so oppressed by 
his own Jewishness that he longed to be part of the powerful goyim? 
Whether one agreed or disagreed with Podhoretz, he certainly touched a nerve. For 
the following three issues Commentary published numerous reactions from readers in the 
‘Letters to the Editor’ section of the magazine, amongst them about a dozen which praised 
Podhoretz for his alleged intrepidity.273 Moreover, the exchange between Podhoretz and the 
Poliers illustrates the intense nature of the arguments progressive liberal Jews and those 
who thought that liberalism was no longer a viable option for Jews engaged in by the early 
1960s. As shown, the beginnings of these arguments reached back to the end of Second 
World War and would throughout the 1960s grow so intense that Orthodox Rabbi Yaakov 
Jacob came to describe intra-communal Jewish relations by 1968 as having taken on the 
nature of “a civil war”. He claimed that at the heart of this war lay the question of “who is 
more authentically Jewish”.274  
While the 1960s were an economically prosperous decade, it was also a time when 
the anti-communist consensus collapsed and American society appeared dominated by 
extremes – it was, as if, in the words of Jonathan Sarna, “the middle dropped out”.275 This 
tense period also contributed to a deepening sense of unease amongst American Jews, 
which found reflection in continued intra-communal debates about redrawing the 
boundaries of acceptable political behaviour along ideological lines. Especially the first half 
of the 1960s was a time of widespread uncertainty and internal strife within the organised 
American Jewish community. As this chapter demonstrates arguments centred on issues 
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such as how Jews as Jews and as Americans should position themselves relative to the civil 
rights movement, to integrationist measures in Northern schools and neighbourhoods, to a 
growing Holocaust consciousness and Jewish particularism, to the emerging student 
movement and the counterculture.  
Commentary was one venue where the shift from concerns about Jewish integration 
to survivalist considerations, which came to characterise the agenda of a great majority 
within the organised Jewish community during the later half of the 1960s, was 
foreshadowed.276 It was during the early 1960s that Jewish intellectuals, such as Irving 
Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Bell, came to feel, in the words of 
Sidney Blumenthal, “more alienated [from developments on the American national stage] 
than ever”.277 While most still considered themselves radicals of some sort, the emergence 
of the student movement and counterculture, coupled with the radicalisation of certain 
elements within the civil rights movement, seemed to them to spell the beginning of the 
decline of American civilisation.278 Towards the end of the decade, many of them began to 
move to the right of the political spectrum. 
In opposition to traditional narratives, this chapter shows that the anti-progressive 
backlash of future neoconservatives did not just emerge in reaction to developments of the 
later 1960s and especially to the Six-Day War in 1967. As previously shown, early 
neoconservative ideas arose during the 1950s and the Jewish dimension was not primarily 
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related to Zionist concerns. Neoconservative ideas were elaborated further during the early 
1960s and gave way to a broadly invested critique of the liberal establishment. The main 
concern of future neoconservatives was that developments within liberalism supposedly 
were threatening to undermine the social stability of American society, which they 
considered essential for the security of Jews. Yet, while many interpretations of 
neoconservatism contend that the right turn of liberal intellectuals emerged purely as 
reaction to transformations within liberalism, which is referred to as the ‘heroes’ paradigm, 
this chapter demonstrates that the neoconservative turn accelerated, as future 
neoconservatives began to accentuate more forcefully those elements in their thought that 
had been closer to conservatism than to liberalism all along.279 It is impossible to single out 
one specific event that drove this shift during the early 1960s. However, by examining a 
multiplicity of variables it is possible to observe the emergence of a framework, however 
polymorphous and often contradictory, of core neoconservative thought.  
In the process of turning towards the right, future neoconservatives began to promote 
the idea that a more conservative politics was the best way to ensure Jewish security and 
collective survival. Accordingly, Jews were an integral part of American society – who by 
virtue of its democratic political culture had offered Jews previously inexperienced safety 
and integration – and therefore it was of vital importance to defend American values and 
traditions from the “onslaught” of social and political movements that potentially sought to 
undermine the very foundations of American society. Podhoretz took the lead in pointing 
out the threat that emanated for Jews from America’s perceived cultural and moral 
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deterioration, re-fashioning himself, in the eyes of fellow neoconservative Lucy 
Dawidowicz, into “the true defender of the Jews”.280 
 
Norman Podhoretz: ‘The Meir Kahane of the Intellectuals’281  
 
Norman Podhoretz was born on January 16, 1930 and grew up in a working-class family of 
Galician immigrants in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn. While his parents, nominally 
Orthodox, were highly selective about religious observation, they rejected both Reform as 
well as Conservative Judaism as not sufficiently Jewish. In high school, he was mentored 
by his English teacher Harriet Haft, who was “bent on civilizing” him and in the long run 
turn him into a “facsimile WASP”.282  She also instilled in him a keen interest in literature, 
which in 1946 led him to Columbia University on a scholarship, where he studied under the 
accomplished literary critic and first generation New York intellectual, Lionel Trilling. At 
Columbia, Podhoretz felt like one of Stendhal’s “young man from the provinces”, 
intimidated by the WASP “preppy types”.283 Meanwhile, he also worked studied for a 
degree in Hebrew Literature at the Seminary College of Jewish Studies, the academic 
division of the Jewish Theological Seminary. 
Lionel Trilling, who was the first scholar of Jewish descent to be tenured in an 
English department at an elite American university, had flirted with communism, yet had 
never been a strong believer. He was deeply affected by the moral crisis of his friend 
Whittaker Chambers, a former Soviet spy, who broke with the Communist Party in 1938 
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and turned against the Soviet Union after the signing of the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939. 
Chambers’ denunciation of alleged Soviet spies in the State Department led to the infamous 
Alger Hiss trial in 1948 that, in the words of Harold Rosenberg, marked “the initiation of 
militant anti-Communism, with the repentant ex-Communist in the vanguard”.284 Trilling 
was so disturbed by Chambers’ remorse, that, in reaction, he wrote his only novel, entitled 
The Middle of the Journey, dealing with the bitter ideological disputes amongst the 
American intelligentsia, making the absence of integrity at the very heart of the debate into 
the central message of the story.285 
While Podhoretz was one of Trilling’s prize students and tried to emulate him in 
many ways, he would accuse him repeatedly of lacking the courage of his convictions in 
later years. Trilling, who coined the term “adversary culture” during the 1950s, became 
tormented by the belief that the anti-bourgeois values that he and other New York 
intellectuals had promoted in culture and politics during the 1930s and 1940s might under 
certain circumstances lead to the destruction of the very social order of which he was an 
integral part.286 While Trilling was indeed critical of the various social and cultural 
movements that emerged during the 1960s, he, nevertheless, could not bring himself to 
denounce the “adversary culture” in the same terms that Podhoretz would do.287  
With Trilling’s help, Podhoretz was able to continue his literary studies at Clare 
College, Cambridge, England, after he graduated from Columbia in 1950. He began 
working on a doctoral thesis on the political novels of Benjamin Disraeli. At Cambridge he 
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studied under F.R. Leavis, a leading English literary critic who published an article by 
Podhoretz in Criterion.288 With the “superego of a horse” already well developed during 
these years, Podhoretz dreamed of becoming a success story in the literary world. In a letter 
written to Trilling on June 6, 1951, Podhoretz said that he “had these visions of bursting 
upon the literary scene with something world shaking: I was going to make them sit up and 
take notice”.289 He especially wanted to be noted by the New York intellectuals. Having 
visited the office of Commentary in the summer of 1952 and asked by Cohen to review 
Bernard Malamud’s The Natural, he returned to England with “my heart lusting for 
publication and for very little else”.290 Feeling ill at ease in the academic world, he set out 
to follow “his desire to become a New York Intellectual”.291 He, therefore, returned to the 
U.S. in 1953, aborting his university career. Yet, while he worked briefly for Commentary, 
he was drafted into the army at the end of 1953, and was stationed in Giessen, Germany. 
Upon his discharge at the end of 1955, he went back to work as assistant editor for 
Commentary magazine. His motivation for returning to the magazine, he retrospectively 
claimed, was that he wanted “to see my name in print, to be praised, and above all to attract 
attention”.292  
By the time Podhoretz joined Commentary as a permanent member of staff, assistant 
editor Nathan Glazer had left to work at Anchor Books and Robert Warshow, whom 
Podhoretz felt close to when he had briefly worked for Commentary in 1953, had died of a 
heart attack aged 37. Since Eliot Cohen was suffering severely from depression, the 
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magazine was run by the art critic Clement Greenberg and his brother Martin Greenberg, 
with whom Podhoretz clashed continuously over issues pertaining to the agenda of the 
magazine.293 In a letter written to Trilling, which is undated but which must be from the 
later half of the 1950s, he described the atmosphere at Commentary as having become so 
unbearable, riven by infighting and the “oppressive” antics of the Greenberg brothers, that 
he was planning to leave the journal: “Things have become almost intolerable for me here 
under les frères...The main thing is to get out of here before I develop an ulcer”.294 
In the autobiography Ex-Friends, Podhoretz recounted that the main motivation for 
turning his back on Commentary in 1957 was a dispute between himself and the Greenberg 
brothers about an article by Hannah Arendt entitled “Reflections on Little Rock” in which 
she argued against federal efforts to desegregate Southern schools. Her argument was based 
on the distinction between public/political and social domain, attributing education to the 
social rather than the public/political sphere. Arendt argued that federal law should not 
prescribe the social dimension which criteria to use in selecting its members, thereby 
denying federal law power of intervention within the public school system. Moreover, she 
believed that other areas of society should have priority in the desegregation process, such 
as marriage laws of certain states for instance, since she considered those a more 
conspicuous transgressions against the U.S. constitution than school segregation.295 
Furthermore, she objected to the political instrumentalisation of education and 
believed it irresponsible of adults to put the primary burden of federal desegregation policy 
in the South on children. While Podhoretz claimed to disagree with her opinion in the 
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matter, he was impressed by “the originality of the argument”. Martin Greenberg, however, 
rejected its publication outright. He feared that “so politically heretical” a piece of writing 
on a touchy subject like school integration would lead to a curtailing of editorial 
independence by the AJC.296 Podhoretz tried to negotiate conditions for publication for a 
couple of months, but Arendt eventually withdrew the article and it was published in 
Dissent magazine.297  
This incident, in addition to a number of other quarrels, eventually persuaded 
Podhoretz to leave the magazine in order to work for Anchor Books and then for Random 
House for a short while, while free-lance writing for Partisan Review, the New Yorker, The 
Reporter (a magazine run by Irving Kristol after his return from working for Encounter in 
London, England), Esquire, the New Leader, and the New Republic. Podhoretz returned 
eventually to Commentary as editor-in-chief after Eliot Cohen committed suicide in 1959. 
The board of directors of the AJC had offered the editorship to Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell 
and Alfred Kazin, all of whom turned it down. Podhoretz was next in line. Pretending to be 
undecided at first, he accepted the offer eventually, becoming editor in chief of 
Commentary at age thirty. Since he believed that Commentary under Cohen had turned into  
“a true spokesman for the spirit of the fifties”, according to which “the United States of 
America…was the best society a human nature…was likely…to build”. Podhoretz’s 
intention “was to say goodbye to all that; the hard anti-Communism and to celebration, 
however quiet, of American virtue”.298 
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In order to realise his aim, Podhoretz allegedly wanted to bring the magazine to the 
left, an assertion, which is questionable. He certainly did not turn his back on anti-
communism and Commentary came to celebrate a mythologised conception of America 
even more than it had under Podhoretz’s predecessor. Most importantly, Podhoretz 
succeeded in making the journal into an extension of himself. According to Lucy 
Dawidowicz, he “recreated Commentary” when he took over from Eliot Cohen: “You made 
it uniquely yours”, transforming it into an “incalculable influence in shaping American 
public opinion and Jewish public opinion … on the great issues of our time which affect us 
as Americans and as Jews”.299 Podhoretz himself seemed to agree. Relative to his influence 
on the magazine, he declared “There’s a lot of me in almost everything that appears in this 
magazine”.300 
 
The ‘New Commentary’ : A Voice of Radicalism? 
 
According to Podhoretz himself and the standard narrative of neoconservatism, he infused 
Commentary with a dose of leftist radicalism when he took over the magazine in 1960. He 
claimed that his aim “to turn Commentary, as I myself had been turning, in the same 
leftward direction” coexisted with the eagerness “to get the magazine talked about once 
again in as many circles as possible”.301 Overall, historians seem to take Podhoretz’s own 
retrospective interpretation, which he refers to as his “aberrational period”, at face value; 
referring to Podhoretz’s “self-identification as a radical” or claiming that when “Podhoretz 
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took over Commentary; he brought the magazine to the left”.302 Yet this depiction distorts 
the picture. While it is true that Podhoretz opened the magazine to anarchist, progressive 
and democratic socialist voices, he simultaneously began to launch concerted attacks 
against progressive liberalism and specifically against progressive Jewish liberalism during 
the early 1960s.  
His interest in radicalism has been explained by the fact that Podhoretz came to think 
that the Soviet threat to the “free world” had diminished after Stalin’s death and after Nikita 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation speech of February 25, 1956, in which he denounced the 
personality cult created by Stalin and the Great Purges that murdered millions. Podhoretz, 
therefore, seemed to believe that intellectuals should focus their attention more closely on 
the home front and debate various reformist ideas that could strengthen American society 
and make it more resilient in its fight against the communist enemy. Commentary had 
become too predictable and rigid, in Podhoretz’s opinion, just as the intellectual discourse 
had during the latter half of the 1950s. It was his strategy, therefore, to infuse a “fresh look” 
at established ideas and contribute something new and preferably groundbreaking to the 
debate. His opening editorial claimed that the Cold War had transformed American society 
to the point that it had consecrated “all its energies to holding a defensive line not only 
against the very real threat of Soviet power but against the promise of our own future 
potentialities”.303 
The first step towards rehabilitating “the long-dormant tradition of American social 
criticism” was, therefore, to publish excerpts of Paul Goodman’s study of juvenile 
delinquency entitled Growing Up Absurd.  Goodman, himself an anarchist, had tried but 
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failed to get a contract with 19 different publishers. With the help of Podhoretz and Jason 
Epstein it was eventually brought out in book form with Random House. The publication of 
the articles based on Growing Up Absurd achieved the result that Podhoretz’s had hoped 
for: “they put the “new Commentary on the map”.304 About Goodman’s utopianism 
Podhoretz wrote: “I regard it as a virtue rather than a fault that his articles are ‘utopian’ and 
cannot easily be translated into a program to put before the electorate”.305 He further argued 
that it was the role of intellectuals “not to offer programs but to serve ideals…to speak 
unashamedly and passionately not on behalf of what man happens at the moment to be, but 
on behalf of what he has within him to become”.306 
 Podhoretz wanted to shake things up, to address issues that were not being addressed 
by politicians or the majority of intellectuals. And yet, at the same time, he continued to 
publish more moderate voices, even conservative ones. In fact, he seemed to be looking for 
a conservative radical critique of American society that could unify anti-communism in 
conjunction with social experimentation. Nathan Glazer described the radicalism that 
pervaded Commentary in those days as one that was very close to conservative ideas 
relative to an organically grown community characterised by solving problems on a 
localised and kinship level. According to Glazer, it was a radicalism defined by an 
attraction towards “the anti-bureaucratic, the small and the immediate”.307 
Therefore, while publishing Paul Goodman, Staughton Lynd, Michael Harrington, 
David Riesman and Malcolm Maccoby, he also gave voice to Theodore Draper and Richard 
Lowenthal, both of whom defended hard anti-communist positions based on their 
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assessment that Khrushchev was the logical heir of Stalin. In July 1961, Commentary 
published Irving Kristol’s counter-attack on Harvard professor H. Stuart Hughes’ calls for 
unilateral disarmament.308 He also published Lynd’s revisionist perspective on the Cold 
War, which blamed U.S. actions for starting the conflict.309 Other voices of radicalism that 
articulated their ideas in Commentary in the early 1960s were Norman Mailer, Norman O. 
Brown, and Herbert Marcuse; all of whom did not belong, according to Sidney Blumenthal, 
“in the Trilling tradition”.310 In a sense, Podhoretz’s ‘radicalism’ also can be interpreted as 
an effort to antagonise Trilling and to disengage himself from Eliot Cohen’s influence.  
While radical cultural criticism seemed to attract Podhoretz in some way, it cannot be 
overlooked that he at no point questioned the fundamental tenets of American society and 
politics and did not advocate socialist ideology. The limits of his radicalism also were 
reflected, for example, by the fact that he chose not to publish an early version of the Port 
Huron manifesto, offered to him by Tom Hayden, because he allegedly considered it to be 
“intellectually shallow”. He found the statement to be more conditional than principled, and 
he claimed retrospectively that he feared “that the type of humanism embodied in it carried 
the seeds of leftist authoritarianism”. 311 
Since Podhoretz had missed out on the formative experience of the older members of 
the New York intellectuals with communism and the subsequent disenchantment with it, 
his alleged radical phase created an experience, which substituted the process of ‘apostasy’ 
from communism by his disillusionment with early 1960s radicalism.312 The threat posed 
by communists and fellow travellers was superseded by that emanating from the New Left, 
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civil rights activists, student radicals, and later gay and women’s rights activists for the 
American polity and for American Jews. 
In the early 1960s Podhoretz also ran a number of articles dealing with the Vietnam 
War, often expressing a desire to help the South Vietnamese but at the same time 
conveying the message that military action would not be successful in freeing the South 
from the influence of the Vietcong. Commentary published a major exponent of realpolitik, 
Hans Morgenthau, who warned that military involvement in Vietnam was bound to be just 
as unsuccessful as in Korea and would almost certainly lead to more casualties than the 
Korean War. The only possible line of action, Morgenthau suggested, was to impose 
sanctions against North Vietnam.313 
As the discussion of the Vietnam War in Commentary during the early 1960s 
indicates, most of the future neoconservatives supported unilateral immediate withdrawal. 
Irving Kristol was exceptional among ‘Commentarians’ in pleading for the American 
military to remain in Vietnam because he believed that pulling out equalled weakness in the 
face of the communist enemy. Most others, however, tried to publicly defend a moderate 
anti-war position throughout the early 1960s. Considering the war to be “morally and 
politically disastrous”, Irving Howe and civil rights activist Bayard Rustin nevertheless 
believed that the burgeoning anti-Vietnam movement’s “task is not to assign historical 
responsibility for the present disaster to one or another side”.314 Nathan Glazer agreed that 
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the Vietnam War was not the reflection of the debasement of American culture, but “the 
result of a series of monumental errors”.315  
Therefore, while giving voice to radical authors and ideas, Podhoretz simultaneously 
continued to publish articles that took moderate or even conservative departures. That was 
also the case when it came to publishing a specifically Jewish perspective. From the start 
Podhoretz made room for articles that criticised progressive Jewish liberalism. Emil 
Fackenheim, a major influence on Podhoretz’s intellectual development, for example, 
condemned progressive Judaism for insisting that social justice was the essence of modern 
Jewish identity.316 This kind of interpretation was not only false, Fackenheim claimed, but 
would eventually implode since “liberal Judaism is a contradiction in terms”. Jewish 
liberalism, he suggested, was highly problematic because it produced “broad-minded, 
pluralistic, and tolerant” young Jews who consequently were unable to articulate traditional 
Jewish values even when their lives depended on it. Liberalism, he concluded, induced a 
relativistic approach towards existential questions and would ultimately lead to the demise 
of Judaism.317 
Milton Himmelfarb accused Jewish liberals of lacking the necessary self-respect, 
wondering, for example, how Jewish lawyers of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) could defend the constitutional right to free speech of George Lincoln Rockwell, 
the head of the American Nazi Party, when he was seeking admission from the New York 
mayoralty to speak publicly in the city. Disturbed, Himmelfarb asked: “what moral or 
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professional obligation led Jewish lawyers to volunteer?”318 Connecting the Rockwell case 
and Jewish reactions to it to the allegedly detached response of certain Jews towards the 
debate surrounding the Eichmann trial, which will be discussed below, he suggested that 
the liberalism of these people posed a threat to Jewish collective survival. Implying Jewish 
self-hate on behalf of the lawyers, he wrote: “Is it a simple failure of the imagination that is 
responsible? Is it repression, or distortion, or diversion of affect? Probably something more 
complex and obscure; and troubling”.319 
In a similar vein, Podhoretz repeatedly accused Jewish liberals of being disrespectful 
of the Jewish heritage and the memory of the six million murdered European Jews. 
Progressive Jews, he claimed, were jeopardising collective Jewish survival, by supporting 
policies that were counterproductive to Jewish interests. Therefore, he exhorted, they were 
no better than the Nazis themselves, for “any Jew who indulges the inclination to forgive 
and forget is countering that dehumanization [of the Nazis] with a species of his own”.320 
According to Dawidowicz, it was during the early 1960s that she and others around 
Commentary began to realise that a “new anti-Semitism emanated” from the political left 
and that “Jews who preferred universalist causes to their own, whose self-hate exceeded 
their self-esteem, stayed with the Left”.321 
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‘A Study in the Perversity of Brilliance’: Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem 
 
The capture of Adolf Eichmann, former head of the Gestapo’s Jewish section, in May 1960 
and his subsequent trial on Israeli soil, is generally assumed to have been the first step in 
eliciting “American Jews to face the historical legacy of the Holocaust”. While the 
Holocaust would not become a dominant symbol of collective American Jewish identity 
until the later 1960s, the Eichmann trial nevertheless contributed eminently to “a new 
understanding of the Holocaust and its relevance for American Jewish life” amongst Jewish 
communal leaders and Jewish intellectuals and generally considered as an “important 
milestone” in making the Holocaust central to Jewish life.322  
At least for the duration of the trial, it moved discussion of the Holocaust centre-stage 
in Jewish and non-Jewish public discourse for the first time since the end of the war. The 
American Jewish Yearbook reported that thousands of articles, in the Jewish press and 
elsewhere, were published on Eichmann from his capture in May 1960 to his eventual 
execution in June 1962.323 According to historian Hanna Yablonka, the trial of Eichmann 
set in motion “a process of seeing Israel no longer as an isolated entity but as the 
continuation of the Diaspora”.324 While Israeli and Diaspora Jewry had hitherto been 
largely considered as two separate entities, the trial introduced a process of rethinking the 
ways in which six million murdered European Jews, Israel and Diaspora Jewry were linked 
with each other. Many American Jews began to emphasise more strongly the Jewish 
“cultural nationalism” concept, upheld for example by historian Salo Baron, which 
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stipulated an interconnectedness between Jewish constituencies the world over, which 
transcended geographical and temporal dispersion.325 
Furthermore, in the words of the American Jewish Yearbook, “American Jews have 
been afflicted with a deep sense of guilt” for having survived and convinced to not have 
done enough to help European Jewry. Accordingly, the Eichmann trial was seen as 
instrumental in reawakening these “Long suppressed…guilt feelings”, eventually giving 
way to a process, by which memorialising the Holocaust and supporting Israeli statehood 
became central elements of Jewish American identity. According to Israeli journalist Tom 
Segev, trying Eichmann in front of Israeli jurisdiction was designed to “remind the 
countries of the world that the Holocaust obligated them to support the only Jewish state on 
earth”.326 
The trial was of outmost importance for New York Jewish intellectuals and 
contributed to making the Holocaust even more central in their thinking than it already 
was.327 The trial brought into focus questions relative to the tensions between American and 
Jewish identity – between a particularistic and universalistic approach to their existence. As 
part of a search for identity, they began reconnecting the ties of shared experience with 
fellow Jews and the Jewish past, something they had, as intellectuals with a claim to 
cosmopolitanism, long rejected. Reflecting on Jewish identity on the backdrop of the 
Eichmann trial, Daniel Bell, by then an associate professor of sociology at Columbia 
University, gave voice to the feelings experienced by many of his fellow intellectuals. He 
                                                
325 Salo A. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). 
326 Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 327-
328. 
327 According to Norman Podhoretz, the trial itself also raised differences between Commentary and its 
sponsor, the AJC. While Commentary’s main position was that Eichmann should be tried in Israel, the 
Committee, believed that Israel had violated international law by abducting Eichmann from Argentina and 
that he should be tried in front of an international court. Yet, according to Podhoretz, the organisation publicly 
“never took a clear position, they waffled”. Podhoretz, Wiener Oral History Library, 20-21. 
 118 
argued that the existential impact of the Holocaust made him realise that he was part of a 
larger entity linked by historical memory. Bell realised, “that there are responsibilities of 
participation even when the community of which one is a part is a community woven by the 
thinning strands of memory”.328 
Podhoretz has credited his awakening to Jewish issues in large part to the Eichmann 
trial and the national debate triggered by this event. He strongly defended the idea that it 
was Israel’s legitimate right to try Eichmann in its jurisdiction since the crimes committed 
by him were aimed mainly against the Jewish people. Historian Oscar Handlin’s disagreed 
and expressed concern about the ethical and moral implications of the trial. According to 
Handlin, “justice calls also for appropriate procedures that keep principle inviolate”. To 
him it was preferable not to try Eichmann for crimes specifically committed against Jews, 
but judge him in an international court for offenses committed against humanity. Handlin 
believed that Israel should not behave “like other nations” specifically because the essence 
of Jewishness lay in its differentiation; not in the sense that Jews were superior but in the 
sense that being a Jew meant the subjugation to universal ethical precepts and not to “the 
power of the sword”.329 
Podhoretz, in return, claimed that people like Handlin, who argued against a 
particularistic approach to the trial because of allegiance to “higher principles”, were 
denying the uniqueness of Nazism and the Holocaust. Anyone who expected Israel to pass 
on the chance to try Eichmann was using a double standard to judge Israel’s actions and 
ultimately asking “Jews that they must justify their existence instead of taking it for granted 
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that they have a simple right to exist”.330 Finally, he contended that Jews, like Handlin, who 
were expecting the Israeli state “to act more nobly than all other nations” were not so much 
motivated by ideals of "‘transcendent moral obligations’” rather than by “the psychology of 
defensiveness and self-hatred. Unfortunately, the evidence seems to me all too clearly in 
favour of the latter hypothesis”.331 
 The publication of Hannah Arendt’s report on the Eichmann Trial, first as serial in 
the New Yorker and in book form in 1963, caused another big stir amongst the New York 
intellectuals. Eichmann in Jerusalem went beyond the events in the court room, reflecting 
on the questions of Nazi guilt and raise the issue of Jewish complicity in the form of the 
Jewish councils, arguing against the perception that Eichmann and Nazis generally were 
larger-than-life villains, but rather average ‘banal’ people, caught in a system which was 
characterised by an inverted or perverted morality codex.332  
New York Jewish intellectuals, like the great majority of Jewish communal leaders, 
reacted furiously - Irving Howe characterised the controversy as a “civil war” – focusing 
almost exclusively on the accusations against European Jewish leadership for complicity in 
Nazi crimes.333 Despite the anger and the personal attacks directed at Arendt, Irving Howe 
retrospectively credited her analysis with awakening New York intellectuals to a “long-
suppressed grief evoked by the Holocaust”, suggesting that it functioned as a release of 
suppressed feelings of guilt for having remained inactive during the war with respect to the 
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fate of European Jews: “It was as if her views, which roused many of us to fury, enabled us 
to finally speak about the unspeakable”.334 
As immediate reaction to the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Howe organised 
a public forum sponsored by Dissent to discuss Arendt’s work, at which critics of Arendt’s 
piece far outweighed her supporters, one of which was former editor of Partisan Review, 
Dwight Macdonald. While most of the participants judged the concept of the ‘banality of 
evil’ dangerous, since it implied that the Nazis were somehow oblivious to what they were 
doing, many also were concerned about the repercussions allegations of Jewish 
‘cooperation’ would have amongst non-Jews. According to Howe, Arendt’s analysis 
conveyed to “Hundreds of thousands of good middle-class Americans”, lacking additional 
contextual information, “that the Jewish leadership in Europe was…collaborationist” and 
had helped “the Nazis achieve their goal of racial genocide”. Lastly, he claimed, it 
projected the message “that if Jews had not ‘cooperated’… fewer than five to six million 
Jews would have been killed”.335 
Like Howe, Podhoretz claimed that Arendt’s book and the reactions to it taught him 
something about his Jewishness. Feeling “profoundly disturbed” by Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, Podhoretz wrote a fierce critique of Hannah Arendt’s ideas as well as her 
personal motifs. He accused her of implicitly questioning Jews’ continued right to exist as a 
distinct people, a question which, as shown, he himself had implied only a couple of 
months earlier, in “My Negro Problems and Ours”. In “Hannah Arendt on Eichmann: A 
Study in the Perversity of Brilliance”, Podhoretz set out to disprove what he considered, 
inaccurately, one of Arendt’s central claims: that Jewish cooperation with the Nazi 
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oppressors, mainly in form of the Judenräte, had significantly contributed to determining 
the number of Jews that were killed by the Nazis.336 By making such a claim, he argued, 
Arendt was implying that without Jewish help and organisation, “there would have been 
either complete chaos or an impossibly severe drain on German manpower”.337 Ultimately 
this suggested that the Nazis were rational beings with whom it was possible to negotiate 
limits to their aims.  
He went on to accuse Arendt of a double standard in judging Jews, making an 
“inordinate demand…on the Jews to be better than other people, to be braver, wiser, nobler, 
more dignified – or be damned”. This, he asserted, was a tendency, which was widespread 
amongst Jews and posed as much a threat to Jewish survival as the Nazis did: “The Nazis 
destroyed a third of the Jewish people. In the name of all that is humane, will the remnant 
never let up on itself?” The intensity and personal viciousness with which he leveled his 
criticism at Arendt, whose work he had previously much admired, can be read as partially 
reflective of Podhoretz’s personality.338 He concluded his article by claiming that Arendt 
was representative “of the intellectual perversity that can result from the pursuit of 
brilliance by a mind infatuated with its own agility and bent on generating dazzle”.339 
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Arendt was so dismayed by Podhoretz’s accusations that she would never write for 
Commentary again and distance herself from her relationship with Podhoretz.340 
Even though, as shown above, Podhoretz had defended particularistic Jewish interests 
prior to the Eichmann controversy, the event alerted him even more to what he believed 
were “the dangerous implications of the notion that Jews in general and the Jewish state in 
particular were required to be morally superior to everyone else”.341 Consequently, 
Podhoretz’s writings became infused with an uncritical defence of Israel in light of what he 
perceived as a double standard applied in judging the state’s behaviour.   
 
 
The Civil Rights Movement and Commentary Magazine 
 
 
 
Another matter which contributed decisively to the birth of an incipient Jewish 
neoconservative agenda in the early 1960s, but whose impact has generally been 
overlooked in studies of the evolutionary history of neoconservatism, was that of racial 
integration. While Jews, mostly secular and Reform, were disproportionately represented in 
civil rights activities instead, there emerged ample evidence towards the beginning of the 
1960s that northern Jewish communities became exceedingly resistant to the pace of 
integration. It was widely perceived that it was predominately Jewish schools and 
neighbourhoods, which were going to be the first targets of integrationist measures. Many, 
therefore, expressed concern with respect to the potentially corrosive effects of 
desegregation on ‘their’ schools and neighbourhoods, a fact which seems ironic, given that 
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Jews often were attached by white resisters to integration in the South for promoting race 
mixing.342  
As a result of these developments, future neoconservatives began to argue that civil 
rights and liberal politics more generally were undermining the particularities of Jewish 
identity, because African Americans and their white liberal supporters were disputing “the 
right to maintain…subcommunities far more radically than any other group demand in 
American history”.343 In this sense, emergent neoconservatism was part of a broader ‘white 
backlash’ in the North against racial integration that emerged in the early 1960s and would 
grow in intensity throughout the 1960s, as most visibly demonstrated during Martin Luther 
King’s “open housing” campaign in Chicago in 1966, which exemplified the extent of 
widespread opposition to residential integration amongst Northern whites.344  
According to Michael Staub, debates about civil rights functioned as a foil within the 
Jewish community, which raised issues of Jewish collective survival and Jewish identity in 
the aftermath of the Holocaust. In alliance with or in opposition to black civil rights, 
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American Jews tried to redefine themselves and their place in American society.345 In 
discussing the civil rights issue, budding neoconservatives came out for defining Jewish 
identity in opposition to blacks and in narrow terms of Jewish collective survival. In order 
to dissociate Jews from civil rights activism and disavow Jewish progressives, future 
neoconservatives drew on existing ambivalent sentiments within the Jewish community 
towards blacks and towards Jewish radicals, which had already come into play, as shown 
above, within the context of anti-communism.346  
Progressive Jewish leaders, such as Rabbis Joachim Prinz, Albert Vorspan, and 
Abraham J. Heschel, on the other hand, continued to argue that civil rights activism was 
based on Jewish religious and cultural traditions, according to which Jews were morally 
obliged to be righteous (tzeddekah) and to contribute to bettering the world (tikkun olam). 
From these axioms they deducted that Jews had to invest themselves on behalf of social 
justice issues, the most pressing of which was black civil rights. This approach defined 
social justice activism as emblematic of modern Jewish identity, not only in religious but 
also in ethnic terms. Drawing inspiration from prophetic Judaism, many progressive Jews 
saw the essence of their Jewish identity therefore realised by declaring their solidarity with 
integrationist activities of the civil rights movement.347  
Moreover, they argued that the Holocaust demanded of Jews to be at the avant-garde 
of black civil rights because a social order based on racial segregation was “fascism in 
everything but name” and idleness on the part of Jews was as immoral as “nonrestistance 
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on the part of non-Jewish Germans to the Nazi genocide”.348 Some of these “shared guilt” 
arguments, enunciated by northern Jewish leaders, were, however, insensitive towards the 
dangers that Jews were exposed to in the American South, where racists implied that Jews 
were behind the move towards de-segregation, which in a number of cases resulted in 
physical assaults on the lives of Jewish pro-integrationists.349 
Opinions in Commentary dealing with the issue of the black freedom struggle ranged 
from moderate to outright reactionary. Like their progressive interlocutors, 
‘Commentarians’ passionately appealed to Holocaust lessons as a reference point in order 
to underscore the moral righteousness of their case. They suggested repeatedly that Jewish 
leftists and especially civil rights activists were insensitive to their own histories as Jews, 
and most specifically to the history of Jewish victimisation under Nazism, endangering 
fellow Jews by associating them with civil rights in the mind of racists. Furthermore, they 
argued that efforts at integrating de facto segregated schools and neighbourhoods in the 
North undermined Jewish group cohesiveness.350 
While many Jews and a number of Jewish defence organisations continued their 
engagement on behalf of civil rights – albeit in a more qualified manner at times when 
Jewish and African American interests appeared to clash - there was a rising tide of Jewish 
voices that counselled against too deep a Jewish commitment to the black freedom struggle. 
Even labour Zionist journals, such as Midstream and Jewish Frontier began to question the 
wisdom of civil rights activities and develop anti-progressive arguments. Marie Syrkin of 
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Jewish Frontier, for instance, stressed the fact that she belonged to a minority group for 
whom “a ghetto is not a metaphor”, while defending a certain degree of self-segregation on 
part of minority groups in order to uphold communal cohesiveness.351 By 1967, Rabbi 
Richard Rubenstein, who had previously upheld the belief that because of the Holocaust 
Jews were held to work for racial equality, retreated on his former civil rights activism, 
because, in light of alleged rising anti-Semitism and black nationalism, the Jewish 
investment “for Negro emancipation had become untenable”.352 
Concurrent with the shift towards an understanding of the Holocaust as a lesson for 
Jews to focus more on their own concerns rather than on those of others, Commentary 
began to accuse Jewish organisations, such as the AJC, the ADL and the AJCongress, 
which continued to be involved in civil rights activities, of no longer representing Jewish 
interests.353 Milton Himmelfarb argued, for example, that even though the AJCongress 
continued to refer to itself as a Zionist organisation, it seemed more interested in civil rights 
activism than Zionism and that the feelings of ethnic and religious pride it articulated were 
“without content and in fact are more attached to civil-rights rhetoric than to Jewish 
religion, education, or culture”. It was no longer possible to tell, he rebuked, whether the 
AJCongress was “a Jewish organization with a civil-rights program or a civil-rights 
organization whose members are Jews”.354 
                                                
351 Marie Syrkin, “Can Minorities Oppose ‘De Facto’ Segregation?” Jewish Frontier, September 1964, 6. 
352 Richard L. Rubenstein, “Jews, Negroes, and the New Politics”, The Reconstructions, November 17, 1967, 
12. 
353 Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice; Dollinger, Quest For Inclusion; Gus J. Solomon, The Jewish Role in the 
American Civil Rights Movements (London: The World Jewish Congress, 1967); Cheryl Greenberg, 
“Negotiating Coalition: Black and Jewish Civil Rights Agencies in the Twentieth Century”, in Struggles in 
the Promised Land: Towards a History of Black-Jewish Relations in the United States, eds. Jack Saltzman 
and Cornel West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 153-175. 
354 Himmelfarb, “In the Community”, 160. 
 127 
While Commentary published a range of articles dealing positively with the civil 
rights movement during the 1950s and continued to voice general support for racial 
integration throughout the 1960s, it also began to resist the idea that modern Jewishness 
translated into social justice and civil rights activism. Dawidowicz, for example, not only 
denied that social justice activism had anything to do with the ethical teachings of Judaism, 
she also questioned that it was sincere. Challenging the core principles of prophetic 
Judaism, she asserted that Jews who justified their involvement in civil rights with 
reference to Jewish religious and cultural traditions, were in reality more concerned with 
Jewish self-defence than with the black freedom struggle. The Torah and the Prophets 
“merely serve to adorn the will to self-preservation”. Instead of ‘being good for the Jews’, 
however, Jewish civil rights activism, she concluded, was counter-productive and posed a 
serious threat to Jewish interests as it interfered with Jewish efforts to uphold communal 
tenaciousness and cohesiveness.355  
Indeed, the main threat for Jews, which “Commentarians” perceived as arising from 
black demands for inclusion, was for the continued “ability to maintain communal 
cohesiveness”. Moreover, the rising number of assaults committed by African Americans 
against Jews in the context of race riots, as for example the looting of Jewish businesses in 
New York and Philadelphia in the summer of 1964, were no longer considered as “a special 
variant of anti-white feeling encouraged by the more direct and immediate contact that 
Negroes had with Jews than with other whites”, but as anti-Semitism, which was beginning 
to find reverberations amongst “a substantial part of the Negro leadership”.356  
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Glazer argued that while a large majority of Jews had been living more comfortably 
in the U.S. since the end of the Second World War than at any previous time, this security 
was now being challenged by blacks who, supported by federal agencies, demanded 
entrance into schools, residential districts and employment that were predominately Jewish, 
thereby threatening the infrastructure around which distinctive Jews subcultures had 
developed, which he considered essential for Jewish group survival. He claimed that the 
delicate balance between acculturation and distinctive collective identity that Jews had been 
able to strike throughout the last fifteen years, was now being eroded by black demands, 
which “focused exclusively on the absolute barriers that were once raised against him”. 
“Preferential treatment” for blacks endangered the social position of Jews, since “the 
accidents of history have put the Jew just ahead of the Negro, and just above him”, and 
therefore led ‘Jewish’ schools and neighbourhoods to be the first to be integrated.357 The 
interests of ‘Jews as whites’, therefore, often clashed with those of African Americans, in 
some cases leading to racist accusations from both sides. Insinuating that African 
Americans were aiming at ‘total integration’, this push for inclusion would in the long run 
rewrite the ground rules that governed group life in American society to such an extent that 
“it will be hard to maintain any justification for Jewish exclusiveness and particularity in 
America”.358  
Overstating the extent of African American desire for integration, Nathan Glazer’s 
articles on civil rights repeatedly made use of black and Jewish stereotypes, which at times 
exuded racism, in order to back up his argument. Citing Jewish financial and intellectual 
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predilection – armed with an “ability to score the highest grades in examinations and to 
develop money-getting competence” - in comparison to blacks’ tendencies for violence, 
impatience, and limited intellectual skills, he depicted Jews as having moved up the social 
ladder according to the meritocratic principle, while “It is clear that one cannot say the 
same” about African Americans.359 Therefore, measures of ‘preferential treatment’, which 
put African Americans in direct competition with Jews, would undermine “the system 
which has enabled Jews to dominate these institutions for decades”.360 Glazer would 
repeatedly cite an idealised version of American society governed by a pure merit principle, 
ignoring the structural racism, which had excluded African Americans for centuries. 
Moreover, he did not acknowledge the fact that Jews, who had been excluded by quotas, in 
the early 20th century, had only been able to move up the social strata in large numbers only 
after these quotas had been removed.  
Pro-active governmental programmes, such as busing, Glazer claimed, could not 
bring about black integration. Not only did these measures subvert the typically American 
principle of meritocratic advancement and an implicit respect for group boundaries, they 
were also too costly, ineffective and even counterproductive. Criticising the New York 
Board of Education’s policy of zoning and busing developed to integrate Puerto Rican and 
African American children, Glazer described these efforts as unrealistic because of the 
demographic realities. In addition, and even more importantly than devising official 
measures, issues such as “lower I.Q.’s, language difficulty, poor home environment” of 
African American and Puerto Rican children had to be taken into consideration when 
dealing with measures for improving racial minorities’ educational advancement, he 
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argued.361 The solution in bringing about economic and social equality lay in strengthening 
local community institutions and organisations as well as the family, an issue, which, 
according to Daniel Bell, had long been “ignored by the Negro middle-class”.362 Bell 
paternalistically counselled blacks to look to the Jewish communities for functioning 
examples of community organisation and patterns of integration. 
Articles by future neoconservatives often pathologised black culture, accusing 
African Americans repeatedly of being indifferent to their own group, while in the same 
breath criticising them for reacting too violently and impatiently to the slow pace of 
change. In order to inoculate themselves from accusations of racism towards blacks, these 
articles, as Podhoretz’s “My Negro Problem and Ours”, pointed to the fact that their authors 
belonged to a minority group, which had experienced oppression and exclusion. Glazer, for 
example, claimed “The hatred of poor Negroes for Jews was not reciprocated by Jews”. 
The alleged antipathy of Jews for African Americans, he insisted, was purely “part of the 
standard Jewish ethnocentrism which excluded all outsiders”.363  
Furthermore, incipient neoconservatives suggested that African Americans should 
learn from the Jewish experience. Irving Kristol, for example, endorsing 
accommodationism, praised ‘Uncle Tomism’ and called on white and black civil rights 
activists to be a little less demanding, showing his contempt for efforts to introduce 
examples of black defiance of white persecution into history books. He cynically referred to 
Jewish suffering under the Nazis in order to drive home his point that African Americans 
should develop more serenity in the face of oppression and learn from alleged Jewish 
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accommodationism: “so many people seem to think it less than human…for a man to go to 
his death calmly praying rather than kicking and cursing”.364 
As African Americans became more impatient with the pace of progress, reflected in 
the growing popularity of black nationalist ideology and the rising number of race riots 
across the country towards the middle of the decade, future neoconservatives united in their 
opposition against it, which was paradoxical in many ways, since they themselves 
promoted a type of ethnocentrism. They were concerned most about the threat to social 
stability and what they saw as anti-Semitism promoted by black nationalist leaders. In 
February 1965, Commentary published an article by civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, who 
called for the abandonment of tactics of non-violent direct action. In order to successfully 
bring about social and economic equality, he stipulated, it was time to turn towards “radical 
programs for full employment, abolition of slums, the reconstruction of our educational 
system, new definitions of work and leisure”.365 Podhoretz was attracted by Rustin’s 
willingness to abandon grass roots action on behalf of a strategy that worked from within 
the system, reflecting the growing concern with calls amongst a number of African 
American leaders for racial separatism and independence, supposedly accompanied by “the 
threat that they can burn the city down”.366  
 Black anti-Semitism was a central theme discussed in the pages of Commentary 
throughout the following years and will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter. 
Suffice it to say here that perceived black anti-Semitism was countered with Nazi and 
Holocaust analogies, as for instance Dawidowicz comparing the riots during the summer of 
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1966 to “pogroms” and “Black Power” to the Schutzstaffel’s “Black Shirts”.367 At the same 
time, she denigrated Jewish liberals and radicals who denied the existence of black anti-
Semitism, and even worse, made common cause with blacks, referring to them as “Jewish 
cheekturners” who were “chronically…embarrassed about being Jewish” and whose 
“denial of the existence of Negro anti-Semitism is a sort of wish-fulfilling denial of Jewish 
corporate existence.” According to Dawidowicz, the worst of all were those Jews who were 
actively engaged in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and allied themselves with 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE), since they were “spitting in the wells from which they drank” and “providing their 
non-Jewish (Negro) comrades with the ideological rationalizations … for anti-
Semitism”.368  
 
‘The True Democrats are the Few’: Old versus New Radicals 
 
The deep divisions that came to characterise 1960s American society began to appear on 
university campuses around the country in the early years of the decade. Students who had 
participated in the civil rights struggle, as for example the leader of the free speech 
movement, Mario Savio, felt inspired by its aims and tactics, and brought the endeavour to 
create a better society into the universities, which they saw as a reflection of a “corrupt and 
rotten” society.369 Many of the New York intellectuals, such as Nathan Glazer, Seymour 
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Martin Lipset, Irving Howe, and Daniel Bell, had by then risen to prominent places within 
academia. Questioning the moral authority of university administrators and faculties, 
student radicals also challenged the tenured stations of those former radical leftists as being 
to some extent the consequence of privilege, rather than of merit. Coming of age in a time 
when ‘Jewish’ quotas still heavily curtailed the possibilities of an academic career for large 
numbers of Jews, many of the former radicals felt appalled by the new student radicalism 
and repositioned themselves in order to defend the academic status quo. The student 
movement was therefore one of the key developments that contributed to their 
neoconservative turn. 
The first campus protest began at Berkeley in the autumn term of 1964 in form of the 
Berkeley free-speech movement. Emerging from a dispute between political student 
organisations and the university administration relative to the rules of political advocacy 
and organization on campus and supported by a diverse coalition of students, it soon turned 
into a protest, inspired by the civil rights movement’s goals and tactics of civil 
disobedience, led exclusively by left-wing student groups who expressed their discontent 
with American academia, mass society, race relations and foreign policy.370  
Glazer, who was by then teaching at Berkeley, initially hoped to avoid taking sides in 
the burgeoning conflict and claimed that he was trying to uphold a moderate position, 
despite denying that there was a “free speech issue” at Berkeley in the first place.371 As 
positions hardened, both Glazer and his fellow colleague at Berkeley, Seymour Martin 
Lipset, quickly found themselves aligned with the establishment forces. After a sit-in at 
Berkeley turned violent, Lipset, a former Trotskyite from CCNY and national chairman of 
                                                
370 Maurice Isserman, If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (New 
York: Basic Books, 1989). 
371 Philip Selznick and Nathan Glazer, “Berkeley”, Commentary, March 1965, 80. 
 134 
the YPSL, expressed considerable uneasiness at the introduction of civil disobedience 
tactics and the negative effects these tactics could have on the stability of other universities 
throughout the country: “universities are probably more vulnerable to civil disobedience 
tactics than any other institutions in this country because those in authority…are liberal. 
They are reluctant to see force invoked against their students regardless of what the 
students do”.372 For Glazer, who still called himself a mild radical by the late 1950s, and 
other academics, such as Sidney Hook, Oscar Handlin, and Lewis Feuer, the first hand 
experience with the budding student movement, eventually resulted in their alliance with 
conservative academics, such as Milton Friedman, Will Herberg, and Ernest Van den Haag, 
with whom they would not have wanted to be associated only a decade earlier. 373 
Glazer, retrospectively describing his process of de-radicalisation, cited his 
experience of the Berkeley revolt as one determining factor. The lessons he learned from 
these events were similar to those he arrived at after working in the Housing and Home 
Finance Administration for the Kennedy Administration in 1961. These experiences, he 
later claimed, taught him to respect bureaucracies and realise that “the difficulty with 
radical ideas” was that they tended to ignore the complexity of interests involved in any 
given situation: “I learned in quite strictly conservative fashion, to develop a certain respect 
for what was”.374   
While Glazer did not disagree with efforts to raise the educational quality at 
universities or even improve the conditions for political activism on campuses, he did not 
see these issues as the main objective of the free speech movement at Berkeley or any of 
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the other student movement throughout the country that were still to follow.375 He 
mistakenly believed that student activity had little to do with the desire to improve 
education or to realise demands for political activity and participation in campus politics. 
The dominant impetus of the Berkeley student revolt was, according to Glazer, “a passion 
for immediate action, for confrontation, for the humiliation of others, for the destruction of 
authority” and ultimately it aimed at demolishing the most important contribution 
universities made to society: “their ability to distance themselves from immediate crises, 
their concern with the heritage of culture and science, their encouragement of individuality 
and even eccentricity”.376 Furthermore, it seemed to him that the student movement, as it 
developed over the next couple of years, considered “the university as a political recruiting 
ground, and then as an active participant in the political struggles of society”, rather than as 
a place dedicated to education and research.377 
Beyond the critique of the student movement’s goals and tactics, Glazer, Lipset and 
Bell accused liberal academics of giving in to radical students too easily, raising what 
would become a classic neoconservative trope of ‘dough-face’ liberals, infused by a 
‘culture of appeasement’, which rendered them unable to separate friend from foe, caving 
in as soon as they were challenged from the left. Future neoconservatives questioned the 
integrity of professors and administrators’ decisions, claiming that they preferred to 
concede to the demands of the radical students out of fear that the defence of existing 
institutions and academic traditions would be seen as ‘conservative’ or ‘right wing’. 
Accordingly, this led to a state of affairs in which rationality and sobriety were thrown 
overboard and the very foundations of university life were deeply shaken. Looking back, 
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Bell and Kristol wrote “The past five years have been, for American universities, the most 
dramatic in their history. The drama, indeed, is so flamboyant that sober contemplation is 
exceedingly difficult”.378  
Incipient neoconservatives believed that the inability of liberals to defend liberalism 
against student radicals dealt a serious blow to the institution of the university. Professors’ 
surrendering to radicals, when they were supposed to give them moral and intellectual 
guidance, was ultimately a self-destructive development, which reflected what future 
neoconservatives perceived as a wider tendency of the liberal system to self-destruct from 
the inside out. The fact that the university as an institution seemed to be failing also 
reflected the defeat of traditional authorities on a much larger scale. Kristol described 
universities not just as being unable to educate students in the basic rules of political 
propriety, but as failing “to educate” at all, “since they have long since ceased trying to do 
so”.379 The student movement and the budding anti-war movement were, according to 
Kristol, the result of the boredom and resentment felt by students and junior faculty 
members. He claimed that they were “conveniently at hand” outlets with which to agitate 
and counter these sentiments.380 In the years following, Kristol continued to develop the 
anti-intellectual theme according to which liberal intellectuals, because of their inability to 
stand up against perceived enemies of liberalism, posed themselves a threat to the social 
stability of American society. 
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During the early 1960s, future neoconservatives came to believe that the main danger 
for liberalism emanated no longer from the political right, but from the political and 
cultural left - the student movement and emerging counterculture seemed to confirm this 
development. To Daniel Moynihan and Kristol the true ancestor of the 1960s student 
movement and the emerging New Left more generally was not the Old Left but the Old 
Right. Both political movements, they believed, were contemptuous of liberal democracy, 
capitalism and progress. Both had theocentric views of the world and wanted to organise 
society along those lines, based on similar critiques of modernity. According to Moynihan, 
those outraged youngsters, were like “Christians on the scene of the second-century 
Rome”.381 
With the rise of student radicalism on university and college campuses, former 
radicals seemed to have overcome their own radical past and repositioned themselves in the 
status quo camp. The critique that “politics ought not to intrude on the campus” seemed out 
of place, if not hypocritical, coming from a group of former radicals, whose “real college 
education took place” outside of the class room, studying and debating Marxist theory.382 
Underlying their critique of these ‘forces of change’ was a certain extent of status anxiety 
as well as social resentment towards the children of privilege, they believed student radicals 
to be. Accordingly, what Richard Hofstadter referred to as ‘status politics’, offers a partial 
explanation for their reactions against the student movement.383 In this sense, status politics 
was not only engaged in by individuals who wanted to improve their social status, but also, 
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according to Seymour Martin Lipset, by those “already possessing status who feel that the 
rapid social change threatens their own claims to high social position”.384 Furthermore, 
growing up on the margins of American society, they felt the need to strongly assert their 
commitment to the status quo and their American credentials, casting radical students’ 
demands as anti-, or un-American. Moreover, their critique of radical students was 
accompanied by contempt for what they saw as the spoiled children of the upper-middle 
class (and their liberal educators), who were now trying to undermine the very order that 
had provided them with the privilege to act against it in the first place. This attitude was 
given voice, for instance, by Moynihan who referred to student radicals as “rich college 
fucks” whose movement he saw as “a mindless assault on the civic and social order”.385  
Yet, what future neoconservatives seemed to fear most about the student movement 
was their demand for greater participatory democracy at universities and within the 
American polity at large. The reactions of these former radicals to the new radicals’ 
demands for vertical and horizontal expansion of democracy reflected the qualified 
conception of democracy that also characterised the neoconservative project. It rested on an 
admiration for the common people on the one hand, while being ever mindful of the 
populace’s irrationality in times of upheaval on the other. This “democratic elitism” was 
characterised by the idea, that populist democracy and “too much mass political activism is 
a dangerous thing” because the polity is “best when it is not fully itself, when many do not 
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participate, and most lack all passionate intensity. The true democrats are the few; upon 
them democracy rests”.386 
The fear of mass political action and the student movement’s unabashed willingness 
to undermine the stability of the polity was perceived by future neoconservatives as a threat 
to the very system, which had enabled them to move into the centre of American society. 
Moreover, its destabilising effects also entailed negative consequences specifically for the 
Jewish position in American society. Budding neoconservatives argued that their concern 
for social stability, which underlay the rejection of demands for an extension of 
participatory democracy and the loosening of institutional and traditional constraints, was, 
to some extent, that it potentially led to uncontrolled and irrational expressions of “mob” 
passions, to which Jews had fallen victim many times over throughout their history. In 
response to the excessive emphasis of student radicals on civic disobedience, anti-
authoritarianism and individual liberties, former radical intellectuals began to refer to 
traditions in Jewish culture and religion, which articulated the idea that the good society 
rested on a shared morality, which was ultimately enforced by the authority of the 
community. Daniel Bell described his “fear of mass action, a fear of passions let loose” as 
“a particularly Jewish fear…of what happens when man is let loose”. He said: “When man 
doesn’t have halacha, the law, he becomes chia, an animal”.387 Radical Jewish students 
were therefore involved in the demise of the very system, which had been ‘good to the 
Jews’. According to Glazer, the attacks of the student movement - and the New Left more 
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generally - on the bourgeois democratic order meant, “the Jews, the most middle-class of 
all, are going to be placed at the head the column marked for liquidation”.388 
The arguments relative to the student movement foreshadowed positions taken by 
neoconservatives with respect to debates about the impact of affirmative action, political 
correctness, and multiculturalism in future years. According to future neoconservatives, the 
student revolt on American campuses of the 1960s introduced a climate to academia in 
which those who dissented from the alleged radical and/or liberal ‘orthodoxies’ were 
condemned as fascists and racists, accusations neoconservatives levelled in turn against 
student radicals and their supporters within faculties. Incipient neoconservatives believed 
that the student movement’s - and by extension the New Left’s – alleged contempt for 
‘ordinary’ Americans was undergirded by incipiently totalitarian conceptions of society and 
politics. Writing about Jewish involvement in the New Left, Glazer remarked “the New 
Left likes final victories and final solutions”.389 Arthur Schlesinger once described the New 
Left and neoconservatives as “mirror images” (referring here to their ideas about foreign 
policy) of each other in terms of their “sentimental conception…that the duty of the 
state…is to subordinate interests to ideals”.390 This also holds true in terms of the populist 
elitism and the absolutism with which neoconservatives and student radicals defended their 
respective positions. Moreover, as with the New Left, neoconservatism’s “most debilitating 
intellectual weakness…is its lack of respect for its political opponents”.391 
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Conclusion 
 
In 1963, Glazer and Moynihan published their sociological study Beyond the Melting Pot, 
which discussed the role of ethnicity in American society. They claimed that primordial ties 
of race, ethnicity and religion were more relevant to Americans and for the functioning of 
American society than had previously been assumed by liberalism.392 In many ways, their 
book presaged the advent of the ethnic revival of the 1970s and the emergence of 
multiculturalism during the 1980s and 1990s. The study signalled that the consensus 
approach, which had been the idealised guideline for American society since the Second 
World War, began to give way to a more fragmented and particularistic Zeitgeist as the 
1960s unfolded.  
The drive towards re-ethnicisation was the main motivational factor for future Jewish 
neoconservatives in revising their attitudes towards progressive liberalism, a process that 
would eventually lead them to embrace ever more anti-progressive stances by the end of the 
1960s. Their transformed self-understanding as Jews forcefully shaped the outlook with 
which they approached issues, such as the civil rights struggle, the beginnings of the 
student movement and the emergence of the counterculture. They questioned the extent to 
which liberal politics and ideas were still compatible with Jewish identity. In the process of 
negotiating these issues form a narrowly defined Jewish perspective, a number of 
intellectuals, such as Podhoretz, Dawidowicz, Decter, Kristol and Glazer, began to move to 
the right.  
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 Throughout the later part of the 1960s, the development of the neoconservative 
critique of progressive liberalism accelerated. Commentary was joined by PI, which would 
soon become the other seminal neoconservative mouthpiece. PI’s dissemination of its 
critique of social policy, and especially welfare programmes, was underscored by a broad 
critique of American culture, society and the liberal elite. Throughout the later 1960s, what 
had began as a disjointed criticism of the New Left, grew into a full-scale effort to discredit 
interventionist liberalism, the New Left and the counterculture. This movement cumulated 
in an unsuccessful effort by old style liberals, such as Kristol, Glazer and Podhoretz, to 
regain the Democratic Party from the usurpation of New Left forces.  
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Chapter 4 
‘A Crisis in Values’ 
The Public Interest and 
the Limits of Liberalism, 1965-1972 
!  
 
Introduction 
 
 
Norman Podhoretz once claimed that while Commentary had “tangible influence”, its most 
important contribution was “to affect the ideological atmosphere” and thereby “alter the 
terms of the debate”.393 The formation of PI was to have a similar effect. While Kristol and 
Bell created the quarterly with the aim of analysing social policy from a non-ideological 
perspective, it can be assumed that its influence, while difficult to measure, lay in the realm 
of shaping ideological discourse. A journal of relatively narrow range, its target audience 
was not, like Commentary’s, the educated lay reader, but rather “opinion molders” and “the 
governing classes”.394 In order to give their enterprise credibility in the burgeoning world of 
policy analysis of the 1960s, Bell and Kristol infused the journal with a detached and 
scholarly style, discussing issues in extensive, outwardly balanced, often dull and 
statistically encumbered articles. Moreover, the aloofness projected by PI found reflection 
in the fact that, unlike Commentary, it did not feature letters from readers. PI’s early 
circulation numbers stood at 2,000 to 3,000 and remained low throughout its 40 years’ 
existence, following the Kristol’s motto that even “With a circulation of a few hundred, you 
could change the world”.395 
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This chapter investigates the role of PI in the emergence of early neoconservative 
ideas as well as its contribution to the rise of modern American conservatism. Even though 
PI was not created with the intention of making it into an agent for a new politics, it 
nevertheless came to propose a version of neoconservatism, which revolved around the 
practical and moral implications of governmental activism within the social realm. 
Throughout the 1960s, future neoconservatives remained reluctant to associate with the 
burgeoning New Right, as embodied by William F. Buckley’s National Review or Barry 
Goldwater. Yet, the analysis of PI in conjunction with Commentary shows that future 
neoconservatives were not an aberration within the broader conservative movement, as for 
instance claimed by Halper and Clarke or neoconservatives themselves.396 While Kristol 
regarded Buckley’s conservatism “as an eccentricity on the ideological landscape” 
considering its anti-New Deal approach “out of phase” during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
both sides became more accepting of each other by the early 1970s, leading Buckley to 
comment that Kristol was “writing more sense in The Public Interest these days than 
anybody I can think of”.397 
The creation of PI “is generally considered the beginning of neoconservatism”.398 A 
close reading of Commentary and PI shows, however, that neoconservative ideas were not 
just introduced into political discourse with the formation of PI. Rather, PI complemented 
Commentary, contributing “to advance the embryonic neoconservative movement” by 
developing many of the arguments, which had already begun to find expression during the 
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1950s and early 1960s.399 Moreover, drawing on both Commentary and PI as the two 
central outlets for early neoconservatism, this chapter shows that it was from the outset 
much more than an exclusively social policy rationale, as for instance maintained by 
Glazer.400 Such an analysis also underscores the breadth and the multi-levelled nature of the 
enterprise, as well as the fact that neoconservatism’s original version was beset by 
contingencies and contradictions. Comparing neoconservative ideas as they were developed 
in PI and Commentary effectively adds weight to the claim that what has become known as 
neoconservatism was from the outset a polymorphous, idiosyncratic, and rather incoherent 
undertaking. This finding contravenes many of the traditional interpretations that often 
reduce early neoconservatism to a rationale geared either towards the analysis of foreign 
policy or domestic policy, and describe it as much more intellectually coherent than it 
actually was.401  
The close analysis of PI and Commentary shows above all that neoconservatism 
was an ideologically driven enterprise from the start, despite claims to the contrary. PI’s 
editors alleged that their intention was to analyse social policy and specifically Great 
Society programmes from a non-ideological standpoint and yet it was Kristol’s and Bell’s 
ideological disillusionment with progressive liberalism that constituted the backdrop for the 
creation of PI. The desire to prove the limitations of social policy through empirical 
scholarship was therefore in itself a value-driven enterprise and was quickly superseded by 
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an effort to convince readers that the Great Society had been bound to fail from its 
inception, since it promised too much, and employed political solutions for problems that 
were unsolvable by politics. Retrospectively, Glazer showed himself surprised at “how 
soon the simple notion that science and research could guide us in domestic social policy 
became complicated”.402 Very quickly, the journal came to focus on the perceived cultural 
crisis, which, it suggested, was undergirded by an overexpansion of the federal prerogative 
and an excess of democracy, as the root causes for the problems ailing America. The search 
for solutions, it proposed, therefore, centred around a debate of social and cultural mores, 
rather than on economics and politics.  
The centrepiece of both journals’ critique of progressive liberalism was the 
discussion of what neoconservatives referred to as the New Class – a concept with which, 
according to Michael Walzer, “neoconservatives give us the clearest sense of who they 
think they are and who they think their enemies are”.403 The idea of the New Class, 
employed by neoconservatives, lacked precision and was used as a “half analytic concept, 
half polemical device”, often applied “to label whomever the neoconservatives don’t 
like”.404 In the words of Kristol, the New Class “are the media – just as they are our 
educational system, our public health and welfare system, and much else”.405 While the 
New Class spoke the language of progressive reform, it was “engaged in a class struggle 
with the business community for status and power” which it has placed “under the banner 
of ‘equality’”. Its perceived goal was to “reconstruct” American society “in some 
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unspecific but radical way”. By the end of the 1970s, neoconservatives feared, that the New 
Class threatened to overtake the Democratic Party.406 
The neoconservative assault on the New Class was cloaked in terms of a defence of 
democracy. Ironically, neoconservatives depicted themselves as ‘majoritarians’ defending 
the regular American against the elitist outlandishness and subversively un-American 
values of liberal establishment. As will be demonstrated, the main concern of Commentary 
and PI pundits throughout the 1960s was the “erosion of authority”, coupled with a deep 
distrust of the masses and a strong fear of participatory democracy. While using anti-elitist 
rhetoric in order to criticise New Class intellectuals’ striving for a greater egalitarianism, 
neoconservatives opposed more direct forms of mass participation in the political decision 
making process.407 
 
The Public Interest:  ‘A Middle-Aged Magazine for Middle-Aged Readers’ 
 
 
The year 1965 was the pivot of the decade. It saw the first ‘teach-in’ of the anti-war 
movement at the University of Michigan and the largest anti-war demonstration so far, with 
20, 000 participants. The membership of the SDS rose to 15, 000 and when the U.S. 
dispatched 15, 000 marines to the Dominican Republic, it further convinced “antiwar 
circles that the U.S. government was bent on throwing its weight around”.408 Moreover, 
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1965 saw an escalation of the sustained bombing campaign of North Vietnam, as well as a 
massive build-up of American troops to 184, 300 by the end of the year. In March, the 
planned demonstration by 600 civil rights activists from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama 
against the denial of voting rights to blacks in the South turned bloody when state troopers 
tried to break up the protest violently. And in the summer of 1965, under the chants of 
“Burn, baby burn!” rioting youths of the black community of Watts in Los Angeles battled 
police forces, which left 34 people dead, a thousand injured, and four thousand in jail.409 
At the same time, “big-government liberalism was in a triumphant mood”. 
Seemingly, “policy makers thought they had the power to cure social ills, from poverty to 
prejudice”, leading Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) to declare an “all-out war on human poverty 
and unemployment”, as part of a broader scheme - Great Society - to reform American 
society.410 Bell and Kristol envisioned a journal, which would counterbalance the Zeitgeist 
of the 1960s. According to Kristol, the time had come for “someone…to continue talking 
modest sense, even if grandiose nonsense was temporarily so very popular”.411 The 
“grandiose nonsense” mainly referred to the overly zealous spirit of reformism, which had 
gripped the liberal establishment and the anti-authoritarianism and hedonism promoted by 
the New Left and the counterculture. Supposedly, it was a spirit of “healthy skepticism” 
that gave birth to PI, a scepticism geared towards the feasibility of governmental 
intervention on behalf of social problems.412 According to Wilson, PI united “people who 
thought it was hard, though not impossible, to make useful and important changes in public 
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policy”.413 Extremes, which appeared to govern the Zeitgeist, had to be countered by a good 
dose of common sense. Reality, however, looked somewhat differently.  
In the editorial statement of the first issue, Bell and Kristol declared that PI should 
“help all of us, when we discuss issues of public policy, to know a little better what we are 
talking about”. It declared to be “animated by a bias against” all kinds of ideologies.414 The 
intention of pragmatic, anti-utopian analysis also found reflection in the characterisation of 
PI as a “middle-aged magazine for middle-aged readers”. Bell and Kristol argued that, 
“young people tend to be enchanted by glittering generalities; older people are inclined to 
remember rather than to think”. Yet, it was “middle-aged people, seasoned by life but still 
open to the future” who appeared to them “to be the best of all political generations”.415  
The journal’s title itself contradicted the desire to produce ideology-free analysis of 
social policy. Basing themselves on Walter Lippman’s definition of the public interest as 
“what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and 
benevolently”, they were entering the realm of political philosophy and ideological 
speculation.416 The fact that they made the concept of the public interest central to their 
enterprise reflects the centrality of ideology in the editors’ mindsets, since the notion of the 
public interest was in itself concerned with abstractions such as the nature of democracy ad 
of government. The idea that there was a discernible public interest indeed flew in the face 
of contemporary pluralist ideas of political scientists that policy outcomes were the result of 
conflict between the private interest of individuals and groups.  
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Looking through the first issues of PI, the reader is struck by the underlying 
sentiment that something more than social science was needed in order for America to 
overcome its perceived cultural crisis. Moreover, it appears as if PI was specifically 
conceived as an outlet for critiquing Great Society programmes - and by extension 
government interventionism on behalf of social issues. It persistently warned of “the 
difficulty of reform and the dangers of bureaucratization”.417 Even though Bell and Kristol 
declared that they wanted to steer clear of ideologies and “prefabrications”, because they 
“preconceive reality”, discussing social policy and the state of American society during the 
ideologically heated mid-1960s was almost impossible without resorting to the discussion 
of values, ideas and ideologies.418 It is also telling that the large majority of articles in PI, 
while assuming a scholarly air, did not use footnotes. Rather than deliver hard facts to the 
reader, the journal was more about exposing ideas and presenting arguments for or against 
a certain policy.419 In this sense, “the bias against all such prefabrications” can be regarded 
as a form of ideology in itself. Here it should be noted that Kristol’s disenchantment with 
the welfare system pre-dated the formation of PI, as for example shown in “Is the Welfare 
State Obsolete?”420 
Podhoretz, who continued to develop his anti-New Left agenda in Commentary, on 
the other hand, objected outright to the notion that “ideology was dead and that all 
problems were therefore now technical” from the start.421 He questioned the allegedly 
“pragmatist” approach with which PI intended to deal with social policy. He did not believe 
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that the time of ideological battles had come to an end or that intellectual discourse should 
limit itself to the laws of practicality in order to be influential. One issue that irritated him 
especially about PI’ s ‘detached’ approach was that more value- and emotionally charged 
discussions, especially with respect to Jewish life, would find no room in the journal. By 
seeking to create an ideology-free discourse, Podhoretz suggested that Kristol and Bell had 
assimilated too much into the surrounding environment and thereby denying primordial 
ties. PI’s alleged rationale “seemed to me to resemble the idea of the radical 
assimilationists who thought the ‘Jewish problem’ could be solved by the disappearance of 
the Jews into the surrounding environment”.422 It is also interesting to note that Podhoretz 
never published in PI, while Bell, Glazer and Kristol continued to contribute to 
Commentary.  
Even though PI would keep up its non-ethnic style, differences with respect to 
ideology were narrowed in favour of Podhoretz’s stance as the 1960s progressed. 
Moreover, while Jewish concerns were addressed indirectly in discussing such issues as 
busing, affirmative action, and assimilation, the qualitative evaluation of PI has, 
nevertheless, revealed two instances where Jewish issues were discussed 
straightforwardly.423 Dennis Prager’s article, “Homosexuality, the Bible and Us – A Jewish 
Perspective” presented an argument against homosexuality – “a tragic burden” – on 
religiously inspired grounds. Opposing homosexuality was vital, Prager asserted, because 
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“At stake is our civilization”.424 The other article, by David Brooks, discussed the growing 
centrality of religion in the neoconservative enterprise by the 1990s.425 Tellingly, Brooks 
opened the article with an anecdote, which describes him as spontaneously replying to his 
rabbi, when asked what “being Jewish meant” to him, by citing the names “Kristol, 
Podhoretz, Trilling, Bellow”. He qualifies his reaction by adding: “a bunch of Jewish 
intellectuals around Partisan Review, Commentary, and The Public Interest”.426   
The different approaches of Podhoretz and Kristol also shed some light on the 
contentions and competitiveness, which characterised their relationship. They both came to 
represent their own schools of thought within neoconservatism, and their fellow 
neoconservatives tended to either lean towards the one or the other. After one of his earliest 
encounters with Kristol, Podhoretz wrote to Trilling: “I…suspect that Irving may be one of 
those people who is (in your phrase) ‘lucky to the point of being unfortunate’”, concluding, 
“he seems to me a sort of warning for the future”.427 The rift between the two really set in 
when Podhoretz, allegedly against the advice of Kristol, became editor-in-chief at 
Commentary and began publishing articles by Staughton Lynd and Paul Goodman. 
Podhoretz claimed that Kristol “began feeling less than comfortable with me”.428 While 
differences attenuated in later years, they would nevertheless continue to compete with 
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each other for influence and prestige as leading figures within and outside the 
neoconservative community.429 
PI never achieved the intended ideology-free approach. It is questionable to what 
extent it was even desired by the creators of the journal. From the outset, Bell and Kristol 
published a great many articles on the value dimension of the social and political questions. 
Apart from an article by Moynihan on “The Professionalization of Reform”, Glazer’s “The 
Paradoxes of American Poverty” and Bell’s “The Study of the Future”, the first edition 
contained an article by economist Robert Solow on the extent to which technological 
progress affected the workforce. The conservative Robert Nisbet considered the idea of the 
scientific elite and Daniel Greenberg questioned whether the “scientific technological elite” 
was turning into a “new priesthood”. Furthermore, it included an article by cultural 
historian, Jacques Barzun, in which he explored the pros and cons of public subsidies for 
art. Finally, it featured a discussion by Martin Diamond, a student of Leo Strauss, on how 
conservative and liberal interpretations of the U.S. Constitution translated into policies. 
Considering these titles and chosen topics, it becomes clear that PI was from the outset 
much more than just a forum for detached public policy analysis.430 
One main objective of the journal was to review existing government policy 
critically and analyse social problems comprehensively, so that decision-makers could deal 
with social problems with less knock-on effects. The presumption was that many of the 
contemporary Great Society programmes had come about without much public discussion 
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of the issues involved. By the time all the facets of one or the other issue had been thought 
through, “an agency had been established, monies appropriated and people committed”. 
This condition was driven by what Moynihan termed “The Professionalization of Reform”.  
Thus, social reform had become the prerogative of specialists and “massive political 
support and intellectual leadership” were no longer behind many of the new reforms.431 
Thus, Moynihan reasoned, reform professionals, often driven by exaggerated confidence in 
the power of government, conceived complex social programmes in absence of deliberation 
of any major public interest.432  
Moynihan’s analysis is somewhat ironical in as much as he was a “reform 
professional” himself. He had worked in the Labour Department under Kennedy, 
overseeing the composition of the so-called Moynihan Report, entitled “The Negro Family: 
The Case for National Action”, which based itself on studies of ghetto life by E. Franklin 
Frazier and Kenneth Clark. The Report developed the thesis that many problems of the 
urban black poor stemmed from the collapse of the black family unit. According to 
Isserman and Kazin, the report also strongly influenced Johnson’s address at Howard 
University in June 1965, which in many ways was “the most radical speech of his 
presidency”, where Johnson declared that the goal was not just “equality as a right and a 
theory”, but “equality as a fact”.433 
Seemingly convinced that liberal reform was failing, Kristol and Bell, nevertheless, 
believed that government had a seminal role to play in organising society. It was their 
stated aim to influence the decision-making process in order to participate in the shaping of 
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the polity. Not rejecting the principle of an interventionist government with respect to 
social and cultural issues, they nonetheless argued that too many policy makers, especially 
the social scientists amongst them, had given in to overly optimistic beliefs about the 
redemptive effects of government-led social reform. This, in turn, had led to the creation of 
programmes that were ineffective and very often counterproductive.434 As a matter of fact, 
PI quickly came to focus on the negative impact of social reform, discussing what Max 
Weber had termed the unanticipated consequences of social action.  
Yet, PI shied away from partisan politics, publishing a range of opinions about the 
failures and successes of government legislation until the early 1970s. For instance, in 
1974, a special issue dealt cautiously with the lessons of the Great Society. Not produced 
by Bell and Kristol, but guest-edited by Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, it conceded 
that there were “many partial, but genuine successes” amongst Great Society programmes, 
and although, “some public programs simply don’t work or prove to be too costly … there 
is nothing in the history of the 1960s to suggest that it is a law of nature that social 
legislation cannot deal effectively with social problems”.435 Kristol, however, warning that 
New Left liberalism was taking over the Democratic Party, had written in 1966, “Though I 
approve, on the whole, of the various programs for the Great Society, I too am full of doubt 
about their potentialities for a good life in a good society”.436  
A decade later, in tune with majority opinion, he discarded the Great Society as a 
complete failure, believing its measures had contributed to the abandonment of morality 
and an overall degeneration of social and cultural norms. Pointing out that while 
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neoconservatives were “not at all hostile to the idea of the welfare state”, he noted that they, 
nevertheless, did not agree with “the Great Society version of the welfare state”.437 
Thereby, Kristol and his colleagues disregarded the fact that, together with the high 
economic growth rate, the War on Poverty had succeeded in reducing poverty from 22 per 
cent to 13 per cent during the 1960s. In addition, historians assume that not enough funds 
were available in order for the Great Society to successfully meet its goals. Eric Foner, for 
example, claims that the Great Society, in tandem with the civil rights movement, was 
directly responsible for narrowing “the historic gap between whites and blacks in 
education, income, and access to skilled employment” by the 1990s.438 
According to Glazer, the themes, which led to PI being labelled neoconservative, 
were present almost from the start. In addition to much analysis of welfare and education 
policies, PI dealt from the outset with the value implications of these and other issues, such 
as family stability, racial integration, censorship of pornography, science and technology, 
and the environment to name but a few.439 The original intent of using social science to 
rectify complex social problems was superseded quickly by the belief that the issues ailing 
American society were brought about by a “deeper…cultural malaise”, and not always 
solvable by quick government interventionism.440 The fact that PI published an article in 
1970 defending the censorship of pornography and Kristol had done so in March of the 
same year by claiming that “if you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, 
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then you have to be for censorship”, signified the extent to which the journal’s editors had 
moved towards social and cultural conservatism.441 In the early 1970s, Glazer claimed, PI 
pundits came to understand that realising a better society was “more dependent on a fund of 
traditional orientations, ‘values,’ or, if you will, ‘virtues,’ than any social science or 'social 
engineering' approach”.442 According to Kristol, it was “the rise of the counterculture, with 
its messianic expectations and its apocalyptic fears” that brought about a shift towards 
discussing social and cultural issues more generally.443 
This shift also was a consequence of examining the undesired repercussions of 
social policy. The ideas of social policy professionals were advanced based on the intended 
consequences of programmes. PI directed its attention, however, to the unintended effects 
of social action, such as the family breakdown allegedly encouraged by welfare 
programmes, specifically Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), homelessness 
fostered by federal rent control and problems supposedly created by government job 
programmes. Kristol claimed that he did not disagree with the high costs of welfare 
programmes per se, but rather with the “perverse consequences for the people they are 
supposed to benefit”. He believed that “the liberal-inspired welfare system” had led to the 
rise “of a growing and self-perpetuating ‘underclass’ that makes our cities close to 
uninhabitable”.444 Further, he argued that liberal policies were responsible for “social 
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pathologies”, such as “crime, juvenile delinquency, illegitimacy, drug addiction, and 
alcoholism”, as well as for “the destruction of a once functioning public school system”.445 
By pointing out the negative results, PI was highlighting the supposed limits and 
dysfunctionality of federal social policy. Many of these social programmes heightened the 
diagnosed cultural crisis of American society, it argued, by helping to undermine further 
traditional authorities and values, such as those of industriousness, individual 
responsibility, stable family structures, and fair-mindedness. This rationale reflected what 
social theorist Albert Hirschmann, in his analysis of conservative rhetoric, has referred to as 
the “jeopardy thesis” of conservative opposition to reform proposals, according to which 
social reform threatens to jeopardise traditional arrangements, such as family, ethnic ties 
and religious communities, while simultaneously heightening social problems.446 
By the end of the decade, Peter Drucker argued that the social policies of the federal 
government exemplified how overextension of governmental power led to social injustice, 
loss of authority and ultimately to systemic instability. Even dismissing the achievements 
of the New Deal, which had so far been a central pillar of future neoconservatives’ 
universe, he claimed that government interventionism “over these past thirty to forty years” 
had been a failure; it had “proven itself capable of doing only two things with great 
effectiveness. It can wage war. And it can inflate the currency”.447 According to Kristol, 
government intensified and entrenched the “crisis in values” of American society, which 
was “to be observed in many other Western nations as well”. It left people without 
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guidance, as “they don’t know where to turn for answers they could accept as 
authoritative”.448  
The tenth anniversary issue of PI entitled The American Commonwealth – 1975 
analysed the American polity form the perspective of governmental overload, featuring 
contributions by PI regulars Robert Nisbet, Samuel P. Huntington, James Q. Wilson, 
Martin Diamond, Aaron Wildavsky, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Moynihan. Wilson, for 
example, scrutinised the explosion of an activist centralised bureaucracy in response to the 
exaggerated demands made on government, whereas Glazer claimed that a similar activism 
had gripped the judiciary. The overall tone of the volume alarmingly pointed to the threats 
posed by unrestrained federal interventionism to the freedom of the individual.449 
Governmental overextension was, according to PI, the result of the promises to 
erase poverty and racial discrimination. Government had raised the expectation of 
American citizens too much and failed to deliver. In turn, this had led to disillusionment 
amongst the American people and consequently accelerated the declining legitimacy of 
governmental authority.450 The promises of a “new equality” - promoted by the New Class 
- led people to make unreasonable demands on government, which it could not deliver. 
“The revolution of equality”, Glazer observed, rendered people “ever more sensitive to 
smaller and smaller degrees of inequality”.451 Bell further claimed that, “As disparities have 
decreased…the expectations of equality have increased even faster…a phenomenon now 
commonly known as the ‘Tocqueville effect’”.452 In these terms, it was “The revolution of 
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rising expectations”, set in motion under Kennedy and Johnson, which was, in Bell’s 
words, intricately intertwined with “the revolution of rising ressentiment”.453 The more 
equal society became, they argued, the more its members began to develop social 
resentment and envy towards each other, which in turn, led to social instability. 
The diagnosis of governmental overload implied that political practices needed a 
radical overhaul. Governmental activism had to be curtailed; demands and desires by the 
populace tempered. This implied that neoconservatives came to agree with conservative 
ideas of the inevitability of social inequality. As a matter of fact, Kristol came to argue that 
“A Just and legitimate society is one in which inequalities…are generally perceived by the 
citizenry as necessary for the common good”.454 Curbing the growing demand for equality 
was, therefore, in the common interest. Exaggerating the extent to which Americans wanted 
“all at once to boot”, Kristol claimed, that “the revolution of rising expectations” had taken 
on “such grotesque dimensions that men take it as an insult when they are asked to be 
reasonable in their desires and their demands”. Revealing his deep distrust in human nature, 
Kristol claimed that the result of this “excess of equality” was that democracy, or “self-
government”, was “inexorably being eroded in favor of self-seeking, self-indulgence, and 
just plain aggressive selfishness”.455 
In its critique of the “new equality”, PI, like Commentary, also included its 
principled opposition to policies such as busing and later affirmative action. While Glazer 
answered his question “Is Busing Necessary?” in the negative in Commentary, David 
Armor, writing in PI, suggested that busing in 1972 could no longer be justified because it 
                                                
being equal to each other but because these ways continuously prove inadequate for those who use them. 
Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion of equality without every being bale to satisfy it 
entirely”. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 130. 
453 Daniel Bell, “On Meritocracy and Equality”, The Public Interest, Fall 1972, 64. 
454 Irving Kristol, “About Equality”, Commentary, November 1972, 42. 
455 Steinfels, The Neoconservatives, 60; Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America, 26, 27. 
 161 
had failed to meet its goals.456 As shown above, court-ordered busing was a crucial issue 
around which the conservative grass-roots movement rallied. ‘Ordinary’ Americans 
perceived it to be unfair, because their children were forced to travel “across town in order 
to achieve racially balanced schools”. Furthermore, it struck them as hypocritical, because 
the liberal establishment, which according to conservative pundits was behind these 
policies, was able to send their own children to private or suburban schools. Both 
Commentary and PI supported the sentiment against busing and other pro-active 
integrationist measures as a legitimate concern and claimed furthermore that it had nothing 
to do with white racism. Wilson, for example, while agreeing that “Prejudice exists”, 
defended inner-city whites from the charges of racism, arguing that white anger at the 
blacks and white flight “was not primarily” motivated by “anti-Negro feelings”, but based 
on a concern about “standards of right and seemly conduct in the public places”, i.e. crime 
and violence, which he believed was mainly “the result of growing pride and assertiveness” 
as promoted by ideas of Black Power.457 Historian Kevin Kruse, however, has 
demonstrated that issues of racism, often covert and indirect, were indeed the prime 
determinant in the white flight phenomenon.458 
In general, budding neoconservatives cautioned that mobilising the urban poor 
through community action programmes, in order to redistribute social and economic power 
would prove to be counter-productive.459 In their eyes, the approach that more direct action 
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would lead to more equality was promoted by members within the liberal establishment – 
or the New Class - who mostly came from upper-middle class backgrounds, had graduated 
from elite universities, and had become “dazzled by trendy sociological theories…that 
‘empowering the poor’ would so uplift the spirits…that the long, slow, traditional climb up 
the ladder of economic mobility could be circumvented”.460 This tendency of “liberal 
egalitarianism” had to be fought, because “if it is permitted to gather momentum”, it would 
“surely destroy the liberal society”.461  
The renunciation of a more pro-active approach to social issues arose partially from 
the specific class sense of many early neoconservatives. Some, like Bell and Kristol, came 
from working class to lower middle-class backgrounds – even though the extent of poverty 
in which they grew up is, according to Godfrey Hogdson, often exaggerated in 
neoconservative mythology.462 They subscribed to the idea that it was hard work and 
education that continued to be the only effective ways out of poverty. The conviction that 
they had lifted themselves ‘by their bootstraps’ and expected others to do the same was 
pervasive and would continue to characterise neoconservative opposition to government 
policies such as busing and affirmative action in both Commentary and PI throughout the 
1970s. While not disputing that they had risen through hard work, their demand for others 
to follow them by example had a somewhat hypocritical sound to it in light of the fact that 
many of them had received a basic tuition-free college education at CCNY. Moreover, it 
was the drive towards greater inclusivity and egalitarianism introduced by Rooseveltian 
liberalism that had allowed many of the early neoconservatives to take up privileged 
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positions in American society. Lastly, their reduction of the Great Society programmes to 
the War on Poverty overlooked the fact that Johnson’s interventionism “was designed 
primarily to benefit the middle class” through channelling funds into the newly created 
programmes, such as Medicare for the elderly, as well as into education and urban 
development.463 Recipients of Great Society funds were in great majority not part of a 
degenerate “underclass”, as neoconservatives seemed to suggest. 
The liberal intellectual elite, the alleged motive power behind the push for greater 
equality, was according to Kristol, “only the latest expression of a subversive discontent 
with which intellectuals have gnawed at the legitimacy of government for two 
millennia”.464 Criticism of the liberal intellectual elite, which supposedly was in firm 
possession of the political establishment, abounded in both Commentary and PI during the 
later 1960s and continued even as liberalism lost out during the 1970s. An exaggerated 
understanding of their own role in societal organisation governed the importance incipient 
neoconservative thought placed on intellectuals. Accordingly, intellectual expertise was not 
only relevant to policy making, intellectuals were also the guardians of society’s symbols 
and values. Hence, they were considered the “keepers of its memories, and…shapers of 
general ideas” – in short, “the principal suppliers and endorsers of the symbols of 
legitimacy”.465 Hence, in the eyes of budding neoconservatives, intellectuals were a 
singularly important component in the constitution and the cohesiveness of society, 
“crucial…in defining the moral quality of our society”.466  
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Therefore, while much of the neoconservative critique of liberalism was infused 
with anti-intellectual rhetoric, it did not consider intellectuals per se to be the problem. 
Rather, a certain kind of intellectual was causing trouble, namely the liberal, and especially 
the radical, kind. Kristol, for example, welcomed the belated “incorporation of the 
intellectual into American public life” as a result of the Second World War. Yet, he warned 
of a specific type of intellectual, those who “express decided views” on “all sorts 
of…matters on which…they are inadequately informed”.467 Presuming that he himself was 
informed, Kristol believed that not the experts were troublesome but those who got 
involved in issues they knew nothing of. Those intellectuals active in teach-ins against the 
war, for instance, were, following Kristol, “junior in rank…usually in professions that have 
precious little to do with Viet Nam”.468 Their lack of expertise was compensated by 
ideological fervour, by which these intellectuals tried to gain power. One of the 
inconsistencies of neoconservatism revealed itself in this type of condescending attack on 
the alleged elitism and ignorance of other intellectuals, which neoconservatives countered 
with their own brand of elitism. Moreover, one cannot help but recognise certain 
similarities between the intellectuals described by neoconservatives and neoconservatives 
themselves. 
 Finally, something needs to be said about the ‘absence’ of foreign policy in the 
pages of PI. Neoconservatives and scholars alike have claimed that early neoconservatism 
as developed in PI had nothing to do with foreign policy, a rather puzzling circumstance 
considering the fact that neoconservatism has become almost exclusively associated with 
foreign affairs. Moreover, neoconservatives such as Glazer contend that PI was able “to 
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eschew the entire field of foreign affairs”.469 It was indeed the intention of Bell and Kristol 
to forego the discussion of foreign affairs in order to focus exclusively on domestic issues. 
At the time the journal was established, the Vietnam War was the most crucial matter on 
the foreign policy agenda of the country. And since PI pundits “had a wide spectrum of 
opinion on the issue”, the editors-in-chief decided, in the words of Kristol that they “did not 
want any of the space in our modest-sized quarterly to be swallowed up by Vietnam. The 
simplest solution was to ban foreign affairs and foreign policy from our pages”.470  
This, however, was only partially the case. In discussing social and cultural 
problems that ailed American society, it was unavoidable that the analysis of foreign affairs 
would enter into the picture. As a matter of fact, while Vietnam was never discussed per se 
in the pages of the journal, it was mentioned regularly, as for instance in comparison with 
the crisis at home or within the context of discussing domestic issues. Moreover, 
investigating PI’s early concerns demonstrates that even though foreign affairs were not its 
main focus, they were “never far off the radar screen”.471 For instance, in the first two 
years, foreign policy entered the pages of PI directly on two occasions. Once in a section 
discussing the question of  “Reforming the Draft”  - which featured arguments for and 
against a national service system - and in an article by Moynihan entitled “Crisis of 
Confidence”, in which he drew a direct analogy between the debacle in Vietnam and the 
perceived failure of the War on Poverty. Moreover, in the winter 1968 issue, Robert Giplin 
analysed the technology gap between Western Europe and the U.S., the brain drain of 
scientists and engineers from Europe to the U.S. and the implications this had for 
                                                
469 Glazer, “Neoconservative from the Start”, 17. 
470 Irving Kristol, “Forty Good Years”, The Public Interest, Spring 2005, 7. 
471 Matthew Continetti, “Two, Three, Many Neoconservatives: Forty Years of The Public Interest”, The 
Weekly Standard, December 18, 2006. 
 166 
transatlantic relations. The following year, PI published an article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
director of the Trilateral Commission and future National Security Advisor of the Carter 
administration, on the “Purpose and Planning in Foreign Policy”.472  
Furthermore, many of the typical PI topics, such as the “crisis in values”, the 
welfare state, the student movement, the New Left and so on, all had their international 
components as well as implications for foreign affairs. A number of articles compared the 
differing welfare systems or the respective economic systems in articles such as “The 
British Debate the Welfare State”, “‘Third Worlds’ Abroad and at Home” “Whatever 
Happened to British Planning?”, “Sweden: Some Unanswered Questions”, “What Welfare 
Crisis? A Comparison Among the Unite States, Britain, and Sweden”, or “Japan’s 
Galbraithian Economy”. A special issue entitled “The Universities” dealt with the student 
movement in a global context in articles such as “French Students: A Letter from Nanterre-
La-Folie”, “Germany: Radicals and Reformers”, or “Democracy and the English 
University”.473  
In response to a conference on “The Public Interest and the Making of American 
Public Policy: 1965-2005”, Kristol elaborated on the interdependency of foreign and 
domestic policy in the pages of the journal by explaining that one central intent had been to 
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define an American welfare state and social policy, compatible with the editors’ vision of 
the U.S. as a global power. During the inception of the magazine, Kristol said, "there was 
clearly a growing American opinion that believed a European type welfare state was the 
correct and inevitable model for the United States." Conversely, he claimed, the right 
rejected the very idea of the welfare state and saw itself as the harbourers of “a radical 
individualist ethos”. Bell and Kristol, however, were looking for a model of “a welfare state 
that could be reconciled with a world role for the United States?" In Kristol's view, there 
was such an option. PI’s “work in economic and social policy” was therefore closely tied to 
realising “our national destiny as a world power”.474 Significantly, Kristol founded PI’s 
foreign policy counterpart, The National Interest in 1985, which quickly became the 
conservative pendant to the more liberal Foreign Affairs.  
Even though much of the literature has often tried to reduce early neoconservatism 
to a social policy rationale, it becomes clear upon evaluation of PI in conjunction with 
Commentary that the domestic and international spheres were inextricably interconnected 
in the emerging neoconservative outlook. According to its vision, the U.S. needed a 
morally and culturally stable society, guided by an ideologically robust intellectual elite, in 
order to cope with internal and international threats to its system. Yet, neoconservatives 
diagnosed an insecure, guilt-ridden society with an intelligentsia who despised the liberal 
bourgeois ethos on which American society was founded and a people, who, without proper 
guidance by its intellectuals, was “confused and insecure at the lack of clear meaning in its 
order”.475 Glazer remarked, for instance, that “the breakdown of traditional modes of 
behaviour is the chief cause of our social problems” and believed that “some important part 
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of the solution to our social problems lies in…traditional restraint”.476 Neoconservatives, 
therefore, came to see themselves as the defenders of ‘true’ American values and as the 
interpreters of the people’s needs and desires. It was in this sense, that the intellectuals of 
the New Class – who had deepened and perpetuated the “crisis in values” - became 
neoconservatives’ prime opponents, whose influence had to be thwarted in order to 
preserve the liberal bourgeois order.  
 
 
The Defence of the Bourgeois Populist Order against Countercultural Millenarians 
 
 
To counter the “millenarian, utopian forces” that allegedly had gained prevalence in the 
liberal arena during the 1960s, Kristol promoted an approach, which he believed rooted in 
orthodox - rabbinic traditions of Western philosophical thought, according to which the 
potential for human transformation was finite and only to be achieved gradually.477 
Accordingly, human nature, imperfect and selfish, had to be contained by strong social 
institutions and a set of powerful moral values. According to Kristol, the modern, secular 
agents of these orthodox-rabbinic traditions were the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers and their American revolutionary followers. Romanticising America’s 
founding generation, Kristol claimed that they had been aware “that republican self-
government could not exist if humanity did not possess…the traditional ‘republican virtues’ 
of self-control, self-reliance, and a disinterested concern of the public good”.478 The 
supposedly realistic temperament that drove the formative process of republican democratic 
theory and practice was, in Kristol’s view, the defining variable in making the American 
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Revolution into a successful enterprise, as opposed to the allegedly failed French 
Revolution, which ultimately ended in tyranny and anarchy.479 
 Kristol applied this highly generalised framework to the analysis of contemporary 
American society and, by extension, the Western world. Accordingly, the two contending 
forces within Western societies were the prophetic, millenarian, and perfectionist on the 
one hand and the rabbinic, meliorative, and practical ones on the other. “For nearly two 
millennia”, the prophetic forces, however, had the upper hand and had been dismantling 
Western society, undermining its traditional moral and political values. The crisis of 
legitimacy that Kristol and his fellow neoconservatives came to diagnose during the 1960s, 
was brought about by what they considered as the self-destructive forces inherent in 
Western political and philosophical thought, and more specifically liberalism. The alleged 
constant drive towards ever greater equality had eroded the bourgeois order, which had kept 
the excessive selfish individualism of capitalism in check by counter-balancing its drive 
towards self-interested and hedonistic pursuits with the internalised restraints of self-
control, self-discipline and delayed gratification.  
The estrangement of capitalism from its original moral codex – which Bell referred 
to as “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism”, became in Kristol and Bell’s minds the 
main problem for American society in the latter half of the 20th century: the citizen had 
been replaced by the de-spiritualised consumer; the bourgeois ethic had been replaced by 
an all-pervasive consumer ethic. In a special PI issue entitled “Capitalism Today”, both 
Bell and Kristol expressed their concern that “a proudly decadent younger generation and 
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an adversarial intellectual culture” were spending the remaining moral capital of Western 
societies.480 Towards the early 1970s, Kristol began to concentrate most of his energies on 
cultural commentary and, together with Michael Novak, on developing a defence of 
corporate capitalism from attacks by critics on the right and on the left. Both pundits saw 
no alternative to the capitalist system, which they considered the precondition for a society 
based on political liberty. According to Kristol, “Never in human history has one seen a 
society of political liberty that was not based on a free economic system…Never, never, 
never. No exceptions”.481 
However, Kristol initially advocated a qualified free market defence. In his critique 
of both capitalism and socialism entitled Two Cheers for Capitalism, Kristol argued that 
while he appreciated the underlying values that had been conducive to the evolvement of 
the capitalist system, such as hard work, thrift, frugality, moderation, and self-discipline, 
these values were now receding and all that was left was unrestrained profit motive.482 He 
believed that capitalism had become estranged from the moral system that once legitimated. 
The internalised self-discipline and delayed gratification that had marked the bourgeois 
personality had been replaced by a culture that was ruled by boundless material acquisition. 
This libertarian ethic of the business culture in capitalist America enabled it, for example, 
to make a profit by selling the counterculture. Hence, in “Capitalism, Socialism and 
Nihilism”, Kristol criticised capitalists for promoting “the ethos of the New Left for only 
one reason: they cannot think of any reason why they should not. For them, it is ‘business 
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as usual’”.483 Therefore, “the idea of bourgeois virtue…has been replaced by the idea of 
individual liberty”, according to which rationale everything was allowed.484 When Kristol 
became a WSJ editorialist in 1972, he began to castigate the business establishment for the 
wasteful salaries paid to its leadership, deceptive and corrupt business practices, and for 
seemingly failing to enforce a code of ethics.  
According to Kristol, one of the main threats emanating from the New Left was that 
it tried “to fill the spiritual vacuum at the center of our free and capitalist society” that was 
left by the disintegration of bourgeois morality with its alternative, anti-capitalist visions.485 
The capitalist system, therefore, needed to be re-infused with traditional bourgeois values 
of self-control and a responsible business culture. Moreover, capitalists needed 
intellectuals, which would make their case in terms of ideology. Kristol suggested, for 
example, that corporations “give support to those elements of the New Class – and they 
exist, if not in large numbers – which do believe in the preservation of a strong private 
sector”.486 During the later half of the 1970s, Kristol began promoting “supply side 
economics”, the conservative alternative to Keynesianism. In 1975, PI published the “The 
Mundell-Laffer Hypothesis – A New View of the World Economy” by economist Jude 
Wanniski, which was the beginning of PI’s promotion of supply side economics, a central 
rationale, which would inform Ronald Reagan’s economic policy during the 1980s.  
According to the hypothesis developed by Wanniski, Arthur Laffer and Robert Mundell, 
the best way to cultivate economic productivity and revenue was by cutting taxes and 
government spending and let the market do the work. Kristol also financed Wanniski’s The 
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Way the World Works, through funds he obtained from the Smith Richardson Foundation. 
Moreover, Kristol helped Wanniski to acquire a fellowship at the American Enterprise 
Institute.487  
Towards the late 1960s, Kristol, Bell, Glazer and Podhoretz began to heighten their 
warnings that alienation from the bourgeois value system was far more pervasive than 
previously assumed and that it did not just affect the liberal elite. It was a spirit, they 
claimed, which came “to permeate our college-educated upper middle classes” and since 
“our society is breeding more and more “intellectuals” and fewer common men and 
women”, it was producing more citizens who were out of touch with fundamental 
American values.488 The central agent of this subversive attitude, they believed were New 
Class intellectuals, who also had prepared the ground for the countercultural movement of 
the 1960s and legitimated its alleged anti-bourgeois, anti-authoritarian, and anti-American 
sentiments.  
Yet, in their assessment of the connection between intellectuals and the 
counterculture, budding neoconservatives distorted the support the counterculture had 
amongst the American intellectuals, especially amongst academics. As shown by Charles 
Kadushin’s study of American intellectuals, for example, academics disapproved in great 
majority of the student movement. Out of 22 professors he questioned with respect to the 
counterculture, 6 supported it in a qualified way. A study by Seymour Martin Lipset and 
Everett Carll Ladd Jr., which based itself on the Carnegie Commission’s Survey of Student 
and Faculty opinion from 1969, moreover demonstrated that university professors were on 
the whole a lot more moderate with respect to contemporary issues than budding 
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neoconservatives made them out to be. Moreover, opinions towards the counterculture 
amongst elite intellectuals were on average more ambivalent than neoconservative 
interpretations allowed for.489 
Nevertheless, Kristol, contemptuous of the perceived ‘radical chic’ of leftist 
intellectuals, accused intellectuals of the New Class as elitist in “their contempt…for 
bourgeois civilization”. They did not feel alienated from American society for its “material 
inequalities”, Kristol claimed, but simply because they rejected “the ethos of bourgeois 
society”.490 He claimed that the majority of Americans did not share the New Class agenda, 
‘a fact’ neoconservatives argued they understood. Therefore, they, rather than New Class 
intellectuals, were the defenders of the ‘real’ America. Liberal intellectuals’ supposed 
concern with egalitarianism and statistical equality was a perversion of real liberalism, one 
that was being forced onto common Americans by courts and government bureaucracies 
against their will. Using a vocabulary, which evoked the trope of anti-Semitic denigration 
of supposed subversive Jewish influence on government, Kristol alleged that behind the 
concern with equality lay a “a hidden agenda” – in reality New Class intellectuals wanted 
to move the nation away from “that modified version of capitalism we call ‘the welfare 
state’ toward an economic system so stringently regulated in detail as to fulfil many of the 
traditional anticapitalist aspirations of the Left”.491 Therefore, he pointed out, “it is the self-
imposed assignment of neoconservatism to explain to the American people why they are 
right, and to the intellectuals why they are wrong”.492 
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Kristol contended, “the masses of people tend to be more ‘reasonable’…in their 
political judgments and political expectations than are our intellectuals”; they are “less 
consumed with egalitarian bitterness or envy than are college professors or affluent 
journalists”.493 Yet, as adumbrated above, much of neoconservative writing also testified to 
a rather suspicious attitude towards ‘the masses’ and an elitism of its own. Neoconservative 
scepticism towards greater egalitarianism and participatory democracy was constantly 
undergirded by a fear of the masses “out of control”. They expressed dismay at what they 
saw as the spreading of rampant individualism, in which self-realisation appeared to be the 
prevailing mood and violent activism was turned into a mode of politics. Kristol, moreover, 
repeatedly uttered his discontent at the populist nature of American mainstream society 
when he, for example, said, “I do not think that the United States is an altogether admirable 
place…I think its society is vulgar, debased, and crassly materialistic”. Moreover, he 
claimed, “I think the United States has lost its sense of moral purpose and is fast losing its 
authentic religious values”.494  
This was a situation, which, he believed, was further entrenched by New Left 
liberalism and the counterculture, which, according to Podhoretz, were “all part of a single 
movement expressing a single impulse and tending toward a single overriding goal”.495 
Therefore, the New Left and the counterculture triggered in many of budding 
neoconservatives a desire to protect what they believed were values of elementary order, 
academic freedom, professional standards, and basic human civility. According to Adam 
Wolfson, editor of PI from 1994 to 2005, “Neoconservatism…came into its own in reaction 
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to the left’s nihilistic revolt against conventional morality and religion”.496 Moreover, what 
shocked most into moving towards the right was the perceived anti-Americanism of the 
New Left and the counterculture. Jeane Kirkpatrick, political scientist at Georgetown 
University and future advisor of the Reagan presidency, explained that she was not so much 
alienated by the fact that the anti-war movement rejected the war, but rather by the fact that 
it portrayed the U.S. as “immoral – a ‘sick society’ guilty of racism, imperialism, and 
murder of Third World people in Vietnam”. Because “Neoconservatives were not 
fundamentally alienated from American life and society”, it was this “wholesale assault on 
the legitimacy of American society”, which “became the foundation of the opposing 
neoconservative position”.497 This perceived “wholesale assault” on America and its 
underlying values also continued to be Commentary’s major concern during the later 1960s, 
which came to promote a full-blown attack on the New Class, New Left and the 
counterculture from a specifically Jewish perspective. 
 
Commentary, the Spectre of Anti-Semitism and Jewish Radicals 
 
Commentary’s discerned need to defend the existing liberal-bourgeois order was driven by 
the urge to guard Jewish existence therein. In addition to the perceived anti-Americanism of 
the left, future neoconservatives distanced themselves further from liberalism because of 
the alleged anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism that, they believed, began emanating from the 
New Left and African American leaders in the time leading up to and after the Six Day War 
in 1967. After the United Nations had withdrawn all peace-keeping units from key points in 
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Egyptian-ruled Gaza and Sinai, Egypt stationed 1,000 tanks and 100,000 troops on the 
Israeli border, closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and the Arab media had begun 
beating the drum for Israel’s destruction, Israel, fearing a comprehensive attack from 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan, under the aegis of the Soviet Union, launched a series of pre-
emptive air strikes against its hostile Arab neighbours in June 1967.498 Acquiring the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem in a 
campaign attesting to “brilliant planning and execution”, Israel emerged as the foremost 
military power in the Middle East. The victory “refuted the notion, common after 1956, that 
the Jewish state could not defeat Arabs without Western allies”.499 
The Six Day War is generally described as a cataclysmic event for American Jewry, 
opening the door to a new sense of Jewish pride, and awakening them to Israel and the 
Holocaust as important markers of American Jewish identity. Cohen and Fein, for example, 
claimed that while “the weeks before the war had reminded Jews of Jewish vulnerability, 
the week of the war provided them, for the first time, the experience of Jewish triumph”.500 
According to Silberman, the Six Day War replaced efforts by American Jews “to persuade 
themselves…that they were just like everybody else” with a renewed self-assertiveness and 
desire for distinctiveness.501 
Whether the impact of the Six Day War on moving American Jews away from 
universalism towards particularism was as wholesale and categorical as is often alleged, is 
questionable and often seems to be exaggerated. It has been demonstrated previously, that 
the Holocaust and its perceived lessons already had been important issues, and very 
                                                
498 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 2006), 329-334. 
499 “Terrible Swift Sword”, Newsweek, June 19, 1967, 24; Goldschmidt, Jr. and Davidson, A Concise History 
of the Middle East, 329. 
500 Cohen and Fein, “From Integration to Survival: American Jewish Anxieties in Transition”, 81. 
501 Silberman, A Certain People, 201. 
 177 
conflicting ones at that, amongst American Jews during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, 
the defence of and the push towards greater Jewish particularism, as shown, had begun 
during the early 1960s. The impact of the Six Day War was, according to Michael Staub, 
not so much to bring these issues to the fore, but rather to consolidate them and to render 
arguments surrounding Jewish assertiveness and survival even more combative than they 
already were.502  
For the formative development of neoconservatism, the war was relevant in the 
sense that, in its aftermath, neoconservatives felt even more compelled to accelerate their 
critique of the New Left, the counterculture and Jewish radicals. The interpretation that the 
events surrounding the war constituted the main push for neoconservatives’ right turn, 
however, oversimplifies the complexity of the ideological shift.503 The shock and awe 
engendered by the war certainly constituted an important impetus in the consolidation 
process of neoconservatism. Nevertheless, as shown, the Jewish dimension of 
neoconservatism was present long before the Six Day War, contrary to what many analysts 
of neoconservatism, as for instance Dorrien or Kevin Phillips, have claimed.504  
The Six Day War contributed to a rising sentiment of doom and gloom about the 
future of American Jewry in the pages of Commentary. While most scholars highlight the 
positive sense of empowerment the war aroused amongst most Jews, Commentary became 
more pessimistic with respect to the Jewish future after 1967. According to Lucy 
Dawidowicz, American Jews experienced the Six Day War as “a trauma, perhaps best 
diagnosed as a reliving of the Holocaust in an eerie awareness of once again being put to 
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the ultimate test”.505 Podhoretz argued similarly that the Six Day War raised the spectre of 
“a second Holocaust”, in that “For the second time in this century…a major community of 
Jews was being threatened with annihilation…while the world, as it seemed, stood 
complacently by”. Podhoretz drew the conclusion that American Jews had come to believe 
that “if Israel were destroyed…the Jews of America would be next”.506 Moreover, he was 
convinced that “the new sense of Jewish vulnerability”, which arose during the war, 
outweighed the sense of triumph and strength Jews felt in light of the successful Israeli 
operation.507 In light of the criticism of Israeli action, Podhoretz believed that “the taboo 
against open expression of anti-Semitism was broken in America” during and after the Six 
Day War, and that therefore, the “Golden Age of Jewish security” had come to and end. In 
the aftermath of the war, Dawidowicz expressed her concern that “we are entering a new 
cycle of antisemitism”.508 Milton Himmelfarb alleged that, the impact of the war on 
American Jewry was “a kind of education in reality”. Intertwining America’s and Israel’s 
destinies, he claimed, “that one reason why we’re more sensible Americans is that Israel 
has helped us become more sensible generally”.509 
In the aftermath of the war, Podhoretz and other Commentary contributors 
exaggerated the extent to which the radical left and black leadership instrumentalised anti-
Semitic sentiment. It is not an overstatement to say that the magazine became obsessed 
with uncovering anti-Semitism, using the accusation of anti-Semitism all too lightly. While 
there were indeed instances of overt anti-Semitism on the left and amongst a number of 
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African Americans, these usages were, nevertheless, found on the fringes of both 
movements and did not constitute the rule. As a matter of fact, Martin Luther King, Jr., the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National 
Urban League continued to support Israel and speak out against instances of anti-Semitism 
much more frequently and firmly than white non-Jewish leaders and/or spokespeople of the 
right.510 
Moreover, Israel’s existential struggle gained much sympathy amongst a great 
majority of Americans during the Six Day War, a sentiment, which, as shown by Melani 
McAllister, would continue to grow and not diminish after 1967. At one political rally for 
instance, 200 pro-Arab protesters were pitted against 20, 000 Israel supporters. The media 
was mostly sympathetically concerned with Israel in the lead-up, during and after the war. 
Israel’s deployment of military force appeared to many Americans, suffering from the 
Vietnam failure, a model for the U.S. in terms of how military prowess should be explored 
efficiently.511 Additionally, it is questionable to what extent criticism of Israel – which the 
New Left raised under the banner of anti-colonialism and Third World ideology - 
automatically constituted a challenge to Israel’s existence or even a cover up for anti-
Semitism. According to Podhoretz, however, “‘anti-Zionism’ was the order of the day” in 
the New Left, which, to him, generally translated directly into anti-Semitism, because, he 
claimed, leftists seemingly could only “tolerate Jews only as victims, not as victors”.512  
Yet, McAllister demonstrates how Israel became an “icon of positive militarism” in 
the later half of the 1960s and even more so after the Vietnam War had ended. In light of 
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the Vietnam syndrome - “the conservative reinterpretation that viewed the American defeat 
in Vietnam as a failure of political will” - many Americans, especially conservatives, came 
to consider Israel “as an example of the positive use of force”, as well as mobilisation of 
political will. Moreover, defence planners came to believe that Israel “could serve 
American interests…and back U.S. political and military goals”, a line which Commentary 
had propagated since the 1950s.513 As such, Kevin Phillip’s assertion that 
neoconservatives’ excessive focus on Israel would interfere with their capacity of fitting 
into the larger conservative movement was unfounded.514 Effectively, Israel came to play 
an important factor in allying various factions of the emerging New Right, and especially 
so, when evangelicals emerged as a crucial constituent of the movement. These 
conservatives admired Israel not only for its military power and perceived moral superiority 
in the fight against “Arab terrorists”, but also, following evangelical prophetic theology, as 
an instrument in God’s plan.515 Accordingly, Israel would be the setting for the Second 
Coming of the Messiah. Before the millennium of peace could be established, however, all 
Jews had to reunite in the Promised Land and the Second Temple. Finally, Jews would, in 
the words of New Right pundit Ann Coulter, become “perfected”, i.e. Christianised.516  
Hence, towards the end of the 1970s, neoconservatives came to ally themselves, 
even if uncomfortably, with the Christian Right and repeatedly tried to justify the alliance 
to fellow Jews, who in great majority continued to identify as liberals and remained 
especially wary of Christian evangelicals. Kristol, for example, argued that there was no 
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reason for American Jews to fear the Christian Right, because their support for Israel 
“mattered more than evangelicals’ position on other issues”.517 As shown below, 
neoconservatives repeatedly defended their alliance with the Christian Right repeatedly in 
the future and tried to deflect accusations that they were associating themselves with anti-
Semites.518  
While coverage of Israeli affairs and anti-Semitism had received relatively 
sophisticated and even balanced treatment before and during the war, Commentary’s 
position relative to these issues would harden into an excessive Jewish chauvinism in its 
wake, as it began to equate almost all criticism of Israel with anti-Zionism, which in turn, it 
claimed, more often than not, became a stand-in for anti-Semitism. While anti-Zionism was 
to a small extent infused with anti-Jewish sentiment, equating almost all criticism with anti-
Zionism or even anti-Semitism categorically excluded any rational discussion of the issues 
involved. Throughout the following decades, Podhoretz – self-elected representative of the 
putative Jewish interest - continued his accusatory laments on the subject of anti-Zionism 
qua anti-Semitism in articles with titles such as “The Abandonment of Israel”, “J’Accuse”, 
or “The Hate that Dare Not Speak Its Name”.519  
Yet, it has to be pointed out that a great many Jews, even members of the New Left, 
were shocked at what they considered as a revival of political anti-Semitism on the left and 
specifically amongst African Americans. Even some of those who did not initially believe 
that they should reconsider participation in the New Left, felt as if they were “being forced 
out of the movement” because of the pre-eminent notion amongst New Leftists that Israel 
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was an “‘imperialist’ or neo-imperialist instrument”.520 According to Martin Peretz, former 
New Leftist, editor of The New Republic until 2002 and a hawk on foreign policy issues, 
the ‘debacle’ of the National Conference for New Politics in August of 1967 – at which the 
black caucus had demanded amongst other things to be given a 50 per cent convention vote 
and to condemn “the imperialistic Zionist war” - was the “final factor in confirming to me 
that with…the New Left I had not very much in common, and so I found myself really 
trying to define an independent position”.521  
Later, Peretz held Jewish members of the New Left partly responsible for the 
malaise the U.S. found itself in by the end of the 1960s. He claimed that he had great 
difficulty relating to broader American culture after the anti-war movement had imploded, 
coming to understand that, even though not a neoconservative himself, “some of those 
Commentary and public-interest types are right, much as it pains me to concede it, 
that…Jewish liberals and…Jewish radicals, are a part of the reason that American self-
confidence has been so much undermined and that the American military moves rather 
more hesitantly than it would have”.522  
Adding to the discord that had set in between African Americans and Jews after the 
Six Day War was the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school crisis of 1968, which was emblematic 
of the tensions that had developed between Jews and African Americans. It pitted a 
predominately white and Jewish teachers’ union against mainly African American students 
and parents requesting more control over their children’s education. This translated into a 
new Ocean Hill-Brownsville school authority transferring numerous white teachers out to 
other districts. Fearing that community control would break union power, the United 
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Federation of Teachers, mostly with Jewish membership, went on strike. Consecutively, 
both sides battled each other with emotional ferocity and defamations, which many 
observers interpreted as racist and anti-Semitic. Yet, the charges of racism and anti-
Semitism obscured the core issue: the desire on behalf of African Americans to be included 
into a market predominately dominated by Jews. The main issues, which continued to tear 
at the black-Jewish coalition, were school integration, public subsidies for private schools 
and affirmative action. In the aftermath of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, many Jews felt betrayed 
and victimised by a coalition of liberal / black leadership. Neoconservatives stoked the 
flames by claiming that since some liberal and African American leaders had turned anti-
Semitism into “a fashionable item in the American public arena”, American Jews should 
begin to turn inward and once more ask “a question which has only been asked jokingly for 
a number of decades: ‘Is it good for the Jews?”523   
Apart from African American leaders, the main villains in the alleged re-emergence 
of anti-Semitism were in Commentary’s eyes Jewish radicals. Jews who continued to ally 
with the New Left, it claimed, had not learned from the Jewish past and wanted to “emulate 
WASP style”, rejecting their Jewishness.524  Its fierce attacks on Jewish leftists completely 
disregarded the deep divisions within the Jewish radical community. According to Michael 
Staub, even after the Six Day War, there was “an internally diverse” Jewish radical 
movement. The events of the war, in combination with the self-assertiveness of the Black 
Power movement, was for example influential in the creation of the havurah movement, 
which sought to fuse Jewish particularism / survivalism with universal principles of the left. 
While some radicals rejected this approach and continued to promote a more universalist 
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framework, many “attacked their elders precisely for being too assimilated to mainstream 
American culture”.525  
Many of these critical voices were involved with radical Zionist ideas, which linked 
tactics and sometimes goals of black militancy and the anti-war movement to a 
reinvigoration of Jewish education, the defence of the rights of Soviet Jewry and even 
Israel. According to Itzhak Epstein, a founding member of the Jewish Liberation Project, it 
was the aim of radical Zionism to “create a radical national consciousness” and “avoid 
becoming pawns of the white power structure”.526 Jews for Urban Justice rejected what 
they saw as the widespread acceptance amongst members of the Jewish establishment “of 
the worst principles of the Pharaohs – racism, their domination, cutthroat competition, 
exploitation – as their own”. These Jewish leaders were in the eyes of Michael Tabor 
undermining the “struggle for Jewish survival”.527 According to David Biale, former leader 
of the Radical Jewish Union at Berkeley and now professor of Jewish history at Berkeley, it 
was indeed the intention of Jewish radicals to develop their criticism of American society 
from a specifically Jewish and anti-establishment perspective, an undertaking, which was 
characterised by much diversity and competition.528 
Such subtleties, however, escaped the anti-progressive critics at Commentary who, 
with their alarmist and exaggerated rhetoric contributed to firing black-Jewish tensions by 
drawing on racist stereotypes of blacks as culturally and socially underdeveloped. 
Moreover, being radical seemed to be incompatible in their minds with being Jewish. 
Depicting Jewish radicals as traitors of their own people and self-hating Jews, they claimed 
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that the situation of African Americans had by then little to do with white racism and was 
more the result “of inadequate development of various skills and abilities within the Negro 
population…and of certain cultural features”.529 Moreover, according to Milton 
Himmelfarb, Jewish radicals were the most “anti-Jewish” Jews in history.530 Glazer 
continued to draw analogies between Jewish radicals and Nazis, insisting that it was the 
“Jewish intelligentsia” who “abetted and assisted and advised…the expansion and 
inflammation of anti-Semitism among blacks” and rationalized the violence that had 
gripped the country.531 Glazer, comparing the Black Panthers to Nazis, simultaneously 
ridiculed Jewish radicals who continued to be involved in black civil rights as self-
destructive: “All they can do is give the blacks guns, and allow themselves to become the 
first victims”.532 Seymour Martin Lipset argued that “familiar forms of Jewish self-hatred, 
of so-called ‘Jewish anti-Semitism’” amongst Jewish leftists, were an outgrowth of the fact 
that these Jews generally had grown up in overly assimilated families. He concluded that 
Jewish self-hatred was “becoming a major problem for the American Jewish 
community”.533 According to Podhoretz, “Jews should recognize the ideology of the radical 
Left for what it is: an enemy of liberal values and a threat to the Jewish position”.534 
Towards the end of the 1960s, Commentary amplified its campaign to detach Jews 
from the progressive liberalism and radicalism. According to Earl Raab, “the political 
liberalism which opened the world to the Jews two centuries ago, has run its course for the 
Jews in America”. He counselled that the Jewish community, therefore, should abandon 
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“the various forms of self-destructive innocence in which it has been caught and which are 
so deadly to its identity, to its meaning, and indeed to its very existence”. Conservatism, not 
liberalism, should guide Jews in the opening of a new political frontier in Jewish American 
history.535 
 
‘Come Home Democrats’: The Coalition for a Democratic Majority and Democrats for 
Nixon 
 
The social upheavals of the 1960s and the Vietnam War shattered the New Deal coalition 
and the liberal consensus of the early Cold War years. The decade had seemingly ushered 
in a new domestic and international order. At the opening of the 1970s, many Americans 
were fed up with liberal reformism, riots, social disorder and the counterculture. This mood 
was reflected in the voter realignment of the 1972 presidential election, which had already 
been clearly visible in 1968. New conservative constituencies emerged in the South, and 
the Southwest, as well as amongst Catholics and evangelical Protestants.536 These voters 
felt unsettled by the perceived intrusion of the Warren Supreme Court into their lives and 
the social instability of the 1960s, they blamed on the civil rights movement, the New Left 
and the counterculture. Many felt threatened by what ‘Nixonites’ caricatured as 
‘McGovernite’ liberalism, favouring “amnesty, acid, and abortion”; a New Politics, which 
advocated big government, wealth redistributing in favour of the needy and minorities, 
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cultural and social permissiveness and scepticism towards traditional values and American 
power.537 
In addition, the 1972 election also saw, for the first time since FDR, a relatively 
significant, if temporary, shift of Jewish voters towards the Republican Party, ironic in light 
of the Nixon’s antipathy for Jews. Since the New Deal, Jewish voters had consistently 
given between 75 and 90 per cent of their vote to Democratic presidential candidates. 
During the 1972 election this number sank to under 70 per cent. According to Podhoretz, 
some Jews turned away from the Democratic Party not because of affirmative action and 
Israel per se, but because they felt uneasy with, “the entire New Politics Movement”, which 
they perceived as “an assault on the values of the center, the values of…middle class life”. 
Since the majority of American Jews were “loyal to those values”, they felt alienated by 
McGovern.538 Given the centrality of liberalism for the self-understanding of a large 
number of Jews, the relative reduction of Jewish support for the Democratic Party led to 
heated debates about Jews turning towards the Republicans. Many denied this was the case, 
seeing the shift in the “Jewish vote” as merely “reflective of the shift of the American vote” 
and that Jews, like other groups voted their self-interest, which “on most issues coincides 
with larger groups of Americans”.539 
Budding neoconservatives also began to defect from the Democratic Party in 1972. 
Many of these disgruntled liberals believed that the Democratic Party had given in to forces 
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of perceived anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, neo-isolationism and cultural radicalism 
when McGovern won the presidential nomination. According to Kirkpatrick, the McGovern 
campaign “adopted as its own a revisionist interpretation of the post-1945 period. In that 
revisionist view…the United States had major responsibility for the Cold War and Soviet 
expansion”.540 Hook alarmingly denounced McGovern in the Socialist Party newspaper 
New America as an appeaser whose “foreign policy smells of ‘the spirit of Munich’”, 
signalling the Socialist Party’s opposition to the New Politics as elitist, anti-labour and neo-
isolationist.541 A ‘dovish’ approach towards U.S. might would ultimately also mean less 
support for Israel. McGovern, furthermore, seemed committed to support “quotas” in 
favour of previously excluded minorities, which according to Glazer, automatically seemed 
to spell “a restriction on the opportunities of Jews”.542  
Milton Himmelfarb claimed that American Jews had developed a Wiggish 
temperament after the War of 1967. Even if they were not becoming more conservative, 
then at least they were becoming more “natural”, by which he meant that they were 
becoming more self-assertive with respect to particularly Jewish interests.543 A lot of 
projections that Jews were overall becoming more conservative had more to do with 
wishful thinking, however, than with actual reality. A great majority of Jews continued to 
identify their interests with liberal values and politics, even if more moderately so than in 
the past. From the early 1970s onwards, a number of neoconservatives repeatedly expressed 
the hope that the large majority of Jews, which kept voting for Democratic candidates 
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would eventually realise their mistake and heed neoconservatives’ calls to join them in their 
shift to the right. Just as PI maintained that it understood what the putative public interest 
was, so did Commentary claim that it knew what was ‘good for the Jews’, arguing that 
“Jews must once again begin to look at proposals and policies from the point of view of the 
Jewish interest” and vote accordingly.544 That most did not, led to much frustration and 
incomprehension amongst neoconservatives.545  
Yet, even if neoconservatives voted Republican for the first time in 1972, this move 
did not come easily for most. According to Podhoretz, he voted for Nixon, “my first 
Republican vote ever – because he seemed to me the lesser of two evils”.546 To Kristol, 
joining the Republican Party felt “as foreign to me as attending a Catholic Mass”.547 
Nevertheless, it was his hope that Jewish intellectuals might give American conservatism 
and the Republican Party “an intellectual vigor and cultural buoyancy it has sadly lacked 
until now”.548 Yet, most abstained from joining the Republican Party permanently, 
preferring to remain above party politics throughout the 1970s.  
Others voted for McGovern, but half-heartedly, such as Nathan Glazer. He believed 
that, even though the willingness of the U.S. to go to war for Israel or any other ally, had 
markedly been reduced because of Vietnam, support for Israel, nevertheless, would remain 
an important pillar of U.S. foreign policy, whoever would take over the U.S. leadership. 
Unlike Kristol and Podhoretz, Glazer agreed with McGovern’s plan to reduce military 
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spending and U.S. presence in the world, because he believed that military engagement in 
Western Europe was no longer necessary and the American military activities in Asia had 
been a disaster.549 There were others, who were moving away from the left, yet remained 
unwilling to vote for a Republican candidate. They would, as in the case of Peretz, also 
support McGovern despite the fact that they personally disapproved of him. Peretz claimed 
he voted for McGovern “out of a sense of obligation to the liberal body politic with 
tremendous resentment and…with a sense of contempt for him”.550  
 The fact that neoconservatives had not yet given up completely on the Democratic 
Party as the best vehicle for their ideas was signified also by the fact that after Nixon was 
elected to the White House, a number of them, in coalition with academics, politicians and 
labour leaders, announced the formation of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) 
in The New York Times on December 7, 1972. The CDM was, in the words of Sara 
Diamond, “the first organized network of neoconservatives and their allies since the 
dissolution of the Congress for Cultural Freedom”.551 Under the headline “Come Home 
Democrats” – in allusion to McGovern’s campaign slogan “Come Home America” – they 
announced that McGovern’s defeat had been a clear rejection of his politics by average 
Americans because it was “unrepresentative of traditional Democratic principles” and that 
it was time the Democratic Party remember its tradition and take heed of “the wishes and 
hopes of a majority of the American people”. CDM had about 70 sponsors, including 
Podhoretz, Bell, Glazer, Lipset, Michael Novak, Richard Pipes, Paul Seabury, Albert 
Shanker, Ben Wattenberg, Bayard Rustin, Max Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Midge 
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Decter. It rallied conservative Democrats who favoured ‘peace through strength’ and 
rejected the politics of those, who were supposedly hostile to ‘ordinary’, working-class 
Americans and had “sneered at the greatness of America”.552 
 
Conclusion 
 
Michael Harrington coined the term neoconservatism in 1973, in reference to a number of 
his fellow intellectuals from the anti-communist left who had deserted liberalism because of 
the perceived failures of the welfare state. According to Harrington, these failures were the 
driving force behind “the rise of neoconservative thought in the seventies”.553 While the 
article correctly pointed to the centrality of social policy in the emergence of 
neoconservatism, it simultaneously misrepresented it.  The analysis of PI, in combination 
with Commentary, demonstrates the extent to which early neoconservatism was more 
polymorphous, multi-levelled and incoherent than is usually assumed by critics and 
defenders alike. Moreover, PI was much more than just a social policy journal, but an 
ideologically driven enterprise from the start, refuting popular interpretations, according to 
which neoconservatism began as a ‘meliorist’ approach shifting towards an ideological 
outlook only towards the later 1970s. PI’s focus on domestic issues was part of a much 
broader rationale, which sought to develop ideas for a “welfare state consistent with the 
basic moral principles of our civilization and the basic political principles of our nation”.554 
Contending that a majority of Americans – the ‘real’ Americans – did not support 
Great Society liberalism, incipient neoconservatives began to frame those who promoted 
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the new liberalism as elitist – reflected by the concept of the New Class. Neoconservatives 
in turn, presented themselves as self-styled populist majoritarians, whose objective was to 
defend ‘real’ America against a ‘perverted’ egalitarianism and anti-Americanism of New 
Class intellectuals. While Kristol acknowledged that neoconservatives were “part of the 
same New Class” and they, like the New Class sought political power, neoconservatives 
remained true to the real liberalism and American values, while the New Class used 
liberalism just as “a vehicle for gaining power for themselves” on the backs of ‘ordinary’ 
Americans.555 In light of what has been demonstrated, this claim was indeed absurd 
because neoconservatives were a minority voice without any grassroots support and 
therefore very different from the actual populist majoritarians of the burgeoning New 
Right. 
Even though the literature generally reduces neoconservatism either to a public 
policy or a foreign policy rationale, contiguous evaluation of both Commentary and PI 
demonstrates that the domestic and international spheres were interdependent for budding 
neoconservatives. PI was driven by a desire to define a vision of an American welfare state 
compatible with neoconservative’s vision of the U.S. as a powerful global player. 
Accordingly, the U.S. needed a healthy and morally armed society, in order to fulfil its 
supposed destiny of national greatness. Kristol concluded “Imperial powers need social 
equilibrium at home if they are to act effectively in the world”.556 Neoconservatives 
believed it to be their vocation to re-infuse the American people and leadership with 
confidence in the nation’s morality and purpose and to shed the self-doubt and self-loathing 
that was introduced into the American psyche by the liberal establishment. 
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Lastly, another layer of complexity is added to the emergence of neoconservatism 
by Commentary’s continued critique of liberalism. Commentary articulated the frontal 
assault on the new liberalism in a much more straightforward, unpretentious manner than 
PI. It also directly voiced the Jewish dimension of the neoconservative critique of 
liberalism, by which it came to define itself as the self-chosen representative of what it 
believed constituted Jewish interests. Part of this process, as shown and as will be 
demonstrated in further detail below, was an effort to ‘ex-communicate’ those Jews who 
did not agree with Commentary’s vision what being Jewish had come to signify by the later 
1960s. As Commentary and PI redefined what it meant to be a ‘real’ American, 
Commentary defined the parameters what it meant to be a ‘real’ Jew. In this endeavour, 
both PI and Commentary were often much closer to the conservative mainstream than has 
often been claimed. Moreover, for all of neoconservatives’ emphasis on ethnic 
distinctiveness, their criticism of liberalism was articulated from the vantage point of 
establishment privilege. 
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    Chapter 5 
‘Come On In, the Water’s Fine’: 
Towards a Consolidation of 
the Neoconservative Critique, 1972-1980 
!  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the turn of the decade, neoconservatism burst onto the national stage. Robert Bartley of 
WSJ acknowledged Podhoretz as “a pro-American type of intellectual” and 
neoconservatives for “starting to speak up, to launch vigorous counterattacks on the chic 
radicalism, to debunk the debunkers”.557 According to Bartley, they addressed timely 
questions, such as the “collapse of values. The place of tradition in a time of change…The 
place of an intellectual elite in a nation where…only eleven percent of adults have 
completed four years in college”.558  
In 1976, Anthony Lewis drew attention to the emerging alliance between the 
defence establishment and a number of policy intellectuals who were “strong supporters of 
Israel” and staunch proponents of “larger U.S. defense budgets”. Lewis identified these 
intellectuals as a number of writers around Commentary, with close ties to Senators Henry 
M. Jackson of Washington and Daniel Moynihan of New York.559 A year later, Terence 
Smith partially credited Commentary and PI pundits for the success of the burgeoning New 
Right and its effective appropriation of leftist tactics. He described them as proponents of 
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the free market, opponents of affirmative action and agitators against the latent anti-
Semitism that supposedly was rearing its ugly head on the left.560  
This chapter examines how neoconservatives “joined the ranks”, albeit 
uncomfortably and hesitantly, of the emerging New Right, which, in the words of Sara 
Diamond, brought together the “‘fusionist triad of moral traditionalism, economic 
libertarianism, and militarist anti-communism”.561 These new conservatives differed from 
the old conservatives mainly in the sense that, despite of their anti-government rhetoric, 
they were less concerned with the size, scope, or intrusiveness of government than with the 
purposes of governmental activism. In the words of Alan Brinkley, their main intent was to 
use government to cleanse “American culture and politics of what they consider its 
relativistic, anti-traditional character”.562 In this context, neoconservatives slowly came to 
realise that their conceptions of the good society – which were dependent on a highly 
interventionist government - could possibly find a place within the new conservatism. Yet, 
throughout the 1970s, they continued to vacillate between the Democratic and the 
Republican parties – between revisionist liberalism and new conservatism. Their migration 
into the New Right would only be sealed with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. 
As the pace with which former leftist intellectuals were moving to the right 
accelerated, National Review conservatives began to take notice of them, even though they 
feared that neoconservative ideas might be “insufficiently rooted in serious political 
realities, in general principle, or coherent intellectual tradition”.563 James Burnham, a 
former Marxist turned conservative, suggested that neoconservatives were in a “transitional 
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stage”, but that their ideology would eventually “develop further into a more integral 
outlook” of the right, even if not into conventional conservatism.564 William Buckley 
applauded Commentary’s articles on “Revolutionism and the Jews”, which electrified him 
because of their “explicit disavowal of Jewish participation” in the New Left and the 
counterculture and because they condemned “Jewish support for revolutionary groups…as 
‘Jewish antisemitism’”. He claimed that these articles said, “about the Jewish intellectual 
establishment in America what no non-Jew could say without being thought prejudiced”. 
Encouraging neoconservatives to take the final leap and positively embrace conservatism, 
Buckley reassuringly summoned them to “Come on in, the Water’s Fine”.565 
By 1970, both New Right conservatives and neoconservatives were plagued by 
severe doubts about the moral fabric of American society and about the effectiveness of 
American power. Neoconservatives and the New Right conservatives of National Review 
contributed to channelling popular conservatism’s traditional resentment of big business 
towards an allegedly intrusive and oppressive federal government and liberal 
‘establishment’. Successfully redefining the enemy of the American people as the New 
Class/liberal ‘establishment’ was, according to Christopher Lasch, one of the 
neoconservatives’ crucial contribution to the rise of the New Right.566 Neoconservatives 
also shared with New Right conservatives the belief that modern American society, under 
the aegis of New Left liberalism, had come to overemphasise individual rights and 
freedoms at the expense of communal moral standards and traditional values. Together with 
                                                
564 James Burnham, “Selective, Yes. Humanism, Maybe”, National Review, May 12, 1972, 516. 
565 Nathan Glazer, “Revolutionism and the Jews: The Role of the Intellectuals”, Commentary, February 1971, 
55-61; Walter Z. Laqueur, “Revolutionism and the Jews: New York and Jerusalem”, Commentary, February 
1971, 38- 46; Robert Alter, “Revolutionism and the Jews: Appropriating the Religious Tradition”, 
Commentary, February 1971, 47-54; Norman Podhoretz, “The Tribe of the Wicked Son”, Commentary, 
February 1971, 6-10; William F. Buckley, “Come On In, the Water’s Fine”, National Review, March 9, 1971, 
249-250. 
566 Lasch, The True and Only Heaven, 512. 
 197 
traditional conservatives, neoconservatives began to call for “a relegitimation of traditional 
centers of authority” and “a refurbishment of American nationalism”.567  
While neoconservatives played an important role in the success of the New Right 
indeed, it needs to be pointed out that claims, according to which neoconservatives were the 
major force in rendering New Right conservatism socially acceptable, exaggerate their 
influence. By 1970, when neoconservatives were still vacillating in a ‘neither-here-nor-
there’ position, New Right conservatism already had begun entering the mainstream.  For 
example, the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), a conservative youth organisation 
founded in 1960 with fewer than a hundred members, was, with a membership of 50,000 
“the largest non-party political organization in the country” by 1970.568 In the same year, 
National Review celebrated its 15th anniversary with more than 100, 000 subscribers. The 
early 1970s also saw the publication of a number of anthologies on conservative thought.569  
Moreover, even though neoconservatives claimed to know what was best for the 
grassroots base, they did not interact with those important elements of the emerging 
conservative movement, but preferred to focus on the upper echelon of society. 
Neoconservatives’ allegation that they were majoritarians who spoke on behalf of 
‘common’ Americans appears irrational and if not hypocritical on account of the fact that 
they acted from within the realms of established privilege and, unlike the real majoritarians 
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of the New Right, had no connection at all with the bedrock of the movement.570 Extending 
their power beyond the world of essay- and article writing, organising conferences and 
giving speeches, neoconservatives busied themselves building strategic alliances with think 
tanks, the corporate world, conservative academics, political advisors and politicians 
themselves. 
During the 1970s neoconservatives also began to speak more with one voice. While 
they continued to hold highly individualistic views and contend with each other, the main 
protagonists, Podhoretz and Kristol, nevertheless, began to draw closer to each other, 
illustrated, for example, by the fact that Kristol wrote again more frequently for 
Commentary during the 1970s and the 1980s. In the public mind, they would become so 
closely identified with each other that they seemed to merge into one person. Buckley, in 
one famous example, ended a conversation with Podhoretz on Firing Line with the words: 
“Thank you very much, Mr. Irving Podhoretz”.571 
 
‘Into the Right’: Neoconservative Institution- and Coalition Building 
 
Since neoconservatives’ “small numbers precluded their becoming major players in 
electoral politics” they began creating a network of “ties with national security elites” and 
corporate business, which sought to pour money into business-friendly “think tanks, 
university programs, and journals”, all of which were places “most hospitable to 
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neoconservative intellectuals”.572 By positioning themselves strategically “in the 
marketplace of ideas”, neoconservatives consolidated their ideas and joined forces with 
equal-minded pundits of the New Right.573 
In the early 1970s William Baroody, Sr., head of the AEI and former advisor in 
Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign, became aware of the pundits around PI and 
Commentary. In order to challenge the influence of liberal institutions, such as the 
Brookings Institute, he began recruiting corporate support and new minds, as for instance 
the libertarian economist Milton Friedman and neoconservatives, such as Kristol, Ben 
Wattenberg, Michael Novak and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The AEI became one of the first 
conservative think tanks to propagate ‘fusionist’ conservatism, with a main focus on free 
market ideology. Throughout the 1970s, the AEI was joined by other think tanks and 
foundations, such as the Harry and Lynde Bradley Foundation, the John M. Olin 
Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the Manhattan Institute for 
Policy Research, the Cato Institute, and the Ethics and Public Policy Centre.574 
Moreover, Kristol’s diatribes against the New Class, the tendency of business to sell 
out to it and his plea for a reinvigorated capitalist culture had come to the attention of 
William E. Simon, who had served as Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon and looked to 
fund “intellectual refuges for the non-egalitarian scholars and writers in our society who 
today work largely alone in the face of overwhelming indifference and hostility”. He 
believed that these “non-egalitarian” intellectuals “must be given grants, grants and more 
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grants in exchange for books, books and more books”, in order to counteract “the despotic 
aspects of egalitarianism” and promote “the struggle for individual liberty”.575  
Together, Kristol and Simon founded the Institute for Educational Affairs, which 
sought to spread conservative ideas, especially relative to market liberalisation, on college 
campuses, sponsoring for example a network of conservative newspapers at colleges and 
universities, amongst others the Dartmouth Review. Its donations mainly came from 
foundations such as John M. Olin Foundation, the Scaife Family Trusts, the JM 
Foundation, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, as well as big business, such as Coca-Cola, 
Dow Chemical, Ford Motor, and General Electric to name but a few. Kristol also mobilised 
grants for the formation of This World (later renamed First Things), edited by Richard 
Neuhaus, which dealt with the role of religion in society. In the 1980s Kristol was able to 
secure funding from the Olin Foundation in order to create the foreign policy journal The 
National Interest. In all these activities, Kristol stood out for his supreme networking and 
sourcing talents.576 
Meanwhile, Kristol continued his campaign to reform the ethics of American 
business and develop an ideological defence of the capitalist system against perceived 
efforts of the New Left to discredit it. Since he believed that the New Left was trying to 
bring an end to “the sovereignty over our civilization of the common man”, its primary aim 
was to bring about “the death of the “economic man”, because “it is in the marketplace that 
this sovereignty is most firmly established”.577 In his desire to reappraise the capitalist 
system, Kristol came to the attention of Robert Bartley, who had taken a liking to PI. In a 
1972 article, entitled “Irving Kristol and Friends”, Bartley pointed out that “a new group of 
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thinkers had emerged who were making an original contribution” to American 
conservatism.578 The same year, Kristol began writing a monthly column for the WSJ. In 
the late 1960s, Kristol had also taken up the post as Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values 
at the New York University, which he secured with Sidney Hook’s support. This was 
certainly an interesting development in light of Kristol’s seemingly low esteem of students 
and academia more generally. 
While Kristol joined a monthly lunch group with Buckley, which called itself “the 
Boys Club”, Podhoretz began corresponding with Buckley in early 1972 and invited him to 
participate at a Commentary symposium in 1973, which Buckley was unable to attend, 
however, due to illness.579 These were signs that both sides, who until recently had been 
relatively suspicious of each other, were discovering common ground and were willing to 
exchange ideas. Yet, neoconservatives also continued to aspire reviving the Vital Centre, 
which had collapsed over the Vietnam War.580 In the past, Commentary had denounced 
National Review on several occasions. In 1953, Dwight McDonald referred to National 
Review writers as “Scrambled Eggheads on the Right” and Richard Rovere described 
Goldwater/Buckley style conservatism as devoid of “any ideas that can be given 
institutional form” and driven by the axiom that “politics can offer nothing in the way of 
amelioration”. Moreover, Rovere accused both Goldwater and Buckley of promoting an 
ideology, which “denies history’s relevance to itself” and was “almost nothing but insults 
to the intelligence”.581  
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Neoconservatives had been uneasy with conservatism’s historical connection to 
anti-Semitism, its perceived unsophisticated nature and anti-intellectualism, its rejection of 
universal suffrage and civil rights, its hostility to labour unions and New Deal type welfare, 
and its association with devotees to pre-modern ascriptive social hierarchies, such as 
Richard Weaver.582 Neoconservatives did not yearn to revive medieval Christendom or the 
pseudo-feudalism of the Old South. Yet, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Buckley engaged 
in conscious efforts to disassociate himself and his magazine from these tendencies and the 
‘lunatic fringe’ - one reason why an alliance between neoconservatives and National 
Review conservatives became possible in the first place.583 Nevertheless, throughout the 
1970s, neoconservatives continued to view these “ideological conservatives” as 
unsophisticated, since they were, in the words of Midge Decter, “with a few exceptions still 
sulking in their cultural tents”.584 Yet, by the beginning of the 1970s, an alliance between 
neoconservatives and National Review conservatives began to seem preferable to one with 
liberals who appeared to be speaking a different language altogether. 
Throughout the 1970s, therefore, both sides began to approximate each other, as 
neoconservatives realised that their chances of re-capturing the Democratic Party and 
resuscitating Cold War liberalism of the 1950s with old allies were fading. Moreover, for 
National Review conservatives, the neoconservatives had the advantage that, as former 
leftists, they “knew their enemy intimately”.585 In addition, as well-established members of 
the intellectual elite, they could reach out to people who had previously been inaccessible 
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to intellectually marginalised conservatives. A number of traditionalist conservatives, 
however, had been and continued to be highly suspicious of neoconservatives, because of 
their past alliance with radicalism and liberalism and their affinity for Wilsonian-style 
democracy promotion. These conservatives were generally described as the heirs of the 
anti-statist, non-interventionist Taft-wing of American conservatism and the tradition of 
Midwestern isolationism and Southern Agrarianism.586  
Russell Kirk, the leading traditionalist intellectual and author of The Conservative 
Mind, described neoconservatives as a “little sect” who were unable to grasp “the human 
condition”, doubtful of the “accumulated wisdom of our civilisation” and prone “to engage 
in ideological sloganeering”, which Kirk equated with “the death of political 
imagination”.587 The most inflammatory accusation, which traditionalist conservatives 
would level repeatedly throughout the next decades, was that neoconservatives were 
unconcerned with the American interest. A regular GOP contender for the presidential 
nomination, Patrick Buchanan, claimed that neoconservatives, in reference to the Iraq War, 
“seek to ensnare our country in a series of wars that are not in America’s interests”.588 Paul 
Gottfried believed that they were unreconstructed social democrats, who were “with the 
Left even if their expense accounts come from the right”.589 Buchanan, who, in competition 
with neoconservatives for America’s conservative heritage, was categorised as paleo-
conservative during the latter 1980s, referred to neoconservatives as “ideological vagrants” 
and “boat-people from the McGovern revolution” and expressed his discontent at the 
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amount of power they had allegedly harnessed within the conservative movement by the 
1990s.590 
Neoconservatives themselves, however, claimed to uphold the common sense of 
‘ordinary’ Americans against what they described as an elitist, un-American, liberal 
minority that allegedly had usurped American cultural, educational, and political life. They 
suggested that it was their mission to dismantle “the typical New York Jewish view of the 
world, that people who weren’t from New York and Jewish were unfortunate” because 
“they ate Wonderbread and mayonnaise and had boring existences”.591 This claim sat 
awkwardly with the neoconservatives’ own elitist positions and views, as well as with the 
fact that they were self-professed public intellectuals, most of whom were of Jewish 
background, wanting to represent a constituency, which was primarily working to middle-
class, from the heartland of America, where devout interpretations of Christianity and a 
deeply rooted anti-intellectualism were pervasive. It is also in this sense, that 
neoconservatives continued to constitute an ‘outsider’ element within the New Right.  
Yet, neoconservatives embraced a rhetoric which asserted that they knew how to 
defend the hard-working, community-minded suburbanites, which David Brooks referred to 
as “the ubermoms, the workaholic corporate types” from the dominant liberal elite.592 Their 
romanticised image depicted ‘average’ Americans as a “transcendent nation infused with 
everyday utopianism”, which believed that there continued to be a morally defined 
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common good beyond purely individual interests.593 Drawing on ideas of ‘mediated 
democracy’ which according to the neoconservative interpretation had been articulated 
originally by the founding fathers of the American experiment, they claimed that while 
liberal intellectuals felt alienated from American values and the American way of life, the 
majority of Americans did not and nor did neoconservatives.594  
 Indeed, many neoconservative ideas were not running counter to the emerging 
“silent majority” mainstream, as has so often been maintained by traditional interpretations 
of neoconservatism and even neoconservatives themselves.595 According to Thomas Frank, 
neoconservatism was an integral part of a New Right politics of “backlash”, whose “basic 
premise”, following Kevin Phillips, “is that culture outweighs economics as a matter of 
public concern”. Frank, however, exaggerated the extent to which it was neoconservatism, 
which introduced this rationale into New Right thought.596 Nevertheless, the stress that 
neoconservatives placed on ideology and culture provided them with cogent resources in 
their ascendency to power and allowed them to fit in with larger tendencies within the 
conservative intellectual arena.  
Phillips, the mastermind behind Nixon’s “southern strategy”, referred to 
neoconservatives as “distressed ex-liberal Democrats” and doubted that they would be able 
to gain real political power, because of the weight they were giving to Israeli security 
questions. Phillips’ reduction of neoconservatism to an excessive concern with Israel was 
not only a severe misperception of neoconservative ideas, but their successful rise during 
                                                
593 David Brooks, On Paradise Drive: How We Live Now (And Always Have) In the Future Tense (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2004), 267. 
594 Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 111. 
595 Nash,“Joining the Ranks”, 155. 
596 Thomas Frank, What’s Wrong With America?: The Resistible Rise of the American Right (London: Secker 
and Warburg, 2004), 6. 
 206 
the 1970s and 1980s also showed that concern for Israel was more widespread amongst the 
American public than Phillips had expected.597 While Israel was relatively irrelevant to 
Americans during the 1950s and early 1960s, by the end of the 1970s that circumstance had 
undergone profound change. Yet, it was indeed a specific conception of Jewish interests – 
but not exclusively in terms of Israeli security - which deeply impacted on the rightward 
trajectory of Jewish neoconservatives.598 
 According to Phillips, the populist conservatism of the New Right reflected the 
anger and expectations of ‘ordinary’ Americans, who sought to defend their lifestyle 
against perceived encroachments of the liberal ‘establishment’. Phillips predicted that urban 
Catholics, blue-colour suburbanites, the ‘sun belt’ and ‘Bible belt’ states of the South and 
the Southwest, as well as residents of the rural North would flock to the Republican Party 
and come to constitute the emerging Republican majority. These were not the paranoid 
eccentrics consensus historian Richard Hofstadter had written about, but the “silent 
majority” of the American people, Goldwater’s “forgotten Americans”.599 In opposition to 
the populist, ‘anti-establishment’ conservatism of the Republican Party, Phillips assumed 
that the Democratic Party would come to represent the liberal ‘establishment’: the media, 
universities, the Supreme Court, Episcopalians and those who benefited from 
“institutionalized welfare liberalism”.600  
Ben Wattenberg, former speechwriter for LBJ and budding neoconservative, 
together with Richard Scammon, political scientist and elections analyst, agreed with 
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Phillips’ assessment that social rather than economic issues had come to determine electoral 
politics by the late 1960s. Nevertheless, holding out hope to recapture the Democratic 
Party, they did not believe that Americans were by majority conservative or Republican, 
but rather, they claimed, most Americans were “centrists” - like neoconservatives 
themselves. In order for the Democratic Party to regain pre-eminence, Scammon and 
Wattenberg advised, it should not shy away from social issues, such as law and order, 
crime, drugs, pornography, sexual permissiveness, riots, and anti-social behaviour. These 
issues were not shorthand for racism, they argued, but legitimate concerns and if the 
Democrats were to further ignore these matters, Phillip’s prediction of a Republican 
majority would indeed come true.601 
Jerome Himmelstein’s top-down history of modern American conservatism credited 
effective “resource mobilisation” by conservative leaders with the successful rise of the 
New Right. These conservatives, claimed Himmelstein, built a broad conservative coalition 
by combining militant anti-communism, and libertarian and normative elements of 
conservatism into an ecumenical ideology. To reach out to the electorate, they re-fashioned 
an eclectically informed conservative ideology, fed by of a conservative populist language, 
which drew on the image of neither being complete outsiders nor insiders to the halls of 
power.  While correctly pointing to the successful coalition building strategy, Himmelstein 
neglects to consider seriously the relevance of the populist idiom in the rise of the New 
Right.602  
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In The Populist Persuasion, Michael Kazin showed how populism began to shift 
from the political left to the right during the 1940s; around the same time neoconservatives 
began their long journey to the right. Traditionally, the populist style was the purview of 
reform and radical movements, such as the Populists, the Progressives, or the 
Prohibitionists. Populist language, which, according to Kazin, described “ordinary people 
as a noble assemblage not bound narrowly by class” and considered “elite opponents as 
self-serving and undemocratic”, out to “pollute any segment of society they could grasp”, 
was transformed not to promote social change but to stall and reverse it.603  
American populism always claimed to defend the rights and the life-style of the 
virtuous people against the perversions and exploitations of the elite, which was at one 
point in history a “pro-British cabal of merchants, landholders and conservative clerics”, at 
another “the ‘money power’ directed by well-born cosmopolitans”.604 For neoconservatives 
and the New Right, it was the New Class, or the liberal establishment – represented for 
example by the McGovernites, who, according to Podhoretz, refused “to take the popular 
will seriously” and disdained “the majority of the American people, for their sensibilities, 
for their political values, for their sense of themselves as a nation”.605  
What Kazin referred to as the “irony of populism” becomes most visible when 
considering the populist rhetoric of neoconservative intellectuals: here is a group of 
“eloquent men who stand above the crowd” and who articulate “the connections between 
anonymous people and mistrusts the palaver of elites”.606 In order to fight what 
neoconservatives considered “the democratic totalitarianism” of the New Class, they, 
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defined themselves as “a lonely band of truth tellers”, who wanted to “define, refine and 
represent” what Kristol refers to as the “bourgeois populism” of “the American people”.607 
Since neoconservatives were suspicious of unmediated mass democracy, their role would 
be to filter and guide the inchoate grievances and desires of the people. 
 
‘Reverse Discrimination’: The Neoconservative Case Against Affirmative Action 
 
The neoconservative critique of affirmative action was one major issue, which moved 
neoconservatives closer to the conservative mainstream and through which they contributed 
seminally to attracting popular support for the New Right. While neoconservatives were 
critical of affirmative action as a whole, most of their initial disapproval was concentrated 
on affirmative action in academia, an area which, according to Alan Brinkley, “remained 
wedded to patriarchal notions of learning and to rigid codes of conduct” throughout the 
1960s.608 Nancy MacLean demonstrates how universities continued to acquiesce to the long 
established “old-boy system”, according to which jobs were advocated and allocated in an 
exclusivist and closed manner, resulting in an excess of white male employees in relation to 
extremely low numbers of female and minority candidates, especially in the higher 
echelons of the hierarchy. Many leading graduate and professional schools, for example, 
blatantly discriminated against women by either excluding them entirely or only accepting 
limited contingents. By the early 1970s, through the advocacy of female activists of the 
Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) and the National Organisation for Women 
(NOW), the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) began to put pressure on 
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leading universities, confronting them with losing federal contracts, if they did not develop 
measures to render their establishments more inclusive to women and other minorities.609 
Neoconservatives were amongst the most outspoken opponents of these pro-active 
compensatory efforts and their case against them, according to Glazer, was representative 
of early neoconservative thought.610 In the neoconservative imagination these measures 
exemplified how an exaggerated pursuit of equality led not only to an excessive and 
tyrannical growth of government bureaucracies, but also attenuated traditional and 
established values and institutions. Both PI and Commentary grappled extensively with the 
ideological and practical implications of affirmative action for the American polity. As in 
the case of such matters as busing and Great Society-type welfarism, neoconservatives 
claimed that their position best captured the inchoate sentiments of the majority of 
Americans. Moreover, neoconservatives contended to embody the putative Jewish interest. 
Drawing heavily on images of Jewish victimisation, they argued that affirmative action was 
emblematic of how liberalism was creating a climate and policies, which were harmful to 
Jews. In the process of de-legitimising affirmative action, they fell back on identity politics 
and consolidated their “zero sum groupthink” strategy.611  
The neoconservative case against affirmative action was preconditioned on a 
distinctive conception of the civil rights movement and the American liberal tradition. 
Neoconservatives argued that civil rights had shifted markedly by the early 1970s, 
replacing principles of equal opportunity and colour-blindness by race- and gender-
conscious efforts allegedly intended to achieve equality of results. This was to be realised 
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by the enactment of what neoconservatives referred to as government-sanctioned “quotas” 
in hiring and admissions, in order to signify the alleged illegality and immorality of pro-
active integrationist efforts.612 This constituted, they claimed, a breach of cherished 
American individualism, colour-blind equality, and the merit principle. Since affirmative 
action allegedly sought to uplift previously excluded minorities on the backs of white 
males, neoconservatives defined it as a form of “reverse discrimination” or “discrimination 
to fight discrimination”.613  
Neoconservatives contended that affirmative action was a deviation from traditional 
liberalism and civil rights and “if requirements of statistical representation were to become 
a permanent part of American law and public policy” this tradition would be broken.614 
According to Daniel Bell, it was “an entirely new principle of rights”, one which subjected 
the essentially liberal tradition of “professional qualification or individual achievement … 
to the new ascriptive principle of corporate identity”.615 The neoconservative approach to 
racial discrimination drew heavily on ideas articulated by Theodore Adorno’s The 
Authoritarian Personality, which cast racism almost exclusively in psychological terms, 
minimising the relevance of socio-structural variables of racism.616  
Neoconservatives’ claim that the removal of formal barriers to integration and the 
enforcement of anti-discriminatory laws were sufficient to bring about change for racial 
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minorities was based on the experience of white European immigrants and blatantly 
disregarded the different nature of black history in the U.S. According to Matthew 
Jacobson, neoconservatives ignored the fact that white ethnics’ integration was “part of a 
broader pattern of racialized, structural power relations” in which whites, even ‘white 
ethnics’, were over generations treated preferentially to blacks.617 In order to overcome the 
legacy of slavery, disenfranchisement, and legislated inferior education and employment, 
something more than just the elimination of barriers to competition was needed, namely a 
substantial alteration of the power structure of American society. Neoconservatives’ claim 
that affirmative action was a fundamental break with traditional liberal and civil rights 
principles of fair play and meritocracy, therefore, reflected a mythologised interpretation of 
these traditions and an unwillingness to concede the lasting implications of structural 
racism and sexism. Glazer, according to Earl Shorris “the chief neoconservative 
theoretician in the fight against affirmative action”, presented this ‘Eurocentric’, 
romanticised narrative of American history in his monographic analysis of affirmative 
action, called Affirmative Discrimination.618 Accordingly, he did not consider white racism 
as central to the American experience, nor did he treat it as particularly disruptive of the 
‘ethnic pattern’ – which he described as the dominant paradigm of American history.619  
In “A Certain Anxiety”, Podhoretz considered affirmative action as the most 
pressing reflection of the anti-Jewish atmosphere, which, he believed, had come to grip the 
country during the 1960s. He declared that with affirmative action, the “merit system” 
under which “Jews had prospered” was substituted “by a system of proportional 
representation according to race and ethnic origin”. Disregarding two centuries of racial, 
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gender, religious and ethnic discrimination, Podhoretz claimed that the “merit system” had 
“treated all persons on the basis of their merits as individuals regardless of “race, color, 
creed, or place of origin””. Since Jews constituted “a mere 3 per cent of the population”, 
the replacement of the merit system by one of statistically defined preferential treatment “in 
the name of justice to blacks” meant “discriminatory measures were to be instituted once 
more against Jews”.620 
In 1972, Podhoretz continued his groupthink tirade against the supposedly 
discriminatory nature of affirmative action in particular and liberalism in general by 
confronting the readers of Commentary with the historically charged question “Is It Good 
For the Jews?” Claiming that Jews specifically would lose out as a result of affirmative 
action, he approximated the effects of these policies to those of the old quota system, which 
sought to curb Jewish presence at universities and in specific employment sectors. Despite 
the fact that Jews effectively were not in direct competition with African Americans, he 
asserted that the introduction of affirmative action measures were a signal that the 
“positively congenial” atmosphere, which had dominated the American Jewish experience 
since 1945 had ended. Earl Raab claimed that a society based on “ascriptive” principles 
was ultimately “a spiritually and politically closed society; as such it is not the kind of 
society in which Jews can find justice or can easily or comfortably live”.621 They repeated 
their charge that anti-Jewish sentiment was on the rise and found expression in the “idea of 
proportional representation”, which was never a goal of affirmative action, but which, 
according to neoconservative argumentation, guided these policies. Even though, Podhoretz 
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conceded, victimisation of Jews was in all likelihood not the primary intention of those who 
conceived of affirmative action, he implied acerbically that “in a climate in which Jews are 
commonly said to be overrepresented…the idea of putting the Jews in their place is 
considered by some a welcome bonus”.622  
In their agitated critique of affirmative action, neoconservatives fell back on 
exaggerated analogies of the Jewish history of oppression and images of ‘Jews as victims’ 
in order to legitimise their resistance to inclusionary policies and simultaneously avoid 
comparisons with racially motivated anti-integrationists. Glazer even referred to affirmative 
action as a “reverse Nurembergism” or “benign Nuremberg laws”, drawing an analogy to 
the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which outlawed Jews from the German polity.623 Comparing 
the U.S. government to the Nazis was clearly absurd, especially given its policies to 
promote equality of opportunity for minorities. While criticising the group-centrist attitude 
that lay behind affirmative action, Podhoretz argued that Jews should be afforded the same 
opportunity to engage in self-interested politics to advance their own social ideals. 
Considering himself the guardian of old-style liberalism and of the Jewish interest, 
Podhoretz claimed that the Jewish interest lay in the preservation of ‘true’ liberal values of 
meritocracy and equality of opportunity. He mandated Jews to revive, once again, the 
question “Is it good for the Jews? And act on the answers”. Unless, he cautioned 
ominously, “they may wake up one day to find themselves diminished, degraded, 
discriminated against, and alone”.624  
Milton Himmelfarb had made a similar point about pro-active integrationist 
measures within the educational realm three years earlier. “Quotas”, which aimed at 
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diversifying education, he claimed, “send a shiver down Jewish backs”, not only because of 
historical experience, but also because, he believed, American Jews were the ones to suffer 
most from the effort to achieve proportional parity at universities. Indeed, 85 per cent of 
college-aged Jews attended university and 47 per cent went on to graduate or professional 
schools. Moreover, academia, as MacLean pointed out, had been historically “a haven for 
Jewish men in the gentile-dominated economy”.625 
However, proponents of affirmative action countered that the potential disadvantage 
white males, including white Jewish males, would encounter under affirmative action 
measures would not so much constitute a breach of their meritocratic rights but rather, in 
the words of the ACLU, a denial of “their expectations”, which were “grounded in 
discriminatory practices” in the first place. Interestingly enough, as pointed out by 
MacLean, no one had ever even bothered to gather statistical data relative to the impact of 
affirmative action on Jews. The only evidence used in making the case against affirmative 
action was anecdotal.626 It is, therefore, questionable to what extent Jewish opponents of 
affirmative action sincerely believed their own claims that the policies would harm Jews as 
seriously as they predicted. As Glazer later admitted, “affirmative action did not turn out to 
be that great a threat to Jews”. Quite to the contrary, it had indeed benefited Jewish women 
who made up a large part of Jewish university attendees, many of whom had been unable to 
enter academic careers because the “old boys system”.627 Indeed, Glazer would reverse his 
attitude towards affirmative action eventually and come to accept it as an important 
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mechanism in diversifying education.628 Yet, most neoconservatives continued to look 
upon affirmative action negatively. Nevertheless, the fact that they lost interest in opposing 
it seems to suggest that the issue had never been as vital as their rhetoric made it out to be. 
As time progressed another set of concerns had superseded affirmative action, which was, 
according to Muravchik, no longer “a hot issue” by the 1980s.629  
Meanwhile, neoconservatives not only argued that affirmative action impacted 
negatively on Jewish Americans in particular and Americans in general, but also on African 
Americans. Despite the fact that liberals and civil rights leaders “claimed that blacks are in 
fact worse off now than they were ten years ago”, African Americans, neoconservatives 
argued, had made “enormous progress…in the past decade” and were “now moving into the 
middle class in unprecedented numbers”.630 According to the African American economist 
Thomas Sowell, the underlying message of affirmative action was “that minorities are 
losers who will never have anything unless someone gives it to them”. The goal-oriented 
nature of affirmative action, he claimed, ignored “the fact that the ultimate results are in the 
minds and the hearts of human beings”. Moreover, the perception that minorities did not 
rightfully deserve what was given to them by affirmative action could provoke “intergroup 
resentments” and social conflict. It was therefore important, Sowell urged, not “to let 
emotionally combustible materials accumulate from ill-conceived social experiments”.631 
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Basing their claims on mere anecdotal evidence and speculation, neoconservatives 
suggested that affirmative action stigmatised its recipients because they might be perceived 
as being given a ‘free ride’ despite the alleged fact that they did not have the necessary 
skills to perform adequately. Repeating this claim incessantly, neoconservatives contributed 
to spreading the popular myth that affirmative action would bring people into positions for 
which they were not qualified. Moreover, Bell speculated, “quotas and preferential hiring 
mean that standards are bent and broken”.632 Indeed, the impact of affirmative action on 
“standards of excellence” was of great concern to neoconservatives and other opponents of 
affirmative action. In “The Idea of Merit”, Paul Seabury, reiterated the claim that 
affirmative action would replace the meritocratic principle which should govern the 
selection process in education and the workplace with one that “advances and 
rewards…according to status, preferment or chance”.633 Earl Raab argued that under the 
new, allegedly un-meritocratic regime, positions were allocated according to minority 
group membership. Consequently, Bell contended, affirmative action implied that 
“minority persons are less qualified and could not compete with others, even if given a 
sufficient margin”. He wondered about the consequences this condition had “on the self-
esteem of a person hired on “second-class” grounds?”634 
Finally, neoconservatives criticised affirmative action for leading to a tyranny by 
massive governmental bureaucracies imposing enormous amounts of paper work on 
employers and educators and thereby further centralising power.635 The villains who 
brought affirmative action unto American society were, how could it be otherwise, 
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members of the New Class - “foundation executives, university presidents, bureaucrats, and 
publicists”.636 According to Sowell, “the beneficiaries” of affirmative action were 
“bureaucrats” who, through affirmative action policies, acquired “power, appropriations, 
and publicity”. The machinery set in motion by affirmative action had led, according to 
Sowell, to the creation of “an administrative empire serving itself in the name of serving the 
disadvantaged”.637 Glazer blamed affirmative action on liberal politicians and bureaucrats, 
who used these policies as a means to avoid solving the real problems of African 
Americans, some of which, he maintained, were cultural, but were no longer politically 
correct to discuss by the mid-1970s.638  
According to Micklethwait and Wooldridge, Jewish neoconservatives were 
especially distraught at affirmative action within the academic realm, because universities 
were “the institutions which had lifted them out of the ghetto”.639 This is somewhat of a 
simplification. As shown, most of the elder neoconservatives had received a basic college 
education at CCNY, which they attended presumably because it was expense and quota 
free. Others, like Podhoretz, were able to gain admission to more prestigious universities 
under ceiling quotas for Jews, which in Podhoretz’s case was 17 per cent.640 Most of the 
neoconservatives, who eventually made a career in academia, did so, however, only on the 
backdrop of liberal inclusionary measures, such as the GI Bill, which began to open up the 
world of college and university education to large numbers of people after the Second 
World War. As such, they had benefitted from pro-active, federally mandated measures, 
which aimed to give greater number of people better access to higher education. To deny 
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similar mechanisms to include still excluded minority groups was, if anything, hypocritical. 
Finally, the strategy of equating affirmative action with anti-Semitic ‘quotas’, which had 
historically been employed to explicitly exclude rather than include, was not only absurd 
but also rendered reasoned debate of the issues almost impossible.  
If the primary reason for their concern with affirmative action was 
neoconservatives’ strong appreciation of universities as facilitators of upward mobility, 
then they should have supported rather than opposed measures aimed at opening up 
universities and jobs to previously excluded minorities, especially since many of those 
uplifted by affirmative action measures were Jewish. Yet, since these Jews were female, 
neoconservatives did not seem to consider their advancement as relevant. As a matter of 
fact, as MacLean pointed out, the studies of pervasive gender discrimination, prepared by 
WEAL and NOW, “failed to register as significant” with neoconservatives and other 
Jewish community leaders. Calls by a group of women within the AJC, for example, to 
“not refer only to Jewish men” when the effects of affirmative action on Jews were 
discussed, were ignored.641 Yet, Podhoretz firmly insisted that “women are not a minority”, 
because they were numerically equal to men. 642 
Hence, neoconservatives were primarily concerned with the racial rather than the 
gender component of affirmative action. It exacerbated tensions between the African 
American and Jewish communities, which as shown, had been growing throughout the 
1960s. In the early 1960s, neoconservatives already voiced criticism of collectively defined 
“preferential treatment” of African Americans in matters of employment, an allegedly 
“radically new strategy” of integration which diverted from the traditional, liberal strategy 
                                                
641 Lillian Alexander to Bertram Gold, April 14, 1972, cited in MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough, 192. 
642 Podhoretz, “Liberals, Radicals, Conservatives: Who Are They?”, 14. 
 220 
of removing barriers to individual mobility. As shown, Glazer articulated fears that a more 
pro-active civil rights strategy would deny Jews the possibility to maintain exclusive 
arrangements, and thereby undermine Jewish group cohesiveness.643 Jews should therefore 
reject this ‘new’ strategy and continue to hold on to the ‘real’ liberal approach to 
integration, which was based on individual rights and colour-blindness. 
In making their case, neoconservatives led the way in moving the majority opinion 
of the organised Jewish community in their direction on the issue of affirmative action – a 
situation which not only dumbfounded African American civil rights leaders and feminists, 
but also many Jews who continued to support pro-active measures to overcome structural 
discrimination and identify with liberal and radical causes generally.644 Apart from creating 
conflict between Jewish organisations and their constituencies, the opposition of some 
national Jewish organisations to affirmative action also introduced major tensions to the 
Jewish-African American alliance, which looked back on a long history of sustained and 
concerted efforts to fight discrimination in all its forms. The major national Jewish 
organisations, especially the AJC and the AJCongress, who had previously used the Jewish 
status of a historically oppressed group in order to counteract all forms of exclusion, were 
now reversing course – using a history of oppression to distance themselves from civil 
rights. 
While most organisations were inwardly ridden with disagreements about how to 
proceed on the matter, they, at least outwardly, agreed with neoconservative pundits that 
policies of preferential treatment contradicted basic democratic principles. Nevertheless, 
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there were differences even between these organisations with respect to their attitudes 
towards affirmative action. The ADL took the hard-line stance that rejected any kind of 
pro-active effort to redress the racial and gender imbalance. Former national director of the 
ADL, Nathan Perlmutter, explained: “once the state establishes racial criteria as a basis for 
either favouring you or punishing you, you are toying with the very fabric of our 
democracy”.645 The AJC, on the other hand, supported “affirmative action outreach and 
training but opposed any racial preference in hiring and admissions”. Nevertheless, all 
major national Jewish organisations supported the so-called Hoffman letter by the AJC, 
addressed to both Nixon and McGovern in August 1972. It pleaded with both presidential 
candidates to “reject categorically the use of quotas and proportional representation”.646  
The fact that the criticism of inclusionary measures was coming from Jewish 
defence agencies who had been traditionally at the forefront of the fight for civil liberties 
and civil rights seriously split the black-Jewish alliance and contributed, in the long run, to 
a right-ward shift of the American electorate. Developing a language which “argued 
cogently against affirmative action in the name of civil rights”, neoconservatives were able 
not only to reach Jews, but also other white voters who did not want to be associated with 
crass racism and segregationism, but nevertheless felt that resource redistribution by 
government and court sanction was going too far.647 Defenders of the racial status quo 
learned from the neoconservative case against affirmative action that the best way to 
protect their privilege was by packaging it in an ideology of formal equality and colour-
blindness. 
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‘Who Is Kosher and Who Is Treif’: Israel, Anti-Semitism and Jewish Radicals 
 
Throughout the 1970s, neoconservatives warned that enthusiasm for Israel amongst 
American Jews and the American public generally was waning, even though Israel and 
public Holocaust memorialisation came to take on a greater role in American life in general 
and in American Jewish life in particular. Neoconservatives believed that the left had 
turned against its traditional alliance with Israel and that moderate voices within the 
African American community began embracing black nationalist views, which branded 
Israel as a “First World” white oppressor of the indigenous “Third World” peoples of the 
Middle East.648 Moreover, they continued to fear that the residue of the counterculture and 
the New Left still threatened the bourgeois democratic order, because “by some miracle of 
communication”, they continued, according to Podhoretz, to exert “a kind of tyrannical 
power over the minds of many people”.649 
While neoconservatives had initially hoped to develop patterns of Jewish 
identification that were liberal and simultaneously ethnic-national, they began to move 
closer towards Jean Améry’s extreme survivalist position during the early 1960s, according 
to which Jews were under attack and resistance was the only authentic answer.650 In 1975, 
Conservative Rabbi Harold Schulweis complained about the emerging “new Jewish right,” 
represented by people such as Seymour Siegel, Michael Wyschogrod, Nathan Glazer and 
Milton Himmelfarb who argued for a priority of Jewish self-interest over universal 
liberalism. Schulweis observed that the political repositioning – taking place in less 
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extreme form amongst many American Jews - was guided by the Holocaust, which in light 
of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, consolidated a redefinition of Jewish identity 
in post-1960s America.651 Glazer agreed that it was “the growing emotional response” to 
the Holocaust, in combination with black nationalist and New Left criticism of Israel, 
which brought about the shift away from liberalism.652 
Throughout the early 1970s, the threat emanating from a perceived revival of anti-
Semitic tendencies and the alleged abandonment of Israel received primary attention on 
Commentary’s agenda. More than ever before did Podhoretz try to convey the message that 
Israel’s security was intrinsically tied to that of the U.S. A morally, politically and 
militarily weak America, which turned in on itself, would not be able to guarantee Israel’s 
continued existence. A neo-isolationist approach to American power, seemingly gaining 
hold of large parts of the country in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, constituted “a direct 
threat to the security of Israel” - just as domestic policies, inspired by the new liberalism, 
imperilled American Jews.653 
According to Jacob Heilbrunn, the moralist fervour of neoconservatism stemmed 
from the desire to make the U.S. into a bulwark against another Holocaust.654 This might be 
partially true. Neoconservatives certainly seemed haunted by the memory of the Holocaust. 
However, the carelessness and disproportionality with which neoconservatives came to use 
Holocaust analogies and continuously insinuated that a genocidal threat emanated from the 
left for Israel and for American Jews, leaves one wondering to what extent these analogies 
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and alarmist warnings constituted part of a rhetorical strategy with which neoconservatives 
sought to justify their break with liberalism and induce American Jews to do the same. 
Hook’s comment that he could “conceive of a holocaust in the United States and I 
think the Farrakhans are capable of carrying it out”, for example, revealed the extent to 
which neoconservatives operated within the context of paranoia and utter disregard of 
factual evidence.655 Opinion polls had repeatedly shown that anti-Semitism had been at an 
all-time low in the U.S. since the late 1950s. Oscar Cohen, ADL research director, claimed 
in 1972 that “the Jewish position in this country has probably never been as secure as it is 
nor has there ever been less prejudice”. Neoconservatives’ own Milton Himmelfarb wrote a 
decade later “When one looks at the modern history of anti-Semitism here and now, one is 
struck precisely by the minor position it now has”.656 Moreover, Hook singled out the most 
extreme example, the eccentric Louis Farrakhan, in order to make a general statement about 
the level of danger to Jews in American society, thereby ignoring the facts that Hitler had 
come to power with widespread backing amongst Germans and that the successful 
implementation of the final solution had not been the work of a few lunatics, but had been 
possible because of the massive support it received from ‘ordinary’ people, as 
demonstrated, for example, by Christopher Browning.657 
In perceiving the making of another Holocaust around every corner, 
neoconservatives, who prided themselves on being intellectuals, came across as irrational 
and paranoid. They seemingly believed that if they repeatedly told American Jews that their 
“sense of security” was seriously upset by the left and that they were experiencing “a sense 
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of unexpected impotence in America”, they eventually would come to accept that the 
greatest threat to their future was no longer “the seepage of assimilation but the growing 
inhospitality of the American political environment…part and parcel of the general crisis of 
liberalism”.658  
Yet many Jewish voices continued to disagree with conceiving Jewishness through 
the prism of the Holocaust and victimhood. For many, the Holocaust and Israel were less 
important than it was often made out to be by Jewish leadership circles. Conservative Rabbi 
Arthur Green, for instance, conceded that while the Holocaust and Israel were “the 
backdrop events of all our lives”, more relevant to his understanding of Jewishness were 
developments that took place at home during the 1960s, such as the civil rights movement, 
black nationalism and the counterculture.659 In 1968, Green had helped found the Havurat 
Shalom project, which continues its work to this day. Havurat Shalom integrated Jewish 
religious and cultural traditions with progressive egalitarian ideals. It was conceived as “an 
egalitarian Jewish community…where women and men come to pray and learn; explore, 
celebrate and grapple with Jewish tradition; work for social justice; and discuss a variety of 
Jewish concerns”.660 
These were some of the alternative voices Jewish neoconservatives had little 
understanding for. Since neoconservatives believed Jews to be under attack, they came to 
brand as traitors anyone who conceded to the perceived enemies of Israel and Jews. 
Throughout the 1970s, Jewish neoconservatives, led by Podhoretz, heightened their efforts 
to “excommunicate” those Jews who did not follow their prescriptions of what Jewishness 
represented. In communion with the larger Jewish establishment, neoconservatives led the 
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way in excoriating radical Jews as illegitimate, inauthentic, traitorous, indeed as anti-
Jewish, even anti-Semitic.661 They repeatedly accused leftist Jews of having contributed 
seminally to spreading its “tyrannical power”, whose spirit, according to Glazer, ran 
counter to everything the American Jewish experience stood for, because the New Left 
targeted “All the roles Jews play” in American society. The New Left was critical of 
“private business…lawyers, stockbrokers, accountants, etc. – in which Jews are 
prominent”.662 Moreover, some New Left - inspired policies, such as affirmative action, 
targeted Jews specifically, they claimed. Jews who made common cause with these forces 
were to no longer to be regarded as ‘real’ Jews. 
The highlight of neoconservatives’ vehement critique of Jewish radicalism came in 
1971, when Podhoretz ran a series of three articles entitled “Revolutionism and the Jews”. 
One of them, by Walter Laqueur derided Jewish leftists, such as Jews for Urban Justice as 
“immature, irresponsible…restless, neurotic, faddish” and blamed Jewish radicalism on the 
fact that these Jews were “far removed from Judaism”, i.e. over-assimilated, which only 
could be undone by “a catastrophe of the magnitude of Nazism”.663 One is left questioning 
to what extent the continuous forebodings of another Holocaust were supposed to reverse 
the alleged over-assimilation of American Jews. 
Similarly, Glazer, aligning himself with “those of us concerned with Jewish 
interests”, invoked Nazism in his condemnation of Jewish radicals. In his argument, which 
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he would make repeatedly, he explained that the association of Jewish intellectuals with the 
anti-war movement in particular and radical activism in general, posed a threat to all Jews. 
Fearing a “potential backlash” from ‘ordinary’ Americans, he drew a “parallel between 
Weimar and America”. He warned that something akin to the “stab-in-the-back-myth” 
could emerge in Middle America, which could hold Jews responsible for the social disarray 
the country was in, much like the Nazis successfully blamed “the moral ‘degeneration’ of 
Germany on the influence of the Jews”. Glazer abstrusely claimed that Jews could 
potentially be blamed for the antiwar movement, the prevalence of pornography and 
marijuana, the loosening of sexual mores, antiauthoritarian behaviour and so forth. It was, 
therefore, a matter of survival that Jews dissociate themselves from the left. He agreed with 
Laqueur that Jewish radicals suffered from “classic Jewish self-hatred…hatred of…the 
qualities Jews have come to stand for: rationality, moderation, balance, tolerance”.664 None 
of these “qualities”, however, informed neoconservatives’ critique of Jewish radicals – 
another example of the fact that neoconservatives seldom practiced what they preached. 
Podhoretz in turn charged Rabbi Balfour Brickner, a self-defined Zionist and leftist, 
critical of Israeli military action, of being “guilty of the sin of anti-Semitism” for 
participating in a Freedom Seder, organised by Jews for Urban Justice in 1969 and 1970. 
The Haggadah, A Freedom Seder: A New Haggadah for Passover, used at the Seder and 
written by Arthur Waskow, incorporated black liberation concerns and social justice issues 
and the Passover celebrations were attended by an interracial group of participants. 
Podhoretz considered Waskow’s Haggadah “a contribution to the literature of Jewish anti-
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Semitism”.665 According to Waskow, his aim had been to re-create “the liturgy in ways that 
asserted the liberation of the Jewish people alongside the liberation of the other peoples – 
not theirs against ours, or ours as against theirs”.666 
Robert Alter, a professor of Hebrew and comparative literature at Berkeley, 
criticised Jewish radicals for referring to Jewish religious tradition in support of their 
politics. He likened the efforts of radical Jewish activism, such as the National Jewish 
Organization Project, Urban Jews for Justice, and the Jewish Liberation Project, to create 
more authentic patterns of Jewish identity based on Jewish tradition and political 
engagement on behalf of social justice concerns as “political rape of a religious tradition”. 
Appalled at what he considered Arthur Waskow’s “self-effacement before black 
militancy”, he described The Freedom Seder as an “instance of the tyranny of politics over 
religion”. He referred to it as “a document of self-loathing and self-abasement 
masquerading as an expression of self-affirmation”.667 Yet, Alter was not a neoconservative 
and agreed to meet with a group of activists around the Berkeley based The Jewish Radical 
after appearance of the article. According to David Biale, a member of the group, Alter 
admitted, after debating with them that he might have been “overly critical of the Jewish 
New Left”. Nevertheless, his article contributed to the neoconservative agenda against 
Jewish radicalism.668 
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In Podhoretz’s eyes, Brickner belonged “to the tribe of the wicked son” whose 
“wickedness consists of his having removed himself from the community”.669 Brickner, a 
member of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, responded in kind. In his letter 
to the editor, Brickner claimed that “Love of Israel…never did, and must not now, demand 
slavish silence”. The anti-Jewish Jews, he retorted, were those who had the audacity to 
think that they could “judge who among their fellow Jews is “kosher” and who is “treif” – 
who falls within the pale and who has strayed beyond the Commentary line – who should 
be tolerated and who should be wiped out”. He accused Podhoretz of engaging in a 
“pseudo-Jewish McCarthyism” – a new anti-Jewishness “masking in the guise of Jewish 
affirmation”. Brickner, considering himself a Jewish survivalist, warned that “If Jewish 
survival in America depends upon…those…who display little if any real awareness of the 
more complex tensions and balances that Judaism contains at its deeper levels, then we are 
indeed in great trouble!”670 
Another example of how neoconservatives, in tandem with the broader organised 
Jewish community, tried to de-legitimise alternative approaches to Jewish identity was the 
case of Breira: A Project of Concern in Diaspora-Israel Relations. It was founded after the 
Yom Kippur War in 1973 in order to counteract the increasing ideological polarisation 
amongst American Jews and the hardening attitude amongst Jewish leaders. Breira publicly 
called on Israel “to make territorial concessions” and “to recognise the legitimacy of the 
national aspirations of the Palestinians”. Moreover, it denounced “those pressures in 
American Jewish Life which make open discussion…of vital issues virtually synonymous 
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with heresy”.671 Breira initially was able to recruit supporters from a wide variety of 
backgrounds, amongst them about one hundred Reform and Conservative Rabbis. Other 
seminal Jewish representatives were Steven M. Cohen, Paul Cowan, Arthur Green and 
Irving Howe. After generating fierce debates on the limits of dissent in Jewish communal 
life, Breira shut its doors in 1977. As Michael Staub pointed out, it is one of multiple 
Jewish radical projects, which have been ignored systematically in mainstream histories of 
American Jewish Life since 1945.672 
For some time, however, Breira was able to build an intergenerational coalition, 
which brought together Zionist, non-Zionist, religious and secular Jews and even 
momentarily attracted sympathy from Nathan Glazer, Charles S. Liebman, Michael 
Wyschogrod and Jacob Neusner. Initially, many within the organised Jewish community 
believed that Breira was raising important, even if uncomfortable, issues. It was when 
Breira’s activities were beginning to receive widespread national attention in The New York 
Times and The Washington Post during 1976 – undermining what Rabbi Bernard Mehlman 
referred to as the “standard operating procedure” of Jewish communal affairs of “not 
washing one’s dirty laundry in public” - that criticism of Breira from Jewish communal 
spokespersons began to pour out.673 
In April 1977 Commentary laid its eyes on Breira. Echoing Podhoretz, Joseph 
Shattan exaggeratedly claimed that since “the political fortunes of the state of Israel have 
reached perhaps an all-time low” since the Yom Kippur War and Israel was “increasingly 
isolated in the world as a whole, shunned even by many of its former friends and treated as 
a pariah by the community of nations”, organisations like Breira were irresponsible and 
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constituted a Jewish pro-PLO front. He explained the fact that so many “well-meaning” 
Jewish leaders had been attracted to Breira by claiming that they had grown weary “of 
having to uphold Israel’s cause when the cause has gone out of odor”. Maybe, he 
speculated, they were driven by the desire, “to be for once, on the side their government 
may be leaning toward”, disregarding the fact that the U.S. government had been more 
supportive of Israel since 1967 than ever before.674 
 
‘The Culture of Appeasement’: A Resurgence of ‘the Spirit of Munich’ 
 
Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1975 defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam, 
neoconservatives instrumentalised the threat of Soviet conventional and nuclear superiority 
in order “to consolidate their position” within the conservative movement.675 Castigating 
neo-isolationist liberal foreign policy as much as they criticised the alleged amorality of 
Nixon-Kissinger style realpolitik, neoconservatives believed that both approaches had 
contributed seminally to the decay of American national confidence and power. Realpolitik, 
detached from fundamental American values, lacked a clear moral vision of the national 
interest and, therefore, exacerbated the crisis of authority. Nixon and Kissinger, they 
argued, had drained the Republican Party of ideological convictions and the absence of 
moral considerations relative to foreign policy ultimately deprived the government of the 
means with which to mobilise fundamental values and legitimise its policies.676  
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Liberal foreign policy, on the other hand, reduced notions of good and evil to 
individual preferences and viewed government as a vehicle for the pursuit of individual and 
sectional interest. While engaging in intense social engineering, liberal policy undermined 
any viable conception of the common good. Neoconservatives believed that the new 
liberalism led to a relativistic political culture, which denied that there were any meaningful 
collective values to guide the American polity. This approach had severe implications for 
domestic as well as foreign policy, in which the purpose and meaning of the nation were 
under constant scrutiny, leading ultimately to an outlook where cynicism and guilt-ridden 
self-doubt reigned supreme.677 
Neoconservatives wanted to restore confidence in American moral superiority. 
Support for what neoconservatives perceived as a typically American foreign policy, 
therefore, was considered as part of the larger struggle for America itself. Yet, Dorrien’s 
claim that neoconservatives moved into the Republican Party on account of their 1970s 
foreign policy rationale is incorrect.678 As shown, neoconservatives continued to vacillate 
between the Democratic and the Republican Party throughout the 1970s and many of them 
claim to this day that party politics is not what neoconservatism is about.679 However, many 
neoconservatives also came to understand throughout the 1970s that the revival of 
American confidence and power would stand a greater chance in alliance with the right 
rather than the left. Moreover, with respect to foreign policy, neoconservative ideas were 
more in tune with those of the emerging New Right than with liberal politics. Moreover, 
according to Michael Hunt, the desire for “a restored sense of national pride and the desire 
to reaffirm old verities” was also widespread amongst the American public. By the end of 
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the 1970s the country was gripped by “nostalgia for an earlier era”, Hunt claimed, which 
had allegedly consisted of “national omnipotence, clear-cut moral issues, and national 
unity”.680  
This was the ideological context in which neoconservatives re-sparked their 
campaign against world communism in the middle of the 1970s. In “The West in Retreat”, 
Walter Laqueur forwarded the neoconservative sense that the world was closing in on the 
West and specifically the U.S. He claimed that the crisis of U.S. foreign policy in the 
aftermath of Vietnam had sapped America’s will power to lead. Détente, he suggested, was 
partially responsible for this failure of will, as well as revisionist historians who blamed the 
Cold War on America’s imperialist desires.681 In the same vein, Podhoretz argued in 
“Making the World Safe for Communism” that a new wave of isolationist attitudes, visible 
across party lines, but most seminally with liberals, had taken hold of the country. While 
liberals, Podhoretz argued, had historically always been bolder in advocating the use of 
force than conservatives, Vietnam had introduced serious doubts with respect to the global 
role of the U.S. As a result, both liberals and conservatives began to move towards ideas of 
political and military isolationism. He concluded by asking rhetorically: “Have we lost the 
will to defend the free world…against the spread of Communism?”682 
In typical neoconservative fashion, Podhoretz compared the diagnosed “culture of 
appeasement” that allegedly pervaded American society and leadership with that of the 
British and French in their confrontation of Nazi expansionism during the 1930s. Podhoretz 
was “struck…by certain resemblances between the United States today and Great Britain in 
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the years after the first world war”, as for instance with respect to widespread “hostility to 
one’s own country and … derision of the idea that it stands for anything worth 
defending”.683 Rather than pointing the finger towards the New Class, Podhoretz 
specifically accused homosexual artists and writers for this condition, and along the way 
resorted to crude homophobic stereotypes, a move which brought him another step closer to 
other New Right pundits. “Anyone familiar with homosexual apologetics in America today 
will recognize”, that as homosexual intellectuals, such as W.H. Auden and Wilfred Owen, 
had preyed on war weary Britons in the aftermath of the First World War, homosexual 
artist and writers, especially literary types such as Alan Ginsberg, James Baldwin, and Gore 
Vidal, were now contributing in the same way to spreading “the antidemocratic pacifism” 
and feminisation of the American spirit, which undermined America’s will to burden the 
responsibilities of world power.684  
According to this rationale, the homosexual intelligentsia not only undermined 
militarism, because it killed “helpless, good-looking boys”, but also generally agitated 
against bourgeois society, from which they felt alienated because of their sexual 
orientation, which signified not just a rejection of paternal responsibility but also a general 
refusal to take charge of “the destiny of society as a whole”.685 Homosexuals’ “contempt 
for middle-class life or indeed any kind of heterosexual adult life” had begun to pervade 
society at large, by inculcating the liberal establishment with “pacifism…hostility to one’s 
own country and its putatively middle-class way of life”.686 Should this new “culture of 
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appeasement” win out amongst American people, Podhoretz warned, “the United States 
will celebrate its two-hundredth birthday by betraying the heritage of liberty”.687  
Another danger emanating from this neo-isolationist spirit – reminiscent of Munich 
1938 - he cautioned, was, that the U.S. might abandon the defence of Israel as it had 
abandoned Vietnam. He believed that signs for this potential abandonment had begun to 
appear in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, which shattered the myth of the 
invincibility of Israel, introduced by the Six Day War, “shared by supporters and enemies 
of the Jewish state” alike.688 The Yom Kippur War was, in the words of Israeli historian 
Benny Morris, “a stinging slap in the face” for Israel.689 It had brought the U.S. to full 
nuclear alert and was followed by the OPEC oil embargo against nations perceived as 
supporters of the Israeli state. Podhoretz feared that U.S. support for Israel would wane, or 
at least become increasingly “evenhanded” in its approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict, 
because America wanted to insure access to Arab oil and avoid tensions with the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East. This new stance would inevitably lead to pressure Israel “to 
make territorial and eventually other concessions involving the PLO”.690 
Commentary, therefore, continued to promote the idea that a strong Israel was 
crucial to the United States in its battle against Soviet power in the Middle East. In “The 
American Stake in Israel”, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Eugene V. 
Rostow, elaborated on the Cold War context of the ongoing conflict between Arabs and 
Israeli. He interpreted the Yom Kippur War as a successful effort on behalf of the Soviet 
                                                
687 Podhoretz, “Making the World Safe For Communism”, 41; Norman Podhoretz, “America Now: A Failure 
of Nerve? – A Symposium”, Commentary, July 1975, 16-87. 
688 Goldschmidt Jr. and Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 329.  
689 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Knopf, 
1999), 437. 
690 Podhoretz, “The Abandonment of Israel”, 25; Robert W. Tucker, “Oil and American Power”, 
Commentary, January 1977, 29-36; Earl Raab, “Is Israel Losing Popular Support? The Evidence of the Polls”, 
Commentary, January 1974, 26-29. 
 236 
Union to upset the balance of power in the region and create division amongst Western 
Allies, especially in light of the détentist rapprochement between China and the U.S. He 
blamed the U.S. for wavering and inconsistent policy towards Arab nations and for 
contributing to “fortify and perpetuate the Arab ties to the Soviet Union”. Because of the 
strategic importance of the region to the West only a strong and secure Israel could ensure 
the U.S.’ national interest. The destruction of Israel, Rostow concluded, “could spell the 
end not only of the Atlantic alliance, but of liberal civilization as we know it”.691 
Neoconservatives found an ally against détente and dovish foreign policy in Daniel 
Moynihan. While Moynihan was beginning to distance himself from neoconservatives in 
the domestic realm, he continued to be virulently anti-communist and anti-détentist.692 Part 
of the neoconservative revival of hard anti-communism and their move towards a 
unilateralist interventionism was the systematic attack on multilateral bodies and 
specifically the U.N as an inept chatterbox, which offered a platform for expressions of 
anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism.  
Shortly before Moynihan was appointed as U.S. representative to the U.N. in 1975, 
he would begin with the development of a neoconservative critique the U.N. In “The 
United States in Opposition”, he argued that a tyrannical “new majority” had emerged at 
the U.N, constituted of an alliance between the Soviet Union and new national entities, 
which had emerged from the disintegration of the British Empire and were highly 
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vulnerable to the totalitarian, anti-American rationale of Soviet communism.693 These 
countries had come to dominate the U.N. body, Moynihan claimed, and reflected “the 
emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World”, 
which the U.S. – allegedly driven by guilt towards developing nations - needed to oppose 
instead of cowardly standing by. He admonished that it was time “we ceased to apologize 
for an imperfect democracy” and refrain from further engaging in “patterns of 
appeasement”.694 
At the U.N., Moynihan waged a battle against what he believed was the U.N. 
offering a forum in which authoritarian and totalitarian leaders, to the detriment of the 
West, the U.S. and Israel, were perverting the language of human rights. Non-democratic 
countries were appropriating the long established technique of the Soviet Union of 
identifying its enemies with fascism and racism. Moynihan sent out a warning that this type 
of manipulation of the language of human rights was being used as a weapon against the 
U.S., Israel and the West in general.695 Believing that the U.N. had been usurped by 
communist-led instrumentalisation of anti-Western sentiments amongst Third World 
representatives, his most memorable intervention at the U.N. council came when he 
denounced the U.N. General Assembly for adopting Resolution 3379, which equated 
Zionism with racism, by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 31 abstentions) in November 1975, 
earning him much support from the American Jewish community and Americans generally 
in his bid for the Democratic senatorial nomination in New York in 1976.696 
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As informal consultant to Moynihan’s candidacy, Podhoretz pointed out that 
Moynihan’s forceful defence of Israel during the “Zionism is Racism” debates had to be 
considered more of an “aberration”, rather than an “accurate barometer of American 
attitudes toward Israel in general”.697 He counselled to raise the issue that support for Israel 
had weakened drastically, even in “circles, which proclaim their support for Israel…but 
which consistently refuse to support the policies…that make it possible”, as, for instance, 
the case with Moynihan’s opponent Bella Abzug.698 Throughout the 1970s Podhoretz 
admonished American Jews for their unwillingness to support policies that increased the 
military budget, while expecting the U.S. to stand up for Israel. According to Edward 
Luttwak there was a  “huge and increasingly notorious contradiction at the very core of 
mainstream American Jewish political attitudes”, putting the blame specifically on Jewish 
liberals, who “instead of showing greater understanding of the importance of adequate 
defenses…are still pressing for cuts in the military budget”.699  
Another ally of neoconservatives throughout the 1970s was Henry Jackson, long-
time Cold Warrior and opponent of pro-active civil rights measures such as busing and 
affirmative action. Jackson was convinced that the Soviet Union and world communism 
posed a direct and lethal threat to the United States and its allies and that the only way to 
deal with this threat was to confront communism with all means possible. Neoconservatives 
once more supported the standard-bearer of the ‘take back the party’ movement in his final 
effort to capture the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976. This support highlights 
the fact that neoconservatives were still uneasy with the Republican Party and had not 
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completely given up on the Democratic Party just yet. Jackson was also a devoted advocate 
of the state of Israel. According to Benjamin Wattenberg, adviser to Jackson, he appealed 
to many of the neoconservatives not simply because he supported Israel, but because “he 
was for a broader role of America around the world…he wasn’t as awe-consumed by the 
agony of post-Vietnam”. Moreover, “Jackson’s pro-Israelness was part and parcel of a 
world view”, according to which “Israel is not only [dependent] on America but on a strong 
America”.700 Throughout his career, Jackson championed Israel and Jewish interests. In 
1974, he sponsored the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, which has often been 
described as a neoconservative success in undermining the alleged amorality of détente. 
The amendment aimed at limiting trade with communist countries that restricted freedom of 
emigration and other human rights. It was a direct response to the Soviet Union's “diploma 
taxes” levied on Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals who sought emigration.701  
The later half of the 1970s also saw the formation of the Committee on the Present 
Danger (CPD), which allied CDM members with a number of national security veterans 
and anti-communist labour leaders. The CPD became an important “locus of convergence 
of the traditional right and neoconservatives”, seeking to “resurrect a militarized doctrine of 
containment as the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy”.702 It included such figures as 
Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Max Kampelman, Saul Bellow, Richard Pipes, Eugene 
Rostow, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk and Charles Tyroler II. The core neoconservative members 
included Glazer, Podhoretz, Lipset, Decter, and Jeane Kirkpatrick. According to Jerry 
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Sanders, the CPD was like Reagan’s future “shadow cabinet”, as over 50 of its members 
would go on to hold positions within his administration.703 
When Carter took office, the CDM together with the CPD handed him a list of 60 
‘specialists’, including Glazer, Kirkpatrick, Kampelman, and Perle, whom they expected to 
receive appointments to his administration. Despite high hopes, none were selected.704 
Neoconservatives felt “completely frozen out” and claimed that the Carter administration 
was “a New Left administration”.705 As a result, CDM started a campaign to delegitimise 
Carter’s appointment of Paul Warnke, whom neoconservatives considered to be an 
establishment liberal, as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for his alleged 
opposition to strategic superiority and for his position as former McGovern advisor. 
While Carter aimed at steering clear of détente and making human rights central to 
his dealings with other countries, neoconservatives, nevertheless, disliked his approach. 
Neoconservatives accused Carter of failing to understand the Soviet threat. Comparing the 
Soviet Union to Nazi Germany, the CPD argued that negotiating arms limitations with the 
Soviet Union would be just as unavailing and dangerous, as it had been with efforts to reign 
in Hitler through diplomatic efforts in the 1930s: “The SALT I arms limitation agreement 
have had no visible effect…on the Soviet buildup”. The only outcome of negotiations had 
been “to restrain the United States in the development of those weapons in which it enjoys 
advantage”.706 
Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian History and former chairman of ‘Team B’– 
which had been commissioned in 1976 to prepare an independent, i.e. non-CIA, estimate of 
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Soviet military strength - articulated a similar rationale when he concluded in Commentary 
that the Soviet Union was preparing to fight and win a nuclear war. He believed that efforts 
at arms control were futile, unless the nature of the Soviet regime changed, of which there 
was little hope. Convinced that the Soviet Union did not subscribe to the concept of 
‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) and was redesigning its military forces for offensive 
purposes, in order to extent Soviet rule “as far as their ideological and imperial ambitions, 
and the absence of effective resistance, will carry them”.707 Pipes was determined not only 
to bury détente and the SALT process, but also to convince decision-makers to invest in a 
military build-up.708  
Neoconservatives came to believe that Carter’s foreign policy style was even worse 
than Nixon’s détente, as they accused him of alienating long-time allied nations, such as 
Nicaragua, Chile and Iran, by holding them accountable for breaching human rights, while 
not using the same standard in measuring the behaviour of ‘enemy nations’, such as the 
Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and China. Moreover, his efforts to relax relations with the 
Soviets and further SALT II negotiations created an alliance between the CDM and the 
conservative Coalition for Peace Through Strength and the American Conservative Union. 
Together they tried to turn public opinion against SALT II talks through speeches and a 
letter campaign.709 
However, a number of neoconservatives also began arguing for a foreign policy 
style, which like détente set aside values in order to achieve objectives. Anticipating Jeane 
Kirkpatrick’s “Dictatorships and Double Standards” of 1979, which allegedly procured 
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Kirkpatrick the position of U.S. ambassador to the U.N. under Reagan, Glazer claimed that 
while it was a vital for the U.S. to take values into consideration when formulating its 
positions in foreign affairs, it also needed to take into consideration the fundamental 
difference between “run-of-the-mill authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships” and 
“Communist governments”, in the sense that control in communist, i.e. totalitarian, 
countries was more thorough and permanent than in authoritarian, non-communist regimes 
and therefore less likely to undergo systemic change in the long run.710  
Kirkpatrick, in turn, incriminated Carter’s foreign policy for engaging “actively in 
the toppling of non-Communist autocracies while remaining passive in the face of 
Communist expansion”. Furthermore, she argued, that the principles of self-determination 
and non-intervention were selectively applied to communist and rightist nations to the 
detriment of the American interest. Not only did the Carter administration engage in a 
double standard in applying its “human rights policy”, it also acted against the American 
national interest by being soft on communist regimes, while bringing about regime change 
in states that had been relatively pro-American.711 
The 1970s were the decade when neoconservatives began converging with New 
Right conservatives on issues such as racial integration, overblown welfare and 
governmental activism on behalf of racial minorities and the underprivileged, and the 
perceived moral decline of American society. At the same time, neoconservatives and New 
Right conservatives grew together over concern relative to the nature and the global role of 
American power and their belief that the Soviet Union was as bent on spreading communist 
hegemony as ever before. The U.S.’ weakness, supposedly introduced by coward and 
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fearful policies of détente and neo-isolationism, had allowed the Soviets to gain 
conventional and nuclear superiority, which were threatening American livelihood and 
dominance. These were concerns, which would occupy a large part of the neoconservative 
agenda throughout the 1980s and bring them ever closer to the right.712 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to former neoconservative Francis Fukuyama, most accounts presume that 
neoconservatism “was an alien spore that drifted in from outer space and infected the 
American body politic”.713 However, neoconservatism was not an aberration in the wider 
context of American political culture and intellectual history. It was part, for example, of an 
important tradition of anti-statist and anti-progressive intellectuals as identified for example 
by Christopher Lasch in The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics.714 Moreover, 
neoconservatives contributed to the rise of the New Right by connecting their fight against 
liberalism to popular traditions, as for example, ideas of republican virtue or even 
liberalism itself. According to Alan Brinkley, modern American conservatism “rested on a 
philosophical foundation not readily distinguishable from the liberal tradition”. This was 
reflected by the fact that “the defense of liberty, the preservation of individual freedom” 
was as cardinal to modern American conservatism “as it has been to American 
liberalism”.715  
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Moreover, modern conservatism and neoconservatism as expressions of a desire to 
thwart or even reverse progress, relied on a number of antecedents, most of which had, 
however, been relatively ineffective, unorganised and beset by negative attitudes towards 
the future of the nation. Modern American conservatism was able to draw on them, while 
developing an intellectually effective ideology and rhetoric, which was forward looking and 
designed to inspire confidence in the nation, rather than undermine it. Their ability to locate 
their critique within a continuity of American traditions of liberalism, republicanism and 
conservatism discredited those, who considered conservatism and by extension 
neoconservatism, as “pseudo-conservatism”, “a very special minority point of view” and 
claimed that America “never had a real conservative tradition”.716 
Neoconservatives, drawing on specific interpretations of the liberal tradition as well 
as conservatism, played a crucial role in the fashioning modern conservative ideology. 
Their efforts to uphold what they perceived as ‘real’ American liberalism, rooted in 
classical 19th century liberalism, were therefore emblematic of how the New Right co-opted 
ideas of republican virtue and individual liberty and responsibility. Neoconservatives’ 
critique of affirmative action proved a case in point. According to MacLean, 
neoconservatives’ co-opting of the liberal and civil rights tradition as an expression of 
individual freedom, formal equality and meritocracy was “critical in winning sizable 
numbers of white working people to the right” on the issue of pro-active integrationism, 
who felt otherwise uncomfortable with the traditionally conservative rationale of anti-
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integrationism based on ideas of states’ rights, racial inferiority and an exclusivist 
rationale.717 
Neoconservatives’ backgrounds in lower middle-class and often immigrant 
communities, contrary to Buckley’s Catholic, upper-middle class heritage, allowed them to 
appeal to average white Americans “not in class terms, but in ethno-religious terms” 
whereby they developed “a new kind of right-wing populist identity”, which was able to 
compete successfully with leftist identity politics.718 By bringing to conservatism “an ethnic 
memory of the ghetto”, neoconservatives were a driving force in fashioning a conservative 
ideology, which spoke not only to particularly Jewish concerns, but more generally to other 
white ethnics who had previously felt unrepresented by a traditionally exclusivist 
conservatism.719 Lastly, they prepared the way for the rise of “multicultural conservatives” 
or “conservatives of color”, such as Thomas Sowell, Clarence Thomas, Glenn Loury, Alan 
Keyes, Dinesh D’Souza and Linda Chavez.720 Hence, even if neoconservatives were a 
minimal voice, which fit in awkwardly with the entirety of the conservative movement at 
times, they were nevertheless relatively influential, especially in light of their small 
numbers. 
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Conclusion: 
‘Outsiders Still’:  
Neoconservatives, 
American Jews and the  
New Right 
!  
 
 
A number of neoconservatives had held out hope throughout the 1970s that they could 
recover the Democratic Party. When their last remaining luminary, Daniel P. Moynihan, by 
now Senator of New York, decided not to take up the challenge against Carter in 1979, 
neoconservatives rallied to the candidacy Ronald Reagan, whose idealised celebration of 
America and fervent anti-communism approximated their own. Neoconservatives realised, 
in Podhoretz’s words that “one ought to join the side one was now on instead of engaging 
in a futile attempt to change the side one used to be on”.721 
With Reagan’s election, neoconservatives’ lingering inhibitions to embrace the New 
Right all but disappeared. According to George Nash, neoconservatism lost its “abstract 
and reflexive commitment to the welfare state” during the early 1980s.722 Most 
neoconservatives also came to reject the remaining resistance to the label 
“neoconservative”. A number of them attained positions in the Reagan administration. 
Kirkpatrick, for example, took the post of U.S. representative to the U.N., Eliot Abrams, 
the husband of Podhoretz’s stepdaughter, became Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and Richard Perle Assistant Secretary of Defence. Other 
neoconservatives to work for the Reagan administration were Paul Wolfowitz, Max 
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Kampelman, Richard Pipes, and William Kristol. Initially, Podhoretz was mentioned for a 
post in the U.S. Information Agency, which he failed to get in the end.723  
The Present Danger was Podhoretz’s contribution to Reagan’s campaign in which 
he diagnosed that the U.S. was entering a “new era” characterised by “the Finlandization of 
America”, which found expression in “the political and economic subordination of the 
United States to superior Soviet power”.724 He claimed that the U.S.’s political will to resist 
“Finlandization” was undermined by what he perceived as “the culture of appeasement”, a 
product of “the radical movement of the sixties” which, even though it was no longer, 
continued to live through “its ideas”, which Podhoretz believed, were “not only not dead 
but more entrenched in a bowdlerized form than they ever were in the past, all over the 
liberal culture”.725 With the election of Reagan, Podhoretz exulted that it was a “truly 
historic opportunity” for the Republican Party to “reverse the decline of American 
power”.726 
According to George Nash, “The Reagan years were Commentary’s moment in the 
sun”.727 Murray Friedman has claimed, “Commentary became the White House’s favourite 
political journal”.728 Moreover, Reagan has often been described as the neoconservatives’ 
favourite president and is revered and mythologised by neoconservatives to this day.729 
These interpretations, however, exaggerate the extent of Commentary’s influence and 
disregard the fact that during Reagan’s presidency neoconservatives were often vexed, 
especially with respect to his foreign policy. Early into Reagan’s presidency, Podhoretz 
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began “attacking Ronald Reagan from the right!”730 Robert Tucker referred to Reagan’s 
foreign policy as “Carterism Without Carter”.731 In the same vein, after only a year into the 
presidency, Podhoretz began to claim that the Reagan administration’s record with respect 
to foreign policy did “not differ…significantly from the pattern of the last two 
administrations” apart from the fact that it “is spending a lot of money on arms”. For a 
while, there was talk about Kirkpatrick resigning from the administration out of discontent 
with Reagan’s performance.732 
Throughout the 1980s, Commentary continuously warned of the great danger 
emanating from alleged Soviet strategic superiority for the U.S. and for the American way 
of life. To approach the Soviet Union as just another competing superpower, with whom 
deals could be struck, was suicidal, because, Podhoretz argued, the regime was “hostile in 
its very nature to us and trying to extend its rule and its political culture over a wider and 
wider area of the world”.733 Podhoretz’s early frustration with Reagan’s foreign policy 
hardened into something close to contempt during Reagan’s second term. Comparing 
Reagan’s foreign policy to Nixon’s or to Carter’s foreign policy, Podhoretz published 
articles with such titles as “Reagan: A Case of Mistaken Identity”, “How Reagan Succeeds 
as a Carter Clone” and “What If Reagan Were President?” The fact that Reagan laid the 
groundwork for a substantial arms agreement (START) with the Soviet Union, convinced 
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Podhoretz that “the culture of appeasement” also had won over Ronald Reagan and his 
administration of Cold Warriors.734  
Another preferred topic of Commentary throughout the 1980s dealt with the dangers 
regional and superpower conflicts posed to Israel, on the one hand, and the pervasiveness of 
anti-Semitism in anti-Zionist garb in the U.S. and around the world on the other. Podhoretz 
reiterated incessantly that, “the single greatest interest of the American Jewish 
community…is the security of Israel”.735 Podhoretz’s crusade against the alleged 
pervasiveness of anti-Semitism in the form of anti-Zionism grew louder and more 
exaggerated throughout the 1980s. In his infamous article “J’Accuse”, which caused a 
storm in the intellectual world, he took on the alleged “explosion of invective against 
Israel” set in motion by Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1982. After a pro-forma 
declaration that not all critics of Israeli policy were anti-Semitic, he went on to crudely vent 
his anger at critical voices from the “more respectable quarters” of American society, such 
as Anthony Lewis of the New York Times and Richard Cohen and Alfred Friendly of the 
Washington Post for criticising Israel’s invasion into Lebanon.736 
Meanwhile PI continued its promotion of supply side economics and its critique of 
excessive bureaucratisation, issues of diversity, welfare, affirmative action, the 
‘underclass’, crime, multiculturalism and the state of education generally.737 Moreover it 
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continued to elaborate on the perceived cultural causes as primary generator of social 
problems. In “No, Welfare Isn’t the Problem” Charles Murray alleged that while the 
welfare system encouraged abuse and led to changes of individual behaviour and 
community values, it was not the welfare system as such that was the problem but rather 
the entire environment young poor people grew up in, which had supposedly undergone 
profound change since the 1960s. The reforms of the 1960s shared the assumption that 
people were not in control of their own behaviour and should therefore not be held 
responsible. This approach together with the loosening of moral authority led to a situation, 
which had profoundly negative consequences on the character formation of the young poor 
who in turn ended up in welfare dependency more often than not.738 
While both Commentary and PI are commonly referred to as “influential or 
important” journals, their impact on the national scene and on the conservative movement 
was never as pronounced as these assessments contend. Even though Commentary and PI 
had a certain amount of influence during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in relation to their 
small numbers and with respect to shaping specific debates, their “ability to see their ideas 
translated into action” has often been exaggerated. Commentary certainly influenced the 
discourse within the Jewish as well as the wider American community, in terms of issues 
such as early Holocaust consciousness, affirmative action and busing and the relation 
between American Jews, the U.S. and Israel, while PI can be assumed to have contributed 
significantly to discussions about supply-side economics, welfare, crime and so forth. But, 
like PI, Commentary remained a publication of relatively low circulation, which was 
standing at 25, 000 by the late 1990s. Moreover, Commentary’s tone was at times near-
                                                
738 Charles A. Murray, “No, Welfare Is Not Really The Problem”, The Public Interest, Summer 1986, 3-11; 
Mary Jo Bane, “Is Welfare Replacing the Family”, The Public Interest, Winter 1983, 91-101; Charles A. 
Murray, “Does Welfare Bring More Babies”, The Public Interest, Spring 1994, 17-30. 
 251 
hysterical, as for instance with respect to anti-Semitism and the extent of Soviet power 
during the 1980s. This overly emotional approach led to a number of severe misjudgments 
and the articulation of outmoded opinions. In January 2006, Commentary separated from 
the patronage of the AJC, a move which was initiated by Commentary, with the hope “to 
court new and larger donors”.739 While still in print, it nevertheless has been struggling 
financially for the last couple of years. It can be assumed that the influence of PI, with a 
circulation of under 6, 000 by the late 1990s, in absolute terms, was even smaller than 
Commentary’s. Elitist and highly idiosyncratic in nature and content, it never sought to 
appeal to large numbers of people and therefore remained relatively obscure throughout its 
40-year existence. In Spring 2005 it was phased out.740 
Moreover, despite claims that neoconservatism dissolved into the larger 
conservative movement during the 1980s, neoconservatives consciously remained a fairly 
cohesive and distinct group. While many of their ideas were in tune with the New Right, 
neoconservatives, nevertheless, continued to stand out within the broader conservative 
arena. This was best symbolised by the continued clashes between so-called 
paleoconservatives and neoconservatives throughout the 1980s and 1990s about the 
question of who was most “genuinely American and genuinely conservative”.741 Many 
more traditional conservatives continued to consider neoconservatives as un-conservative. 
Russell Kirk, for example, believed that neoconservatives continued to be liberals and 
modernists who aimed at introducing “a world of uniformity and dull standardization, 
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Americanized, industrialized, democratized, logical, boring”.742 It appears that many 
conservatives did only momentarily buy into the highly contradictory nature of 
neoconservative ideology. Moreover, neoconservatives’ elitist and sectarian approach never 
sat well with a movement that was so heavily defined by grass roots activism and concerns 
– despite their efforts to present themselves as populist majoritarians. Finally, the fact that 
many neoconservatives were Jewish made them always fit somewhat uneasily with a 
movement that was strongly shaped by Christian fundamentalism. 
In this respect, neoconservatives’ willingness to defend the Christian Right against 
accusations from fellow American Jews appeared almost outlandish. In response to a 1994 
report of the ADL, for example, which claimed that the Christian Right was spreading “a 
rhetoric of fear, suspicion and even hatred”, Midge Decter rallied 75 Jewish leaders to 
accuse the ADL of “defamation” and “bigotry” in a full-page New York Times advert. 
Decter was adamant that “Judaism is not, as the ADL seems to suggest, coexistent with 
liberalism” but rather with conservatism. Moreover, she later claimed, the Religious Right 
was essential in countering the influence of such movements, as the one “advocating a 
woman’s right not to be a woman”, or the movement “for homosexuals to be considered 
merely heterosexuals with a somewhat different erotic taste”, or finally, “the movement to 
dehumanize blacks by exempting them from ordinary moral demands”.743 
A majority of American Jews disagreed with neoconservatives, however. In Jews 
Without Mercy: A Lament, Earl Shorris denied that neoconservatives’ were speaking for 
other American Jews. In their demand to redefine what it meant to be Jewish in politically 
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and culturally conservative terms, they were rejecting “much, perhaps most of what has 
defined us since our historical beginning”. Neoconservatives, he contended, had turned 
against these principles because they felt that “Jews, and therefore Jewish ethics and 
culture, were vulgar”. To Shorris, neoconservatives had resigned their Jewishness.744 
Others lamented that Commentary had become the house organ for the Jewish 
establishment and sold out moral commitment and social justice action for crass economic 
and political gains.745  
Most of the “converts” neoconservatives made were indeed to be found within the 
establishment. According to historian Karla Goldman, the neoconservative logic of 
retreating from the promotion of a progressive liberal agenda came to strongly define  
“Jewish communal outlooks and agendas” after the 1970s, and does so to this day.746 The 
reasons why a majority of American Jews rejected the neoconservative logic are only 
understood by considering a number of variables. Firstly, American Jews constitute a 
highly educated and secularised group within American society. According to Steven 
Cohen, “Jewishness takes precedence over Judaism” for a majority of American Jews. In 
his study, Cohen found that in comparison to “almost half the non-Jews” to whom “religion 
was ‘very important’”, only “a quarter of the Jews made a similar claim”.747  
The presence of retrograde and religiously fundamentalist elements such as Jerry 
Falwell’s Moral Majority and Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition within the New Right 
certainly played an important role in the continued Jewish aversion towards the Republican 
Party. Furthermore, the fact that a majority of Jews rejected an alliance with these elements 
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for the sake of Israel tells us two things: firstly, a majority of American Jews did not 
perceive the situation as dire enough to engage in such alliance and seemingly disagreed 
with Nathan Perlmutter’s bellicose logic that “If the Messiah comes, on that very day we’ll 
consider our options. Meanwhile praise the Lord and pass the ammunition”.748 Secondly, it 
shows that Israel was less central to the lives of American Jews as often alleged by 
neoconservatives and other Jewish representatives who promoted an alliance with Christian 
fundamentalists within the context of Israeli security and survival.749 
Many American Jews grappled with the implication for Jewish self-definition of full 
inclusion into mainstream society after 1945. Being considered as “insiders” was in many 
ways as if Jews had become goyim, which seemed irreconcilable with a historical memory 
of exclusion and oppression that played such an important role in defining Jewish self-
perception throughout Diasporic history.750 Yet only a very small minority of American 
Jews concluded from these developments that one way to offset the implications of such a 
contradictory condition was to turn towards social and political conservatism. As a matter 
of fact, most American Jews seemed to agree with Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, who, while 
dismayed at what seemed to him as “the betrayal of Israel” by many liberals after 1967, 
“refused to believe that Jews could find dependable allies in that part of American society 
that had almost always excluded them and held them in social contempt”.751  
Like Hertzberg, a majority of Jews continued to believe that their interests and 
values as Jews and as Americans were best guarded by liberal – even if moderately liberal – 
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politics. They did not feel represented by conservatism or the Republican Party. According 
to Raab, one reason why a majority of Jews did not feel at home with the GOP was 
moreover the peculiar “history of the Republican party itself” – one, which they associated 
with “nativist and anti-immigrant” policies, isolationism and anti-Semitism. In Raab’s 
words, the “Jewish electorate appears to have a long memory for such things”.752 
Yet, the continued attachment of large numbers of American Jews to the 
Democratic Party cannot be explained by the inadequacy of the Republican Party and 
conservatism alone. It also feeds off the perception that Jewish interests and values are best 
served by liberal and Democratic politics. In his most recent autobiographical polemic, Why 
Are Jews Liberals? a pseudo-study of why a large majority of American Jews, despite “a 
radically new set of circumstances”, continues to self-identify as liberal, Podhoretz vents 
his frustration at “the stubborn Jewish refusal to rethink the old political pieties”.753 
Describing Jewish commitment to the values of the Enlightenment as “partaking of the 
pathological”, he wrongly diagnoses an excessive liberalism.754 American Jews are indeed 
on average twice as likely to support liberal positions on social and civil liberties issues 
such as legalising marijuana, gun control, pre-marital sex, gay rights and legalisation of gay 
marriage, abortion, euthanasia and suicide, separation of church and state, and women’s 
rights than most non-Jews with similar socioeconomic backgrounds.755  
However, on average American Jews subscribe to a moderate, middle-of-the-road 
liberalism. According to an AJC opinion poll of 2008, which questioned respondents as to 
their political identification with respect to the presidential elections, 44 per cent defined 
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themselves as liberal, 30 per cent as moderate or middle-of-the-road, while 24 per cent 
claimed to be conservative. Of those who described themselves as liberal 5 per cent 
claimed to be extremely liberal, 28 per cent liberal and 11 per cent slightly liberal. Of those 
who characterised their political attitudes as conservative, 10 per cent said they were 
slightly conservative, 12 per cent referred to themselves as conservative and 2 per cent as 
extremely conservative. Of most interest are certainly those who find themselves to be 
middle-of-the-road. These moderates sway, according to Earl Raab, either towards liberal 
or conservative positions, depending on the issues involved. Generally, however, it can be 
said that American Jews are on average more liberal than non-Jews, except for law and 
order issues, the death penalty and affirmative action, where Jews on average tend to agree 
with non-Jews of similar socio-economic background.756 
While Podhoretz takes into account the various explanations offered to make sense 
of the phenomenon of Jewish liberalism, his attempt to rationalise the liberal commitment 
as “a religion in its own right” can be read more as an insult than an actual honest effort to 
explain it. He implies that those who continue voting for Democratic candidates, which at 
the last presidential election were 78 per cent of American Jews, are somehow irrational 
and utterly disconnected from reality. By describing Jewish liberalism in pseudo-religious 
terms and trying to show that there is something pathological about the continued Jewish 
support for the Democrats, he avoids grappling with the fact that a majority of American 
Jews, at least on the national stage, feel that the Democratic Party best represents their 
values and interests both as Americans and as Jews. Hence, his book does not contribute 
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anything to explaining why Jews continue to identify with liberalism, but rather gives 
further insight into how central to Podhoretz’s thought is his contempt for the Jewish left. 
Jewish liberalism can only be explained by taking into consideration a plurality of 
factors. Jewish voters base their decisions on what Peter Medding terms micro-political 
(Israel, anti-Semitism, religious freedom, economic issues) and macro-political interests 
(such as the nature of governmental structure and social organisation), which in turn 
guarantee micro-political interests.757 Political decisions are made therefore not only on the 
basis of hard interest, but also take into considerations ethical ideals. The latter, as Stephen 
Whitfield shows, played an important role in the formation of Jewish political culture. Not 
only are Jews twice as likely as other Americans to vote, their political behaviour also 
continues to be informed by the Jewish history of oppression and discrimination and the 
values that have developed out of this experience. According to Whitfield, the 
“precariousness of centuries in exile” has led to an approach characterised by “the ideals of 
temperance and moderation, scorning both instinctual repressiveness and excess”.758  
Moreover, many American Jews do indeed understand, even if often diffusely so, 
the attachment to progressive causes as an expression of Jewish religious precepts and 
cultural values - the question whether this is actually the case or not is rather pointless - of 
importance is that it is perceived as such. Co-editor of Dissent, Michael Walzer, for 
example, believes that the characteristics, which inform liberalism, are similar to those that 
define the modern Jewish mindset. Both are in essence “skeptical, questioning, 
inconclusive”. Walzer claims that liberalism speaks to the Jewish need for an open society, 
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and a politics guided by a central concern for civil liberties and pluralism. He is convinced 
that the liberal style of politics appeals to large numbers of Jews because it “guarantees the 
continuing openness necessary to arguments about—and now to differing versions of—a 
common Jewishness”.759 While he agrees that vested interests matter, he also believes that 
“if we defend only Jewish interests and not Jewish values, if we lose the sense of ourselves 
as a historic community, a community of shared values, then we have lost too much”.760 To 
liberal and radical Jews therefore, neoconservatives have reduced Jewish politics to a mere 
and narrow defence of the Jewish interest, in the process of which they sought to drown 
alternative definitions of Jewishness. 
However, revisionist scholars have recently begun to investigate the Jewish 
conservative tradition in the U.S. As shown, American Jews only came to identify with 
liberal politics in overwhelming numbers during the late 1920s. Up until then American 
Jews were, in the words of Jonathan Sarna, “far from being united politically and cast votes 
on both sides of the most contested elections”.761 In the 1916 presidential election, for 
example, 45 per cent of the Jewish vote went Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes 
and 55 per cent to the Democrat Woodrow Wilson. In 1920, 43 per cent of Jews voted for 
Republican Warren G. Harding, only 19 per cent voted for the Democratic candidate James 
M. Cox, and an impressive 38 per cent of the Jewish vote went to Eugene V. Debs who was 
running on the third party Socialist ticket.762  
Beyond demonstrating that there exists a diversity of voices, Jonathan Sarna 
showed that there was a rich tradition of Jewish political conservatism not only in the U.S., 
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but also in Europe, one that drew on Jewish political thought, religious precepts and 
historical experience. As a people in exile, shunned by the host societies they lived in, the 
primary concern of Jews in pre-emancipatory times was social stability and integrity – they, 
therefore, in the words of Yosef Yerushalami “inevitably, yet unwillingly, allied 
themselves to the Crown as the best, and, ultimately, the only guarantor of stability and 
security”.763 After Jews received citizenship and allowed full political participation, a 
majority allied themselves with the progressive, liberal forces, which were conducive to 
their well being, yet still cautious not to disturb the peace.764 The conservative elements in 
America, while certainly not philo-Semitic, were generally more tolerant towards Jews than 
their European counterparts. Here, Jewish conservatism was represented, for example, by 
politicians such as Mordecai M. Noah of the Whig Party, who embraced the principles of 
states’ rights and a limited central government, while also advocating “order”, “discipline”, 
social stability and social control. While propagating religious tolerance, Noah nevertheless 
defended slavery and Southern Rights.765 These were the historical and ideological 
predecessors of modern Jewish conservatives such as Frank Meyer and Willi S. Schlamm 
of National Review and neoconservatives, such as Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol.766 
Despite the presence of a strong Jewish conservative tradition, to claim that 
conservative politics is more emblematic of Jewish values and traditions than political 
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liberalism is an equally reductionist approach to a diverse and complex tradition, which has 
seen many political systems come and go. In the words of Jürgen Habermas “all traditions 
are ambivalent” and history is littered with examples where religious and cultural traditions 
were if not instrumentalised then at least used to rationalise one or the other political 
position.767 The approach, according to which Jewish political conservatism is more 
emblematic Jewish religious and cultural traditions than Jewish liberalism, presumes that 
one interpretation of Jewish identity is more relevant and ‘more Jewish’ than another. This 
argument is often supported by the claim that Orthodox Jews, who are allegedly closest to 
Jewish tradition and therefore supposedly ‘more Jewish’, tend to be politically 
conservative. While polls show, for example, that American Orthodox Jews who make up 
10 per cent of the Jewish population in the U.S. voted 70 per cent Republican in 2004, it 
has to be pointed out that Orthodox Jewry remains a heavily understudied subject.768 
Moreover, American Orthodox Jews – themselves a highly diverse group - who are 
politically active are already far removed from Jewish religious tradition in its ‘purest’ 
form, since they busy themselves with worldly matters. In its ‘purest form’, Orthodoxy 
prescribes involvement only with the study of sacred texts; worldly matters are irrelevant to 
it. This is reflected, for instance, in the fact that Ultra Orthodox Jews reject the legitimacy 
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of the state of Israel, since they believe that only God can re-establish the Jewish homeland, 
not mankind.769 
Furthermore, Jewish religious and cultural traditions have always been highly 
diverse, a condition that intensified after Emancipation. According to Walzer, Jewish 
religious practice has always been characterised by a diversity of dissenting interpretations 
to Mosaic Law. While Jewish religious tradition is composed of “canonized and 
authoritative texts”, it is also characterised by an absence of “a single hierarchy of 
authoritative interpreters claiming to be God’s representatives”. Accordingly, divergent 
interpretations were always an important part of Jewish religious tradition, even if they 
“might not have equal legal standing”, they “might nonetheless achieve equal intellectual 
standing”.770 This approach can be assumed to have contributed, however vaguely, to the 
development of Jewish denominationalism, different versions of Jewish identity and a 
diverse and highly argumentative political culture in modern times. To claim, therefore, 
that Jewish religious and cultural tradition “pre-determine” Jews to be politically 
conservative or politically liberal is not only the wrong question, but also reduces a rich and 
highly complex tradition of divergent voices to one singular interpretation. In modern 
times, and especially so in the U.S., the meaning of Jewishness has taken a large number of 
different forms, which find expression in a multiplicity of divergent political attitudes and 
activities. 
The fact that a majority of American Jews identify as liberals, therefore, is not all 
that puzzling, nor is the presence of Jewish conservatives and neoconservatives. What 
demands further scrutiny, however, is how and why, in the words of the executive director 
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of the recently founded PAC Jstreet, Jeremy Ben-Ami, “a small minority” of Jewish leaders 
and organisations was able “to high jack the debate” and take control, especially of “what it 
means to be pro-Israel” – and of defining the Jewish interest in general, creating the image 
that American Jews constitute a monolithic bloc who all agree with each other, when they 
so clearly do not.771 Jack Wertheimer once described the organised American Jewish 
community as one that, in its desire for cohesion, “avoids debates over potentially divisive 
issues and marginalizes those who take exception”.772 Part of the explanation for this 
condition certainly lies with the neoconservatives’ successful efforts to narrowly redefine 
the parameters of the debates over Jewish identity and interests within a survivalist 
paradigm, whereby they set standards for “who is kosher and who is treif” 
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